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ABSTRACT
UNMANAGEABLE OPERA?
The artistic-economic dichotomy and its manifestations in the
organisational structures of five opera organisations.
The starting point for this research project is the high incidence in recent
years of problems in the management of opera houses in Europe, especially
those of an economic and managerial nature. This thesis concentrates on
analysing these issues and suggests that there are inherent tensions in
running an opera organisation which cause these difficulties.
A key concept in the analyses presented in this thesis is the artistic-economic
dichotomy, which describes the dual aim of arts organisations: artistic aims
and economic-organisational aims. In creating an analytical framework for this
concept, theories by Jurgen Habermas, Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato,
and Henrik Kaare Nielsen are applied. The theoretical concepts employed
include civil society, state and market as defined by Habermas and quality as
contextual entity as defined by Nielsen. With the help of these concepts an
analytical model is created for analysing the framework in which opera
organisations operate.
In the course of the thesis five case-study organisations are analysed with the
analytical apparatus created. The organisations analysed are: Deutsche Oper
Berlin, English National Opera, Finnish National Opera, Glyndebourne
Festival Opera and Opêra national de Paris. The information presented about
the case-study organisations includes a brief organisational history, income
and expenditure information, personnel structure and organisational structure.
Additionally, programming, pricing and audience information is presented with
basic details of the opera houses in which the organisations operate.
The key finding of the research process is that a dual organisational structure
often exists in opera organisations: the official organisational structure and an
unofficial artistic structure. This dual structure, it is argued in this thesis, is the
reason for difficulties in managing an opera organisation.
Based on this finding, a model describing the artistic-economic framework in
which opera organisations need to operate is created at the end of the thesis.
This model — incorporating the different value assumptions and quality
contexts existing in the framework of opera organisations — is the main result
of the research process. It can be applied in the analysis of opera
organisations and can, it is argued, assist in academic as well as practical
discussion about how opera houses could be better managed in the future.
Keywords: Opera, organisational structure, art, economy, quality.
1. INTRODUCTION
1. Introduction
The starting point of this research project is the frequency of the problems
that have occurred recently in the management of opera organisations around
Europe. The best known examples are undoubtedly the Paris Opera's
experience with Daniel Barenboim in the late 1980s and Covent Garden's
problems in the last few years. The Finnish National Opera witnessed a
similar turbulent period in the early 1990s when first the Administrative
Director resigned after a series of problems with the General Manager - who
subsequently resigned himself due to lack of confidence towards his work.
These difficulties — which appear rather frequently and seem to follow a
pattern - could naturally result from the incompetence of opera house
managers. However, one cannot help wondering why the greatest opera
houses in the world would repeatedly be trusted to incapable leaders. Thus it
is argued in this thesis that there are inherent tensions in running an opera
organisation, which cause the difficulties in its management structures and
finances - the two most frequent and often coinciding problems.
The managerial and financial problems of opera organisations have been
extensively discussed in several reports and consultancy papers from the
internal organisational point of view over the last few decades. The main UK
opera houses, for example, have been analysed at length by outside
consultants and government bodies a number of times in the last forty years.
These analyses have been carried out with respect to their expenditure,
planning and budgeting processes, working practices, possible additional
income etc. The last of these reports, the Eyre Review, was published in
1998. In addition to the UK there have recently been similar processes, for
example, in Italy (Behind the Scenes: White Paper on the management of
Italy's Opera Houses) and France (The Hugues Gall Reports 1993 & 1997).
2These reports, however helpful they might have been at their time to the
current management of the houses, have not been aimed at creating any
general understanding of the inherent managerial and economic difficulties of
opera organisations. This is often admitted in the conclusions of the reports
and is also well demonstrated by the recurring need to return to the issues.
(See e.g. Auvinen 1996.)
In the light of the above, the aim of the research project described in this
thesis has been to take another view of the functioning and structures of
opera organisations. Instead of analysing the organisational structures of a
single opera organisation 'from the inside' - this has been done frequently
enough without any long-standing success - the research aims to explore and
map out some of the external forces influencing these structures and to find
possible correlations between these forces, the organisational structures and
the difficulties mentioned above. This is done from a more abstract theoretical
perspective and by analysing five case-study organisations in order to
perceive possible patterns and similarities.
2. Preliminary assumptions of the research project
The criteria on which the success of all arts organisations is judged are
twofold: artistic criteria and the economic-organisational criteria. Where
business organisations, by definition, aim only to increase the wealth of the
owners, the often not-for-profit arts organisations need to be successful in
fulfilling the artistic aspirations of the organisation whilst also maintaining the
economic viability of the institution. This balancing act has often caused
problems in opera organisations, both internally and externally. This
phenomenon is called the artistic-economic l dichotomy in the course of this
research project. It is a key concept employed in the course of this thesis.
1 The complete term could be the artistic - socio-economic-organisational dichotomy.
However, for the sake of practicality the term economic will be used in this context, especially
3Opera is an international art form. This is especially the case today when all
the major houses present relatively similar programmes, produced and
performed by a core group of international conductors, directors, designers
and singers etc. This has inevitably led to a great similarity in the core product
and standards of the opera houses. Therefore, the art-form itself dictates to a
great extent the resources and the organisational structures needed to
produce opera. For example, Verdi's Aida requires a fairly specific number of
skilled performers, a certain type of performance space, a certain type of sets
etc. wherever it is performed in order to comply with the conventions of the art
form and international standards. Moreover, the importance of the performers
is naturally indisputable for an opera house - the artists being the core group
in putting out the organisation's 'product'. Therefore, it is assumed that the
artistic process which leads to the 'product' and its influence on the
functioning of an opera organisation needs to be investigated in order to
create a picture of the forces influencing the organisational structures of
opera companies.
Putting on opera in its current form is a costly business. This seems to be a
generally accepted fact. However, there are different solutions for acquiring
the necessary resources in different socio-economic surroundings. The
solutions range from almost complete funding by state and municipal
authorities, e.g. the 'German' model, to almost total reliance on private
funding, e.g. the 'American' model. There have, however, been financial and
managerial problems both in the heavily subsidised organisations as well as
in the less subsidised ones. It is assumed in this research project that in order
to understand the difficulties and tensions in managing an opera organisation
when the economic issues often seem to dominate the sociological and organisational issues
in the discussion about opera organisations. Further, the source of economic power is used as
the basis of the analysis of the influence society has on the case-study organisations.
However, in the analytical model the social value systems will be included in the analysis of
the economic resources used by them.
4the influence of the socio-economic context in which it exists needs to be
included in the analysis.
These basic assumptions lead us to the dual analytical approach to
understanding the functioning of opera organisations that is employed in this
research project. The analytical apparatus presented in this thesis is aimed at
assisting in the analysis of the artistic-economic framework in which opera
organisations operate. It is subsequently used in the case-study analyses of
five opera organisations and their organisational structures. Based on the
combination of the theoretical considerations and the case-studies, a
theoretical model mapping the forces included in the artistic-economic
dichotomy is presented as one of the main conclusions of the thesis.
3. The thesis argued for and other findings of the research project
On the basis of the findings of the research project, it is argued in this thesis
that the official opera organisational structures are incapable of dealing with
the artistic processes included in opera production. Thus, a dual
organisational structure exists in the organisations studied: the official
organisational structure dealing with the socio-economic issues surrounding
the opera organisation, and the unofficial artistic structure dealing with the
artistic realm with which the organisation needs to operate. This dual structure
is the main reason for the managerial difficulties involved in running an opera
house.
It is further argued, that this dual structure can be explained by considering
opera — and its artistic processes — as a civil society / lifeworld i phenomenon.
Based on this, it is further claimed that the official organisational structures of
the opera organisations analysed operate on the system's level. This
1 These terms — based on Jurgen Habermas — are defined and presented in the theoretical
section.
5interpretation — included in the model mapping the forces that influence the
organisational structures of opera organisations — in effect defines the artistic-
economic dichotomy and its manifestations in the organisational structures of
opera companies.
In addition to this theoretical approach, the research project has provided a
set of data about organisational structures and administration of five opera
organisations. Such data is currently not readily available for study purposes.
Thus, the data presented here provides a useful starting point in collecting
this information and making it available in a wider context. Additionally, there
are some new research questions that manifest themselves in the data
collected. These will be commented on in the conclusion after the data itself
has been presented.
4. The structure of the thesis
This thesis is divided into three parts: theoretical considerations, the case-
study descriptions and the discussion. Additionally, there is an introduction
presenting the research project and a conclusion recapitulating the main
conclusions of the research project as a whole.
The theoretical considerations are divided into two chapters. Chapter 2
proposes the theoretical framework and analyses the development of the
socio-economic background against which opera organisations have
historically operated. Chapter 3 discusses the external forces influencing the
organisational structures of opera companies and proposes an analytical
model for analysing opera organisations and their structures. In the original
research proposal, it was also planned to include an analysis of the historical
development of the artistic side of opera production in the theoretical section.
As it has become evident in the course of the research that these forces in
the organisational realm could not be mapped with the approach selected,
6this analysis will not be included. This issue will be commented on further in
the conclusion.
The case-study part of the thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter 4 is an
introduction into the case studies and discusses the selection of the case-
study organisations, the methodology and the process of data collection.
Chapters 5 to 9 present the case-study organisations and the data collected.
The organisations and the respective chapters are: the Deutsche Oper Berlin
— chapter 5, the English National Opera — chapter 6, the Finnish National
Opera — chapter 7, the Glyndebourne Festival Opera — chapter 8, and the
Opèra national de Paris — chapter 9.
The discussion about the case studies takes place in chapter 10. This chapter
examines and draws together the issues included in the case-study analyses.
The main conclusions of the research project are presented in chapter 11. In
this chapter the model bringing together the analytical framework and the
case-study findings is presented and some practical implications of the
findings are also considered. Additionally, some research questions arising
from the research project conducted are presented in chapter 11.
7PART I - THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS
2. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SIDE OF PRODUCING OPERA
1. Introduction
The aim of this research project is to consider the manifestations of the
artistic-economic dichotomy in opera organisations. In order to achieve this
aim, the socio-economic framework in which opera organisations exist and
have existed historically needs to be analysed and linked to a wider
theoretical context. That is the aim of this chapter. First, a set of theories and
theoretical frameworks are presented which when combined, it is argued,
shed light on the socio-economic support opera has received throughout its
history - and is still receiving. Structurally this chapter first presents different
theories as separate entities. These, however, come together in the
discussion of the historical development of support for opera and opera
organisations in Italy, France and Germany-Austria. It is deemed imperative
that the case-study analyses are linked - even on a limited scale - to a wider
background in order to gain more insight into the results.
2. Opera in a wider context
The obvious question arising from the aim to describe the reasons and forms
of support opera has received is: what is meant by opera and why has it
continuously been supported by different societies? John D. Drummond's
analysis of opera in a wider perspective can provide useful tools and
definitions for answering these questions, especially when combined with
other theories presented later on. Drummond argues in Opera in Perspective
that music-drama in some form has been know to man as long as civilisation
8has existed. "There is more to music-drama than merely opera in the opera-
house. It is a tree whose roots lie deep in human history, perhaps deep in the
human psyche, and the branch which we call 'opera' in the 'opera-house' can
only be fully understood if we learn about the nature of the tree itself.
Because Western European culture has flourishing and separate musical and
dramatic arts, we tend to think of 'opera' as being drama plus music, a
combination of two distinct art-forms. From a historical point of view, however,
it is a misleading way of looking at music-drama: the evidence shows that
music-drama as a single entity l
 has always been part of the life of man, from
his earliest beginnings." (Drummond 1980, 14.)
Drummond further argues that the basic elements of music-drama - in the
sense used above - are religion, play and art. "The various forms of man's
music-drama have some basic features in common, and others which reflect
the cultures of which they are part. Music-drama has always been associated
with religious belief and religious ritual, because music, dance, spectacle and
narrative are ingredients of worship. Music-drama, too, has always provided
an opportunity for man to delight in being playful, and catered for his love of
pretending. In combining worship and make-believe music-drama has
developed, in every culture, into an art-form; that is, it has become a
structurally self-contained form of communication, expressing and stimulating
experiences symbolic of some aspect of what it is to be a human being." In
the opera house, music drama manifests itself mainly in the form of art
including, however, some elements of the other categories, too. (Drummond
1980, 13.)
Further, Drummond contemplates the meaning and contents of music-drama
and argues that the dual imagery of music and words and the blend of implicit
and explicit create its power. "The blend of implicit and explicit in music-drama
is not confined to the relationship between words and music: it is fundamental
to the art form. The interaction between apprehensible and comprehensible
1 There is a similar argument made in Kerman: Opera as Drama. However, in this context
Drummond provides the more applicable framework for analysis.
9elements permeates its whole being. Viewed overall, a music-drama
communicates indefinable experiences to us in definable ways; viewed at a
much lower level, every musical sound, every word, every physical gesture
has both a concrete comprehensibility and a hidden implied meaning which
we cannot easily explain. [--] It is a gigantic image operating visually and
aurally, in time and in space, composed of a legion of constituent images,
each of which contains the double-helix of implicit and explicit meaning."
(Drummond 1980, 28.) Drummond further links this double existence in
music-drama to the division of Apollonian and Dionysian as first introduced to
the discussion about opera by Friedrich Nietzsche in The Birth of Tragedy
from the Spirit of Music (1871). Nietzsche uses the Ancient Greek gods
Apollo and Dionysos as labels for the two opposite forces in music. Apollo
represents the forces in man considered rational, conscious and explicit,
when Dionysos represents the irrational, subconscious and implicit.
Drummond summarises: "Although Nietzsche was the first to explain the
forces that combine to make music-drama (at least in such clear-cut terms), it
was primitive man who first instinctively created that balance. We can see
why music-drama has always been important to man. Together, Apollo and
Dionysos provide a way to link the explicit (that which we know by direct
experience) and the implicit (that which we come to sense, indirectly), the
concrete (that which we can define and explain) and the discrete (that which
we cannot define or explain). To 'primitive' man, music drama offers a way of
bringing together the worlds of reality and magic. It offers the same to
'civilized' man." (Drummond 1980, 31.)
Thus, 'opera' according to Drummond is a specific Western European branch
in the historic continuum of music-drama, born at the end of the sixteenth
century. It is usually performed in an opera house and is dominated by the
artistic aspects of music drama (as opposed to religious or playful aspects). It
deals with the mythical dimensions of life by combining the Apollonian and
Dionysian elements, thus providing man with a connection between himself,
the things he knows and the things he can imagine. Therefore, opera as an
art form, and the support it receives from society should be considered in this
10
wider framework. Drummond analyses the development of opera as an art
form in relation to these principles in Opera in Perspective, however, these
principles - especially when combined with theories by Habermas, Cohen and
Arato, and Nielsen - will also assists in understanding the socio-economic
framework in which opera organisations have existed and still exist.
3. The concepts of 'public sphere' and 'civil society'
Drummond argues that opera is a specific answer by Western European
society to man's eternal need for music drama. The historic development of
this (section of) society, it is argued, bears close links to the development of
the socio-economic support for opera. In order to discuss these links later on,
the concepts of public sphere (especially the bourgeois public sphere) and
civil society, along with their development, need to be explored. This will be
done on the basis of Jurgen Habermas' Strukturwandel der Offentlichkeitl
(1962) and Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns 2 (1981), and Jean L.
Cohen and Andrew Arato's Civil Society and Political Theory (1992). These
theories provide, it is argued, a useful framework for the analyses of the
relationship between opera and the surrounding society.
According to Habermas the concepts of 'public' (as in public sphere) and
'private' are of Greek origin, having survived in Roman Law through the
Middle Ages in Europe, but having no standard usage during that period. In
the feudal society of the High Middle Ages the term 'public' was used as a
status attribute. "This publicness (or publicity) of representation was not
constituted as a social realm, that is, as a public sphere; rather, it was
something like a status attribute, if this term may be permitted. In itself the
1 In this study the English translation The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere,
translated by Thomas Burger (1989), is used.
2 In this study the English translation The Theory of Communicative Action, translated by
Thomas McCarthy (1987), is used.
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status of manorial lord, on whatever level, was neutral in relation to the criteria
of 'public' and 'private'; but its incumbent represented himself as an
embodiment of some sort of 'higher' power." (Habermas 1989, 7.) The
ultimate form of this representative publicness was attained in the French
Court. "In the etiquette of Louis XIV concentration of the publicity of
representation at the court attained the high point of refinement." (Habermas
1989, 10.) However, the development of Renaissance society towards
humanism had emerged first in Florence among the nobility of early capitalist
northern Italy, then in Paris and London, leading towards separation of the
Court / State from civil society. "The aristocratic 'society' that emerged from
that Renaissance society no longer had to represent its own lordliness (i.e. its
manorial authority), or at least no longer primarily; it served as a vehicle for
the representation of the monarch. Only after national and territorial power
states had arisen on the basis of the early capitalist commercial economy and
shattered the feudal foundations of power could this nobility develop the
framework of sociability - highly individuated, in spite of its comprehensive
etiquette - into that peculiarly free-floating but clearly demarcated sphere of
'good society' in the eighteenth century. The final form of the representative
publicness, reduced to the monarch's court and at the same time recelVing
greater emphasis, was already an enclave within a society separating itself
from the state. Now for the first time private and public spheres became
separate in a specifically modern sense." The term 'private' "designated the
exclusion from the state apparatus" and 'public' "referred to the state that [--]
had developed, under absolutism, into an entity having an objective existence
over against the person of the ruler". As at the end of the eighteenth century
the feudal powers, the Church, the prince, and the nobility "who were carriers
of the representative publicness, disintegrated in a process of polarization",
and "split into private elements on the one hand, and public ones, on the
other". "The first visible mark of the [--] polarization of princely authority was
the separation of the public budget from the territorial ruler's private holdings."
(Habermas 1989, 11.)
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A parallel phenomenon, both historically and ideologically, to the peak and
demise of the representative publicness was the rise of the bourgeois civil
society, divided into private sphere and public sphere by Habermas in The
Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. The emergence of early
finance and trade capitalism started to create a new social order. "This
commercial exchange developed according to rules which certainly were
manipulated by political power; yet a far-reaching network of horizontal
economic dependencies emerged that in principle could no longer be
accommodated by the vertical relationships of dependence characterising the
organisation of domination in an estate system based upon self-contained
household economy." (Habermas 1989, 14.) "Civil society came into
existence as the corollary of a depersonalized state authority. Activities and
dependencies hitherto relegated to the framework of the household economy
emerged from this confinement into the public sphere. [--] The economic
activity that had become private had to be oriented toward a commodity
market that had expanded under public direction and supervision; the
economic conditions under which this activity now took place lay outside the
confines of the single household; for the first time they were of general
interest", i.e. of 'public' relevance. (Habermas 1989, 19.) Thus, "along with
the apparatus of the modern state, a new stratum of 'bourgeois' people arose
which occupied a central position within the 'public'. [--] This stratum of
bourgeois was the real carrier of the public, which from the outset was a
reading public. [--] Their commanding status in the new sphere of civil society
led to a tension [--] between 'town' and 'court'. (Habermas 1989, 23.) "The
bourgeois public sphere may be conceived above all as the sphere of private
people come together as a public; they soon claimed the public sphere
regulated from above against the public authorities themselves, to engage
them in a debate over the general rules governing relations in the basically
privatized but publicly relevant sphere of commodity exchange and social
labor. The medium of this political confrontation was peculiar and without
historical precedent: people's public use of their reason." (Habermas 1989,
27.)
Civil society
(realm of
commodity
exchange and
social labor)
Conjugal family's
internal space
(bourgeois
intellectuals)
Public sphere in the
political realm
Public sphere in the
world of letters (clubs,
press)
(market of culture
products)
"Town"
State (realm of the
"police")
Court (courtly-
noble society)
Private Realm
Sphere of Public
Authority
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In The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere Habermas summarises
the above argument in a 'blueprint' of the bourgeois public sphere in the
eighteenth century. (Habermas 1989, 30.) This is displayed below in figure 1.
Figure 1.
Before progressing to current definitions of civil society and the public sphere,
one aspect of the development of the bourgeois public sphere according to
Habermas deserves to be presented. The graph above includes the category
'Public sphere in the world of letters', i.e. the culture debating public that
emerged with the bourgeois public sphere. "The 'town' was the life center of
civil society not only economically; in cultural-political contrast to the court, it
designated especially an early public sphere in the world of letters whose
institutions were the coffee houses, the salons, and the Tischgesellschaften
(table societies)." (Habermas 1989, 30.) Later on, however, this development
was to turn against itself, turning the culture-debating public into a culture-
consuming public. "When the laws of the market governing the sphere of
commodity exchange and social labor also pervaded the sphere reserved for
private people as a public, rational-critical debate had a tendency to be
replaced by consumption, and the web of public communication unraveled
into acts of individuated reception, however uniform in mode. [--] Since the
middle of the nineteenth century, the institutions that until then had ensured
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the coherence of the public as a critically debating entity have been
weakened. " (Habermas 1989, 161-162.)
The analysis of society today with regards to the civil society is presented by
Habermas in The Theory of Communicative Action and by Jean L. Cohen and
Andrew Arato in Civil Society and Political Theory. The concepts of division of
the society into lifeworld and system, the further division of the lifeworld into
public and private spheres (i.e. civil society), and the division of the systems
level into economic system (market) and administrative system (state) need to
be presented briefly in order to use Habermas's theories in subsequent
analyses. Additionally, the tendency of the systems level to colonise the
lifeworld provides a useful tool, it is argued, in analysing the support for opera
organisations from the society around them, both today and historically. The
concepts mentioned above are highly complex and theoretical; thus, the
presentation below should be regarded as a practical simplification in order to
make the theories available for the analytical purposes in case-study
analyses.
Habermas argues that society is divided into two, the lifeworid and the
systemic level. The lifeworld comprises of the private and public spheres of
the individual and operates through communicative interaction among its
members. "The institutional core of the private sphere is the nuclear family,
relieved of productive functions and specialized in tasks of socialization; from
the systemic perspective it is viewed as the environment of private
households. The institutional core of the public sphere comprises
communicative networks amplified by a cultural complex, a press and, later,
mass media; they make it possible for a public of art enjoying private persons
to participate in the reproduction of culture, and for a public of citizens of the
state to participate in the social integration mediated by public opinion."
(Habermas 1987, 319.) Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato, however, in their
Civil Society and Political Theory combine these two categories into one, civil
society, which will be adopted for the purposes of this study. It is defined in
their text as follows: "This concept would include all the institutions and
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associational forms that require communicative interaction for their
reproduction and that rely primarily on processes of social integration for
coordinating action within their boundaries." (Cohen & Arato 1992, 429.)
This lifeworld - civil society - is 'opposed' by two media-steered systems, state
(steered by the medium of power) and economy (market steered by the
medium of money). The function of these systems in conjunction with civil
society is described by Habermas as follows: "From the standpoint of the
subsystems of the economy and the state, their interactions with the
respectively contiguous spheres of the lifeworld take the form of interchange
relations connected in parallel. The economic system exchanges wages
against labour (as input factor), as well as goods and services (as the output
of its own products) against consumer demand. The public administration
exchanges organizational performances for taxes (as an input factor), as well
as political decisions (as the output of its own products) for mass loyalty."
(Habermas 1987, 319.) "On this plane of analysis, the uncoupling of system
and lifeworld is depicted in such a way that the lifeworld, which is at first
coextensive with a scarcely differentiated social system, gets cut down more
and more to one subsystem among others. In the process, system
mechanisms get further and further detached from the social structures
through which social integration takes place. [--] modern societies attain a
level of system differentiation at which increasingly autonomous organizations
are connected with one another via delinguistified media of communication:
these systemic mechanisms - for example, money - steer a social intercourse
that has been largely disconnected from norms and values, above all in those
subsystems of purposive rational economic and administrative action that [--]
have become independent of their moral-political foundations." (Habermas
1987, 154.) Habermas further describes the colonization of the lifeworld by
state and economy: "The functional ties of money and power media become
noticeable only to the degree that elements of a private way of life and
cultural-political form of life get split off from the symbolic structures of the
lifeworld through the monetary redefinition of goals, relations and services,
life-spaces and life-times, and through the bureaucratization of decisions,
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duties and rights, responsibilities and dependencies. [--] Monetarization and
bureaucratization appear to overstep the boundaries of normality [colonize
the lifeworld] when they instrumentalize an influx from the lifeworld that
possesses its own logic." (Habermas 1987, 322-323.)
With the assistance of these theoretical frameworks, the historical
development of the support for opera and opera organisations is analysed
below. Additionally, the analytical model created later on to analyse the
current case-study organisations will be based on these theories and the
framework they provide.
4. Socio-economic development of opera
Opera is often considered as an aristocratic and elitist art-form, having come
into being in the court of Florence as a courtly entertainment and having often
been closely associated with courts and states during its four centuries of
existence. Then, on the other hand the concept of the bourgeoisie has been
closely linked with opera by Theodor Adorno, for instance. He writes: "There
are also historical grounds for ascribing opera to the bourgeoisie rather than
to feudal or courtly culture, with which it arranges the convenu. Sonorous
fullness and choral masses alone point toward an incomparably greater circle
than the aristocratic one, which laid claim to the privilege of the proscenium,
but left the gallery, the actual viewing space of opera, to the bourgeoisie."
(Adorno 1955.) Linked with this aristocratic-bourgeois dichotomy are the
concepts of commercial opera on one hand and opera funded by state, court,
or by private patronage on the other. A unified understanding of these issues
does not exist nor is there agreement on relevant terms among opera
scholars. The aim of this section is to briefly consider the history of opera with
the assistance of the theoretical framework presented above and, in the
process, implicitly establish the way in which these issues and terms are
understood in the context of this study.
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4.1. From the 16th century to 1791
Italy
The Western European music-dramatic activity we know as opera was
conceived and born at Florence in the end of the 16th century. The
ideological background for opera was a relative secularisation of society
which had become increasingly affluent through commerce. These
circumstances gave rise to a new humanist outlook in which Greek thought
was reborn. A strong influence towards this development within the sphere of
opera was Girolamo Mei, a scholar who recovered some lost Greek
manuscripts and provided new translations of others, freeing them from
Christian influences. Most importantly he provided new insight (by request of
the composer Vincenzo Galilei, father of Galileo) into Greek music and
drama; the music-drama deemed to be at the heart of 'recreating' the Greek
spirit. This inspired a succession of Florentine Camerati involved in the task,
the third of which created the music-drama deemed to be the first Western
opera, i.e. the Corsi-Peri-Caccini l collaboration, Daphne, in 1597. (Drummond
1980, 108.) This was received by contemporaries as something entirely new,
as an art form truly combining music and drama in Greek style. Thus, the
ideological connection of opera with the creation of the bourgeois public
sphere and the civil society is evident, both being influenced by the
secularisation of society, emerging commerce and the Greek idealised
models; on one hand of society and on the other of music.
This new art form, free from the influences of the church, was eagerly
adopted by the rulers of Florence. The wedding of Maria de Medici to Henry
IV of France in 1600 called for something splendid; thus the second work in
1 Jacopo Corsi (1561-1602), an entrepreneurial nobleman and "chief patron of the arts in
Florence" at the end of the 16th century. Ottavio Rinuccini (1562-1621), poet. Jacopo Peni
(1561-1633), musician. (Parker ed. 1994, 8.)
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this style, Pen's Eurydice was performed'. (Sadie ed. 1989, 16.) This is an
early demonstration of the connection between the new art form and
society's tendency toward representative publicness. This is further reinstated
by the fact that the court of Mantua, rival to the Florentine court, displayed
activity in the field of opera giving birth to Monteverdi's Orfeo, a work which
some scholars regard as the first real opera. (Parker ed. 1994, 14.) The social
tradition of representative publicness continued through the early decades of
the new art form; the next main home for opera being the Barberini Palazzo in
Rome. The election of Maffeo Barberini as Pope Urban VIII in 1623 gave rise
to the commitment of the Barberini family towards opera as entertainment for
political expediency2 . (Sadie ed. 1989, 20.) The importance of representative
publicness to opera is well present in a description of early opera by Ellen
Rosand: "The first operas, Dafne, Euridice, Orfeo, Arianna, like the intermedi
before them, were courtly entertainments [--]. They were commissioned and
created to celebrate specific political or social occasions, and were performed
before an invited patrician audience. [--] Verbally and visually, iconographic
conceit and allegorical allusion extolled a ruling dynasty - Medici, Gonzaga, or
Barberini - besides marking the specific occasion. The splendor and
lavishness of the productions reflected further glory on the ruler, brightening
his image at home and abroad." (Rosand 1991, 10.)
The next important scene in the development of opera - both as an art-form
and a socio-economic phenomenon - took place in Venice. "Born in Florence,
and further developed in Rome, opera essentially defined itself as a genre in
Venice. [--] With the political stability of its oligarchic structure and the
economic democracy that sustained it, Venice offered a unique situation for
1 This has been partly linked to the political change in Florence in turning away from Spain
towards France; the new form of court entertainment coincided with this change.
2 The importance of opera as a forum for political influence is very well illustrated by two
incidents in which the Barberini were involved. First, after the death of Urban VIII in 1644, the
family was banished from Rome due to accusations of their extensive use of papal funds to
organise these performances. Second, librettist Giulio Rospigliosi, author of several Barberini
operas and the first stage-director in the history of opera, was elected as Pope Clement IX in
1667. (Parker ed. 1994, 17 - 20.)
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the elaboration of others' inventions. [--] What happened to opera in Venice
during the seventeenth century was fundamental to the art itself: there and
then, opera as we know it assumed its definitive identity - as a mixed
theatrical spectacle available to a socially diversified, and paying, audience; a
public art" (Rosand 1991, 1.) In Venice opera was for the first time performed
for a paying public in Teatro S. Cassiano in 1937. (Sadie ed. 1989, 21.) The
success of this 'commercial' (see below) opera was the final phase in
establishing the young art form. Some scholars, e.g. Rosand, even claim that
the history of opera as we know it begins in Venice. This notion is well in line
with the argument presented here - i.e. that socio-economic development of
opera is closely linked with the development of the bourgeois public sphere -
as emerging commercialism and the public sphere played a crucial role in the
Venetian operatic scene in the 17th century. As Ellen Rosand points out, the
Venetian aristocracy built theatres in which the new art form could be
presented, not only for commercial reasons (even though they received rent
from the impresario running the theatre) but to compete with other Venetian
families in splendour and power (i.e. to gain influence in the public sphere).
"Dependable financial backing derived from the Venetian sociopolitical
structure: competition among patrician families, essentially a self-ennobled
merchant class [my italics], encouraged investment in theatres as a means of
increasing wealth and status." (Rosand 1991, 1.) "And this [setting up
theatres] was not simply for economic motives: subtly tangled up with that
factor was the idea of theatre as a symbol of magnificence, an assertion of
the family's economic and political clout within the city." (Kimbell 1991, 114.)
The theatres were leased to impressari, who seem from the surface to have
acted like businessmen. However, a closer scrutiny of their activities reveals
that the companies often received hidden subsidies from the noblesse, for
example in the form of a specific star singer provided 'with the protection of',
say, a certain nobleman. Further, the rent of the boxes, set for the season
before the repertory was known provided a subsidy as such, since it was not
in effect connected with the efforts of the performing company. According to
Rosand "a broader aristocratic base supported these theatres as annual
leaseholders of boxes." (Rosand 1991, 1.) Further evidence of subsidy
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(possibly from the family owning the theatre) is the fact that several of the
productions - the books of which have survived - in Venice during the 1640-
60 made substantial losses. Still the impressari remained in business having
had to receive funds from an external source - probably the noblesse - to be
able to do so. (Bianconi and Walker 1984, 227 & 239.) Thus, however much
the Venetian opera was ostensibly run as a business and aimed at a paying
public, the funding from the theatre owners and box owners is evident. Thus,
opera in Venice had emerged from the court but had not, as often has been
claimed, been left to the sole mercy of the emerging market. It had found a
feasible place of existence in the public sphere - in many ways bourgeois
since the Venetian aristocracy was "essentially a self-ennobled merchant
class". (Rosand 1991, 1.) In this sphere, opera continued its existence and
was defined as the art-form we currently know as opera. "Opera as we know
it, as an art appealing to a broad audience, had its origins in this special
environment." (Rosand 1991, 11.) However, elsewhere it existed in parallel
with court opera, especially opera seria, which carried forward the tradition of
representative publicness in its operatic form for a further two centuries.
According to Kimbell, opera in Italy was (after the 17th century example of
Venice where the art-form had become established) to maintain a character
of conviviality (i.e. its function in the bourgeois public sphere) for centuries. "It
was less a feature of the operas themselves than of the atmosphere and
environment in which they were performed. But since opera is supremely a
social form of art, the conviviality of the setting did affect the work of art in a
number of ways. [--] The box-system [--] has been the backbone of Italian
theatre life for the best part of 300 years. From Venice, where it had first
evolved as a form of insurance, it had spread rapidly to the other cities of
Italy. Where it was not commercially necessary, as at some of the court
operas, it was nevertheless retained because to have one's box at the opera
was recognized as a charming social asset. [--1 The box was their public
salon: there they could mingle with the best society of the town." (Kimbell
1991, 11.) The court operas, even when maintaining the box-owner structure,
upheld an attitude more towards representative publicness. "[U]ntill the
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unification of Italy several of the leading opera-houses in the peninsula,
notably those of Turin and Naples, were court theatres. There etiquette was
distinctly more starchy: in the presence of the court, laughter and
conversation, even applause, were strictly proscribed; there could be no
question of drawing the curtains of the boxes; the company sat formally
dressed and brilliantly illuminated and submissively mannered for the whole
evening." (Kimbell 1991, 13.) The Italian operatic scene in the 18th century,
thus, was divided between box-owner funded theatres operating in the
emerging bourgeois public sphere on one hand, and the court theatres
upholding the manner of representative publicness on the other. As Kimbell
writes: "Opera became so popular for two apparently distinct if not mutually
exclusive reasons: In the first place as a public entertainment on the Venetian
model; in the second, as the most spectacular of the art-forms appropriate to
the representative courtly life of a royal or ducal capital." (Kimbell 1991, 206.)
This division, however, was not as strict as in France, for example. The Italian
peninsula was divided into small city-states, in which the power of the
monarch was considerably lesser than in the court of Louis XIV, for example.
Also, even though opera seria and opera buffa were connected with court and
public opera houses, respectively l , this division was not as clear as in France.
France
In France the division between bourgeois opera and the representative court
opera and their respective institutional frameworks was to be reflected in the
art-form itself already in the late 17th century. "French opera has always been
strongly institutionalized: thus serious, all sung opera [tragedie lyrique] is
inseparably linked with the court and the Opera or Academie Royale de
Musique, while opera with spoken texts [opera comique] is associated first
with the Theatres de la Foire and then with the Opera-Comique; these
1 "The distance between these genres made itself felt on nearly every front — their subject
matter and literary tone, [—] their audiences and relative engagement with contemporary
society, the cost and institutional structure of each [—]." (Parker ed. 1994, 84.)
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divisions began to break down only in the late 19th century." (Sadie ed. 1989,
31.)
The earliest form of indigenous French opera was the Pastorale d7ssy by
Pierre 'Abbe' Perrin and Robert Cambert, performed for Louis XIV in 1659.
(Demuth 1963, 105.) "Louis XIV had a clear perception of the political
usefulness of entertainments as a means of amusing and controlling his
subjects, of impressing foreigners, of developing and demonstrating physical
dexterity among his courtiers, and of displaying at every opportunity his
personal emblem, the sun, as a symbol of enlightened rule." (Parker ed.
1994, 33.) This relates well to Habermas' view of the court of Louis XIV. "In
the etiquette of Louis XIV concentration of the publicity of representation at
the court attained the high point of refinement." (Habermas 1989, 10.) Thus,
Louis XIV established the institutional framework for tragOdie lyrique by
granting Perrin a royal patent to form Acadômie d'Opera in 1669. After the
failure of Perrin's AcadOmie, the new French lyric art-form was firmly
established by Lully in the late 17th century after he had acquired the royal
patent for presenting lyric work. "Although Lully's patent allowed him to
perform his operas before a paying public, they are indelibly stamped with
courtly ethos: the focus on glorifying the Roi-soleil was inevitable." (Parker ed.
1994, 36.) The Lullyan tradition of tragedies lyriques was carried forward and
developed subsequently by Rameau and Gluck, who operated in the
institutional environment of the Acad6mie until the revolution brought changes
to the way in which the French operatic scene was organised. This was due
especially to the LibOrte des Thèatres act issued in 1791, which ended the
monopoly of the Acadêmie over 'serious' French lyric work. (Crosten 1948,
12.) Even though the Acadêmie was not directly subsidised by the King, the
royal patent had given it a role of royal importance before the revolution and it
had retained its air of representative publicness. "Thought had been given as
well to the reality that attendance at the Opera was as much a performance
as what took place on stage." (Parker ed. 1994, 63.)
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The 'comic' form of French lyric activity was more related to the public opera
houses providing 'popular entertainment' for the upper stratum of the
bourgeoisie — the evolving bourgeois public sphere. The opera comique with
spoken dialogue, was performed in a group of fair theatres known collectively
as Theatres de la Foire. They presented spoken plays interspersed with well-
known tunes (vaudevilles) and "enjoyed immense popularity, and the rival
institutions under government monopoly — the Opera and the Com6die-
Frangaise — did their utmost to hinder the fair theatres, mostly by restricting
their ability to employ vocal music in their offerings." (Parker ed. 1994, 91.)
This they were entitled to do with the monopoly granted in the royal patent to
lyric performances. The Theatres de la Foire were brought under common
management in 1715 and named Theatre de l'Opera-Comique. It remained
as the institutional background for French comic opera, even though after the
death of Louis XIV Philippe of Orleans had established the Comedie-Italienne
to favour Italian lyric entertainment. These two institutions were merged in
1762 and Opera-Comique was to carry on the tradition of the opera-comique
till the late 19th century when the gap dividing French lyric art and its
institutional forms was finally closed.
In 1752 an incident - the Querelle des Bouffons — took place in Paris centred
around the Italian opera buffa and the French trag6die lyrique. After a
performance of Pergolesi's La serva padrona by an itinerant Italian troupe at
the Opera a debacle about the two traditions — and especially about their
respective merits — broke out. The Ensyclopedists supported Italian opera
against French, "but the real targets of the reformers were the hidebound
material and performing practices at the Opera, which were also a symbol of
the absolute monarchy." (Sadie ed. 1989, 118.) The art form of the bourgeois
public sphere was thus employed in an attack on the representative
publicness of the monarchy at the Opera, which was to fall after the 1789
revolution and the 1791 act on freedom of theatres.
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Germany-Austria
Early operatic activity in Germany and Austria was dominated by Italian
opera, it was "Italian in its language and Italianate in its musical style. Many of
the leading Italian composers of Italian opera held court appointments in
Germany, [--] and the greatest Italian Librettist, Metastasio, was Viennese
court poet." (Sadie ed. 1989, 27.) Also, the style of the German court opera
was predominantly that of representative publicness, after the Italian court
opera tradition. There were two exceptions to this general rule: the Sin gspiel
tradition of German vernacular music theatre which gained ground in the latter
part of the 18th century, and the Theater am G5nsemarkt in Hamburg which
existed from 1678 till 1738.
The Theater am Gansemarkt was "the first public opera house in any city
outside Italy. " (Buelow 1978, 26.) Venice had a great influence on the
Hanseatic city-state of Hamburg, which was a great commercial centre on the
Elbe river. "By 1678 Hamburg was the richest and largest city in northern
Europe [--]. In one respect at least Hamburg did resemble Venice: both cities
were centres of trade and commerce Ft" The Hamburg opera was founded
by Gerhard Schott, a member of a well-known patrician family. He directed
the opera himself (apart from two failed attempts to lease the opera house) till
his death in 1702. "It seems probable that he had outside financial support,
although no evidence exists to prove it." (Buelow 1978, 26.) "[T]he burghers
managed to maintain predominantly German-language operatic
performances, despite the opposition of some of the clergy and periodic
financial crises." (Sadie ed. 1989, 27.) "While Hamburg opera cannot be
called the first German national opera, simply because the concept of
German nation did not exist, its theatre was the first opera house based on
the German language and German popular music traditions. It was 'peoples
opera', if it is remembered that the people were the wealthy merchant and
aristocratic classes." (Buelow 1978, 28.) Thus, it seems clear that the Theater
am G5nsemarkt existed in the bourgeois public sphere in circumstances
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similar to those in which 'commercial', non-court opera had been established
in Venice.
The German Singspiel tradition was a phenomenon parallel to that of the
Thêas tres de la Foire in Paris. It is "an opera, usually comic, in German with
spoken dialogue". The genre had its roots in the German Hanswurst tradition.
"Once the Hamburg operatic venture had foundered in 1738, the only
German-language Singspiel venture was the Hanswurst company at the
K5rtnertortheater in Vienna." (Sadie ed. 1989, 86-88.) It had been founded in
about 1710, thus having a longstanding tradition by the time Joseph II
founded the German National-Singspiel in 1778 which took over the
Kartnertortheater. This enterprise was not, however, successful and the
theatre closed its doors in 1788. Nevertheless, the Singspiel had become —
as reinstated by the emperor - a relevant competitor to the opera seria at the
court theatres. "At this time there was little demand for opera seria in Vienna.
The emperor, who considered it both expensive and elusive, allowed it only
on special occasions." (Parker ed. 1994, 109.) These two developments — the
lessening popularity of the representative opera seria and the establishing
Singspiel as a valid operatic tradition come together in 1791. In this year
Mozart composed both La clemenza di Tito and Die ZauberflOte. The first is
considered as the ultimate culmination in the tradition of opera seria and the
latter the first Singspiel to achieve longstanding historical success. Naturally,
the creation of Don Giovanni, Le nozze di Figaro and Cosi fan tutte must not
be forgotten in this context. With these works the opera buffa had emerged
from the bourgeois theatres to the sphere of connoisseurs at the court
theatres. "Even a theme as dubious as the old Don Juan story could now
appear on the emperor's most exclusive stage, for by virtue of Mozart's score
it now shared in a Viennese conception of opera buffa as a fully fledged
category of high art." (Parker ed.1994, 111.) The bourgeois public sphere was
thus gradually taking over — and partly had already done so — the sphere of
representative publicness, in art as well as in the reality of revolutions.
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4.2. 1791 — 1914
Italy
The 19th century witnessed notable changes in the operatic life of Italy and its
institutional forms. After the victory of Napoleon at Marengo in 1800 many of
the courts that had sustained Metastasian opera seria were left in disarray.
"Napoleon's intervention led to the creation, temporarily again, of some
improvised governments up and down Italy, creating a sort of paradigm for
the improvisation and intrigues to opera buffa plots." (Parker ed. 1994, 169.)
In the latter part of the previous century opera buffa had gained ground as
popular entertainment. This development continued in the first half of the 19th
century, added with the creation of new genres — or amalgamation of old ones
- as opera semiseria l etc. (Kimbell 1991, 334.) "One consequence that can
be partially attributed to the changes brought about by the French-inspired
switch of governments throughout the peninsula was a surprising increase in
the number of theatres, many of which would perform opera during some
portion of the year. [--] The increase was in part an aspect of urban growth,
resulting from the movement of people from less prosperous rural
surroundings to towns [--]. More theatres meant an increasing demand for
material." (Parker ed. 1994, 171.) The same aspect is commented on by
Kimbell: "One of the problems which the immense popularity of the new opera
buffa brought was the need for what can only be described as mass
production." (Kimbell 1991, 334.) As a result the concept of repertory opera
started to develop, coinciding with the advancement of industrial practices
elsewhere. At the start of the 19th century an Italian opera house had
presented two new operas each season. As the production conventions grew
more elaborate this was becoming more and more unmanageable in the first
decades of the century creating a need to repeat productions. "The notion of
repertory opera, with singers coming along to appear at the drop of a hat in a
1 "[A] genre well adapted to the vogue for melodramatic plots with happy endings, works
similar to the 'rescue' plots popular in Paris and elsewhere in the wake of the French
revolution." (Parker ed. 1994, 171.)
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work everyone more or less knew, was not to develop fully until the 1840s."
(Rosselli 1984, 8.) "By the mid-1850s, when the industry had fully recovered
from the upheaval of 1848-9, repertory opera was becoming established. By
the 1870s it was the norm." (Rosselli 1984, 170.) This development went
hand in hand with the development of the market for singers. "After the 1848
revolutions, governments and law courts were increasingly reluctant to
interfere with freedom of contract among those engaged in market dealings, a
reluctance confirmed in Italy from 1860. Opera singers [--] were thus already
creatures of the market, and the new state of things was confirmed as the
nineteenth century wore on." (Rosselli 1992, 79.) The rise of the market was
also reflected in the way the theatres were run — the developing opera
industry called for a professional impressario. "In the middle decades of the
eighteenth century, sometimes until its close, it had been normal practice in
some leading theatres — those of Turin, Milan, and Bologna in particular — for
an association of nobles to act as impressari and elect a directorate to run the
opera season. [--] By the 1820s the association of noble impressari was
generally recognised as extravagant and expensive [--]. On the same
grounds, associations of boxholder-proprietors like those of La Fenice,
Venice, did their best to attract professional impressari. [--] Impressari were
not necessarily dependent on any individual member of the nobility, and the
very touch of roguery that marked some of them conferred a kind of freedom.
Yet they were deeply dependent on the upper classes as a whole, first for
their concessions and then — crucially — for the means of making up an almost
certain loss." (Rosselli 1984, 20 & 39.)
The popularity of opera-going — resulting in the need for mass production of
an industrial character - was inevitably linked to the role that Romanticism had
in the social and political life in Italy during the 19th century. "The peculiar
significance of Romantic movement in Italy was a consequence of the fact
that, during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic periods, art had become
politicized, or, to use more Mazzinian phrase, 'socialized'. [--] The primary
motive of Italian Romantic art was a desire to express and form the new
society that was emerging in the post-Napoleonic age. [--] The theatre
28
became the focal symbolic building at the heart of all Italian cities. And the
impact it achieved might entitle us to regard it as a kind of spiritual Trojan
Horse. [--] Increasingly during the 1840s theatres were chosen as the scene
for political demonstrations [--1." (Kimbell 1991, 391 -394.) The rulers realised
the need to control and colonise this increasingly bourgeois public sphere
phenomenon, as can be seen from a memorandum l to the Pope from
Monsignor Luigi Ciacchi in 1837. "The theatre, considered in the abstract, is
and can only be an object of indifference to the government, an object to be
tolerated, an object with no immediate connection with the heavy cares of the
state. But considered concretely, in view of the links it forges in society
between the people and the government [my italics], it naturally changes its
aspect, and necessarily takes its place among the beneficent concerns of the
governing classes." (Kimbell 1991, 395.) This attitude was also visible in the
ways in which the government and the municipalities gradually took
responsibility — at least partially — to make good the losses of the opera
houses. The first form of subsidy had been the gambling monopoly granted to
the opera houses. When the gambling monopoly was abolished in the
northern Italy in 1814, the La Scala official committee, for example, ended up
offering an official subsidy in cash to attract an impressario to manage the
theatre. (Rosselli 1984, 71.) After the unification of Italy the subsidies from
central government were abolished and the municipalities took over.
However, the amounts declined rapidly due to social pressure, e.g. from the
new socialists, and forced several leading opera houses to close down for
several years in 1870s. "Verdi's answer was to call for renewed government
subsidy — something that would come about only in the twentieth century
when control of opera houses had passed to public bodies. [--] The coming of
a centralised state with liberal representative institutions and a growing middle
class" brought an end to this era in the history of Italian opera houses.
(Rosselli 1984, 79.) The framework for opera in Italy had thus seen the
decline of the representative publicness, the rise in the importance of the
bourgeois public sphere, market and mass production. The first marks of the
1 As translated by David Kimbell in Kimbell 1991.
29
increasing colonisation of the lifeworld by the state were also witnessed
during the 19th century.
France
The revolution period in France starting from 1791 - when the Constituent
Assembly demolished the system of privileges of the Academie royale de
musique - was to be turbulent in the socio-economic and institutional history
of French operatic life. This is well reflected in the frequency in which the
Paris Opera (Academie royale de musique) changed its name between 1791
and 1871, a total of 22 times. (Bereson 1998, 89.) A thorough description of
the changes in the institutional history of opera in France would thus be an
impossible task within the scope of this study. Therefore, only the main trends
illustrating the lines of development in the socio-economic framework for
opera in France will be discussed here.
The Paris Opera - the former bastion of representative publicness -
underwent major changes during the decades of revolution. The case of
opera comique was different; "popular opera in Paris was firmly established
on business principles and remained so, for all the shocking episodes that we
like to associate with the word 'revolution'. In fact, the revolution opened up
opera as a business proposition, creating far more opportunities than it did
catastrophes." (Parker ed. 1994, 122.) There was an increased demand for
opera comique in Paris. This was encouraged "by the various Revolutionary
governments, who saw the advantage of whipping up patriotic enthusiasm by
theatrical means [--], and the existence of two flourishing opera comique
theatres at the same time. [--] The old Comedie-Italienne in the rue Favart,
renamed Theatre de l'Opera-Comique National in 1793, met a formidable rival
in the Theatre Feydey, founded in 1789 as the Theatre de Monsieur and
renamed in 1791." (Sadie ed. 1989, 195.) "The rivalry between these two
theatres lasted for ten years, by which time they were economically
exhausted: thus they merged." (Parker ed. 1994, 127.) The Revolutionary
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opera comique, even though losing its importance gradually in Paris after the
amalgamation of the two rival theatres, was successful elsewhere in Europe,
most notably Germany. "The story of French opera from 1800 to 1830 is
vitally concerned with its international acceptance: in fact, its transformation
into an exportable commodity." (Parker ed. 1994, 130.) Thus, the emergence
of a market that coincided with the revolutions opened up new opportunities
for French comic opera operating on business principles.
The Opera, however, was to experience a period of extreme turmoil before
the emerging bourgeoisie and the market gained ground in its function. As the
freedom to establish theatres was granted in 1971, the Opera was to lose. It
had acquired the majority of its funds through the annual dues payable by the
lesser theatres to the Opera. When the dues were abolished the commercial
theatres flourished. However, "the other side of the coin was that the Paris
Opera almost died with the king and the queen, who were executed in 1793."
(Parker ed. 1994, 125.) After the rise of Napoleon the role of the Opera was
strengthened again. "Napoleon's motivations for support of opera were far
from 'artistically' inspired. His much vaunted phrase 'Paris vaut bien un opera'
reveals the cardinal rule operating at least since the 17th century that a
capital city requires a great opera. [--] Furthermore he stated unequivocally
that the opera is important and should be supported by the state because it is
one of the places of contact between the head of the nation and the nation
itself [--]." (Bereson 1998, 86.) The state support for the Opera was thus
reinstated and remained, in principle, very similar over the first three decades
of the 19th century, whatever the prevailing regime.
After the 1830 'bourgeois' revolution, the administration of the Opera changed
considerably. "The Opèra now becomes a business, catering to newly
ascendant bourgeois audience. Since a self-proclaimed 'bourgeois-king' had
recently assumed the throne of France, cultural institutions now naturally
turned to the needs of this social class. And so it was as part of his program
to buttress his new base of political support that Louis-Philippe encouraged
the entry of bourgeois values into the Acadêmie Royale de Musique."
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(Fulcher 1987, 2.) However, the business character of the Opêra after 1830
was only one way of looking at it. Even though Louis Veron made a fortune
for himself as the director of the Opëra, the enterprise still received state
subsidies. These were even more relied on when the first enthusiasm of the
new bourgeois public towards grand opera started to decrease in the middle
of the 19th century. "[W]ith the French Revolution conceptions of power
change; the locus of the power is now the 'people', and hence it resides in
'public opinion'. [--] The Opera was palpably a dangerous realm, one of
contestation over the voice of the 'people', and concomitantly politicians saw it
as potentially a realm of challenge to political authority. Not surprisingly they
took special care to 'control' the Opera's public as part of an increased
surveillance of the theaters [--]." (Fulcher 1987, 5-7.) Thus the French State
assumed the control of the Opera in 1871, renaming it Th6atre National
d'Opera. The inauguration of the new Palais Gamier in 1875 marked the end
of the era of bourgeois grand opera, and the increase in the colonisation of
this public sphere phenomenon by the newly emerged democratic state - as
opposed to the previous colonisation by the emerging market during grand
opera's peak period. (Gourret 1977, 86.) The end of the century also
witnessed the beginnings of the breakdown in the established artistic and
institutional division between all sung opera at the Opera and the comic
repertory at the Opêra Comique. This is evident, for example, in the way
Gounod's Faust developed. "Faust, which was commonly regarded as typical
'grand opera', in fact started life at the Theátre Lyrique as an opèra comique
with spoken dialogues. Gounod added the recitatives and the big ballet for the
Opera in 1875." (Sadie ed. 1989, 210.) This development towards the
breakdown in the historic division - all sung opera at the Opêra and opóra
comique at the Opëra Comique - in the status of the Paris opera houses was
to be concluded in 1939, when the two main houses were merged under state
control. (Gourret 1977, 94.)
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Germany and Austria
The beginning of the 19th century in Germany was characterised by the
lingering death of the ideals and structures of the previous century, coinciding
with the birth of new ideals that (when carried out by Richard Wagner in the
latter part of the century) were to influence the operatic world considerably.
The slowness in the demise of the 18th century ideals and practices was
partly due to practical reasons. "The decentralisation of German life meant
lack of organization: the theatre in Germany was long dependent on a
structure consisting broadly of Hoftheater [Court theatres], in which
aristocratic and normally Italian traditions predominated, Stadttheater [State
theatres] or private enterprise theatre (especially in the Hanseatic cities), and
small wandering troupes [--]." In the latter three "mixed repertories prevailed,
with the leading operatic roles often taken by actors willing to sing rather than
trained singers, supplemented by a slender chorus probably drawn from a
neighbouring church. Upon these shaky foundations several composers set
about building a more individual and dramatic art." (Sadie ed. 1989, 185.)
Thus, the institutional structure of the previous century, and the lack of
organisation long hindered the development of the German Sin gspiel — which
had reached its peak with Mozart - into fully-fledged German romantic opera.
In the early decades of the century, models were sought outside Germany.
"The French Revolution profoundly impressed the artists of the politically
stagnant groups of states that then formed Germany, and in their search for
national unity and for a sense of growth and direction it was to France that
they turned for the inspiration of a dynamic alternative society. [--] There was
[--] a strong wish to develop a more popular, realistic form of opera in reaction
to the Italian tradition of opera seria which had long been identified with the
courts and the ancien rOgime." (Sadie ed. 1989, 181.) However, despite the
first 'real' romantic German operas in the early part of the century by Weber,
Spohr and Marschner, the changes in the art form and the institutional
conventions surrounding it were to came after the 1848 revolution and the
rise of Wagner.
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"[My the end of the 1840s Wagner was formulating [--] radical solutions to
what he, and others, regarded as the crisis of opera. Nor is it coincidence that
this reappraisal was taking place at precisely the time that social revolution
was breaking out all over Europe. For Wagner, the issues of art and society
were inextricably intertwined: true art could flourish only in a society free from
oppression and exploitation." (Parker ed. 1994, 223-224.) Thus, when the
1848 revolutionary movement reached Dresden, Wagner joined in — not as an
artist but as a citizen. He was forced to flee to Zurich where he wrote several
essays on art and its function in society, criticising equally the bourgeois
opera for being an industry, and the representative opera as entertainment for
those who are bored. "What Wagner held up by contrast was the Greece of
Aeschylus where the whole community, not just the social elite, attended
artistic festivals and where the honour of participation, not money, was the
reward." (Spotts 1994, 31.) Thus, there is an obvious parallel between the
ideals of Wagner and the ideas of Habermas, who defines the colonisation of
the lifeworld (Wagner's 'whole community') by the systemic levels of market,
(Wagner's 'money') and the state (Wagner's 'social elite). The ideals of
Wagner are thus already directed beyond the bourgeois public sphere opera
towards democratisation of the institution of opera. However, this was not to
take place during Wagner's lifetime despite his attempts to hinder the
consequences of the market and state involvement, by placing the shrine of
his art — Bayreuth — outside the metropolises (to avoid displays of power by
the elite) and by dimming the lights in the auditorium (to prevent all bourgeois
public sphere interaction or gestures of representative publicness by the
aristocracy). However, even in the case of financing Bayreuth, he needed to
rely on these two sources; Ludwig ll of Bavaria in the form of royal patronage,
and the bourgeoisie in the form of the box office takings after the attempt to
fund the enterprise through a patron's association had failed. (Spoils 1994, 45
& 80.) Artistically, however, if not organisationally Wagner proved successful
in appealing to the broader German audience. "In the wake of unification in
1871, Germany was awash with musings about national greatness, the
'German soul', the 'German spirit', 'national redemption', 'national salvation'.
Wagner's dramas and prose writings had something to offer on all these
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topics. It was also perfectly natural to compare his struggles in launching the
Festival [i.e. Bayreuth] with Bismarck's efforts in founding the Reich and to
regard the success of 1876 [the first Bayreuth season] as the cultural
counterpart of the military and political triumph of 1871." (Spotts 1994, 77.)
The seeds of the nationalistic development of the 20th century were thus
already apparent in the case of Bayreuth. In many ways, however, the
organisational framework of opera remained static elsewhere in Germany and
Austria. For example, it took the 1918 November Revolution to finally end the
exclusivity of the Berlin Hofoper — one of the remaining bastions of
representative publicness in Germany. (Cowden ed. 1992, 86.) As a
comparison, only in 1907 a bourgeois opera house — Deutsches Opemhaus -
was established in Berlin. (Meyer zu Heringdorf 1988, 14.)
4.3. 1914-
The 20th century development in the socio-economic framework for opera in
all three countries considered here has been relatively unified. The same
trends of development have been fairly uniform around Europe, many even
globally. These tendencies are diminishing renewal of the core operatic
repertory and increased state funding and control.
The 20th century witnessed a decline in creative operatic activity throughout
Europe. The number of 20th century operas that have gained a lasting
position in the core repertory of opera houses is very limited when compared
with 19th century operas. Often it seems that even 18th century repertory can
compete in frequency of appearance with 20th century creations. This
development is inevitably linked to 20th century development in music, e.g.
the increasing complexity of harmony. "Harmony provides narrative with an
engine; harmony provides harmony with an explanation. But the increasing
complexity of harmony in the early twentieth-century was beginning to rob it of
its onward urge, and hence to deprive opera of its motive power." (Parker ed.
1994, 280.) Artistic reasons aside, however, there are also socio-economic
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explanations to the fact that the repertory of opera houses concentrated
around the 19th century operas. "Cities were now much larger, the
professional and business classes much more numerous and more varied. [--]
[O]nly in small town could a narrow elite [--] go on dominating the opera
house. [--] Rising incomes and the spread of modern comforts led more and
more theatres by the 1880s to take benches out of stalls, fill them with chairs
with arm rests, and cut standing room down to almost nothing; promenading
was out. [--] Fewer and fewer new operas were being created; opera goers
were now content to hear the same dozen or two works again and again [--].
But they did not, as before, hear an opera twenty times in a season; instead
they might hear it ten times in forty years [--]." (Parker ed. 1994, 479-481.)
Thus, as the wealth of society was increasing and widening the opera
audience, the liberal bourgeois public sphere function of the opera house was
diminished. The public was now larger but visited the opera house more
seldom. This made it possible for the opera houses to present same repertory
year after year. This change in the audience, often dated around the First
World War, coincides surprisingly with the date of composing of the last
operas that have gained a place in the core operatic repertory. "As in so many
other areas of artistic, scientific, technical, and philosophical endeavour, the
period up to the end of the First World War was one of crucial and rapid
change in opera. Within a decade of Verdi's death (in 1901) Strauss's Elektra
and Shoenberg's Erwartung had been written, and by 1917 Berg was at work
on Wozzek and Stravinsky on Histoire du soldat. (Parker ed. 1994, 280.) This
further validates the interpretation that the development of the operatic
repertory, and thus the socio-economic operating principles of the opera
houses, is intertwined with the development towards democratisation of the
opera audience.
The second main socio-economic development that can be linked to the
broadening and democratisation of the opera audience is the increasing state
involvement - in funds and control - in the running of the main opera houses
in Italy, France and Germany. This development, as pointed out earlier, has
been a pan-European trend, especially since the Second World War. The
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case of Italy serves well as an example. "The reorganisation of opera with
state subsidy and a form of state control was not unique to Italy; it has
happened all over Europe, essentially because in advanced economies the
costs of opera rise faster than either the possible takings or the general price
index. In Italy it was hastened by discontent at boxholders who blocked
financial reform, and by tensions of the First World War [--]. La Scala became
a public institution (ente autonomo) in 1920; so between 1926 and 1936, did
the main — soon to be the only — opera houses in ten other cities; from the
latter year, municipalities in smaller towns with opera seasons of more than a
month also had to set up a public body to run them." (Rosselli 1992, 210.)
With the emergence of public funding the control also crept in. "[B]y the 1930s
the essentials were in place — not only subsidy but, in each of the main opera
houses, and administration responsible to a ministry in Rome and headed by
a superintendent who was a government appointee." (Rosselli 1992, 211.)
Similarly, in Germany the Ministry of Culture assumed responsibility over the
main opera houses after the 1918 November Revolution. (Cowden ed. 1992,
86.) In France the democratic state had already assumed control and
provided funds for the Opera from 1871 onwards. State control of the Paris
opera houses was further tightened in 1939 when the Opera and Opera-
Comique were brought together under state control by Reunion des Theetres
Lyriques Nationaux. "Government bureaucracy with all its regulations now
intruded directly into the artistic process." (Cowden ed. 1992, 68.) The state
funding, control and the democratisation of opera houses seems during the
last few years to have lost its impetus. Several governments have imposed
limits on the growth in the amounts of funding and the Italian enti autonomi
were to be 'privatised', i.e. changed from public bodies into 'independent'
foundations by 30 June 1999 to enable the involvement of private capital and
commercial ventures. (Sicca 1997, 217.) Thus, the 20th century has
witnessed a decline in the role of opera as a bourgeois public sphere
phenomenon and the increasing colonisation of the opera organisations by
the states. However, the willingness of the states to bear the financial
consequences of this colonisation seems to be decreasing. Thus, at the close
of the 20th century, the socio-economic organisation of the opera houses
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appears to be in turmoil again. This further reinforces the need to examine the
situation from an analytic point of view.
5. Conclusion
In this section the development of opera, and the socio-economic framework
in which it has developed organisationally and institutionally has been briefly
presented and analysed. The issues, however, need to be linked together
more concisely, as is done below.
Ruth Bereson has recently argued (Bereson 1998) that the continuous
support for opera from different states and regimes, whether monarchies or
democracies, is due to the fact that opera is above all a state ceremony. To
support her argument she analyses the organisational development of opera
in France and England in a similar way to this chapter. This, it is argued here,
is an unnecessarily state-biased way of looking at the historic development of
the socio-economic framework of opera. Based on the theories and examples
in this chapter there is a different argument is made here, based on
somewhat similar evidence.
It is argued, that opera as an art form is an answer to man's eternal need
(Drummond 1980). for music drama during a certain historic period of
Western European society's development — especially in the bourgeois public
sphere. (Habermas 1987 & 1989.) Further, it is closely linked to that section
of society and its development. As has been demonstrated above, the early
development of opera coincides with the changes in society from the feudal
system towards the emergence of the state as a separate entity from the
ruler, and the rise of the market. Opera as a lifeworld (as opposed to the
emerging systems of state and market) phenomenon existed in both these
realms, on one hand as a medium for representative publicness (e.g. court
operas) and on the other hand as an emerging bourgeois public sphere
phenomenon (e.g. the public opera houses in Venice). With the growing
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importance of the market, opera - as an important aspect of the social life of
the emerging bourgeoisie - was increasingly colonised by it. This is evident,
for example, in the Italian impressario system and the emergence of repertory
opera. (Rosselli 1984.) The peak period of opera, especially Italian opera,
coincides with this development. The chain of revolutions between 1789
(France) and 1918 (Germany) gradually brought an end to the role of opera
as representative publicness and increased the dominating role of the
bourgeoisie. This development of increasing democratisation — as it further
progressed beyond the bourgeoisie — brought to the fore the colonisation of
opera by the state in the 20th century, during which most of the leading opera
houses in Europe became state funded and administered. However, it is
argued that opera still is — as it always has been — a lifeworld phenomenon
existing in the public sphere. It has, during its 400-year existence been a
vehicle for representative publicness, and been colonised by the emerging
market and subsequently by the emerging welfare-states. As the end of the
20th century is witnessing a shift from state dominance in opera organisations
towards the market again, the importance of the civil society — its bourgeois
sector or some other — to opera must be born in mind. After all opera is — it is
argued — a lifeworld phenomenon, not a systemic one. Thus, only at the
lifeworld level does it attain its importance. This has been recognised — as is
evident from the colonisation of the phenomenon — both by the states and the
market during the history of opera. At the lifeworld level, therefore, socio-
economic support of opera organisations needs to be discussed now as well
as in the future.
39
3. THE ANALYTICAL MODEL
1. Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to define the parameters and variables that
influence the organisational structures of opera organisations. This is done in
three sections; first the artistic production process and the socio-economic
support for opera production are considered individually. At the end of the
chapter the discussion is brought together and an analytical model is created
for examining the forces that influence the structures of opera organisations.
2. The artistic processes
The aim of this section is to define the artistic variables that need to be
investigated if we try to understand the way opera organisations function. The
approach used here is 'product led', i.e. the inevitable elements needed in a
specific production will be derived from the events that take place on the
stage. This is based on the assumption that opera as an art form inevitably
imposes its own structures on the organisations engaged in its production. As
this historical abstracting process is based on the tacit assumptions of the
author, it is naturally only one of the possible interpretations of the factsl.
However, in the course of this study the model arrived at will be tested to
justify the assumptions.
1 However, Walther Volbach and Quaintance Eaton arrive at similar categorisations in their
writings about opera production. The existence of similar classifications and categorisations
increases the justification of this attempt as well.
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2.1. On the physical constraints
In order to define the physical limits of the activity we have defined as opera
we need to discuss how far these limits can be extended before we depart
from the art form. The limits of any art form are always inevitably in dispute -
by the artists themselves as well as by the analysts and the aestheticians.
This aesthetic discussion is outside the limits of this study and will therefore
be left to people more qualified to attempt it. However, a working knowledge
of the limits of the 'product', opera, needs to be achieved in order to proceed
in the analysis of the organisation producing — and thus being influenced by —
this 'product'.
We can fairly safely say that opera is an art form appealing to two senses:
vision and hearing. More seldom an opera performance engages our senses
of taste, feeling or smell. It might be argued that all these senses contribute to
the holistic experience of a night at the opera, but as far as the conditions are
suitable for human existence (e.g. temperature is within the comfort range)
these senses are fairly seldom engaged in the experience of opera as an art
form. Naturally, the need to keep the performing environment suitable for the
presence of audience and performers has implications for the 'husbandry' of
any opera organisation. These practical issues belong to the area of more
general venue management and therefore their influence will be included in
this study only where they have implications on the artistic-economic
dichotomy in opera investigated here. For the above mentioned reasons, we
can safely consider opera as an art form of two senses for the purposes of
this study, i.e. vision and hearing. Traditionally opera as an art form would be
divided into three interdependent aspects, i.e. musical, dramatic and visual
elements. This approach will be used later in this discussion. However, at this
point it seems fruitful to analyse physical realities of opera divided according
to the actual sense with which they are perceived.
Let us first consider the aspect of hearing. In the previous chapter opera was
described as a Western European child of the family of music-drama. This
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indicates that our hearing is engaged in the process of receiving the music
associated with the drama in question. Also, as far as the opera contains
language-based drama, as is often the case, our hearing is also responsible
for receiving that information, be it sung or spoken dialogue. In most opera
the music and other heard aspects of drama are produced by acoustic
instruments and unaided human voices. (In some contemporary opera this
generalisation does not hold. However, here we are bordering the area of shift
from traditional opera towards some other form of music-drama.) This
acoustic production of the sound elements of opera creates certain demands
on the physical realities in which opera is performed. The surroundings need
to be limited in size and acoustically favourable to enable the human voice,
however well trained, to reach the listeners. The place of performance also
needs to be quiet enough to enable this process of communication. These
physical demands have led opera as an art form to contribute towards the
development of a purpose built venue, an opera house, in which it is mainly
performed. The size and layout of this specific form of building thus reflects
aspects of the art form for which it was designed and the size of the audience
for which it was intended. The physical reality of the performing venue is thus
an aspect that has to be investigated in order to create an understanding of
the influence of the art form on the organisation of opera production since the
venue and its physical characteristics inevitably define some of its functions.
A similar line of argument is also valid for the visual aspects (here meaning
the aspects perceived by the sense of vision) of music drama. Our vision
provides us with the information on the rest of the dramatic aspects of opera,
i.e. expressions and movements of the singer-actors. It also receives
information about the illusory reality in which the music-drama concerned is
placed in the form of sets and props. In order for all this to be perceived, we
again face the limitations of the human capability of observation. The
activities need to be observed from such close range and direction that they
can be properly seen. This leads to limitations on size of the venue and also
to demands on light and position of the performance in the venue so that it
can be seen. The traditional solution to this has been to concentrate all
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activities on one specific area, the stage. This has obviously been an effective
solution to the problems of both seeing and hearing.
The solution to the physical limitations of opera as an art form described
above has been the opera house and its stage, which has provided the
means to produce opera in a way that it can be seen and heard. Inevitably,
whilst the art form has evolved and developed over the centuries, the physical
realities (e.g. sizes of venues, lighting techniques etc.) in which it has been
performed have also changed.
2.2. Music-dramatic constraints
Alongside this division of opera — based on the physical constraints — into two
parts, the more traditional way of describing opera as a threefold activity of
music, drama and visual aspects is useful to us. This division reflects the
more inherent aspects of the art form. The variables it urges us to investigate
will be discussed below one aspect at the time.
Music
We have defined opera in the context of this study to mean a certain
Western-European form of music-drama. Therefore, it is not necessary to
define all aspects of the music involved in this activity from the very
beginning; some aspects will be taken as 'given' in Western-European
classical music, leaving the definitions and limits of these issues to be
discussed and investigated by musicologists.
In the realm of opera, the music performed on the stage and the music
accompanying the stage events needs to be created and performed. In opera
these roles are usually separated, i.e. music is composed first and then
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performed on stage rather than improvised l . For this production of music we
therefore need composer(s) and performers. The role and the definition of the
composer is fairly straightforward; the composer is the person responsible for
the creation of the music performed. In opera this is usually one person.
However, in the early days of opera the music was often compiled from
different sources (and also from different composers — the whole remaining,
however, stylistically relatively consistent due to usage of contemporary
sources) and further adapted by the 'composer' — often the house music
director — responsible for the specific performance. This process naturally
blurs the identity and role of the composer. However, the music performed at
any given time has always been composed by someone and possibly further
arranged by another. Therefore, in the creative process of composing opera
we find two roles; that of a composer and that of an arranger.
The performing side of music in opera can be roughly divided into two
categories; the performers on-stage and the performers off-stage. Normally
this division is based on the distinction of participation in the dramatic
activities, i.e. the performers on-stage participate in the drama-side of opera
whereas the off-stage performers participate only in the musical performance.
However, there are instances — depending especially on production — where
the off-stage performers also have a dramatic role. The performers on-stage
are usually singers, i.e. soloists playing persons of the drama and the chorus
acting as non-specified persons taking part in the dramatic events. The
musical on-stage performers sometimes also include instrumentalists in a
form of a stage ensemble of instruments characterising an ensemble in the
drama. The musical performers off-stage usually consist of an orchestra or an
ensemble. The size of this group can vary greatly whilst the role it performs
remains similar. The leader of this orchestra or ensemble has throughout the
history of opera had a distinctive role in acting as an overall coordinator of the
1 The amount of freedom of the performers has changed during the history of opera. At some
periods improvised embellishments of composed arias have been an integral part of the
performer's interpretation. The freedom has not, however, been so great that it could be
labelled as improvisation of all the music.
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musical side of opera production, i.e. conductor — the tradition of the 'artistic
conductor' starting from Jean-Baptiste Lully in 1680s.
For the practical side of producing the musical side of opera in physical reality
we need (apart from the composer, possible arranger, soloists, chorus,
conductor and orchestra) some additional objects (and thus persons to
produce these objects). The music has to be made available to the musicians
in a printed or written form as a score and the parts; the musicians need
training and instruments to be able to perform the music needed etc. The
extent to which these practical issues have been included in the role of an
opera organisation has changed during the history of the art form; they being
most often outside the organisational domain. Therefore, it is important to
realise their existence but the relevance they have to this study is fairly
limited.
Drama
The dramatic side of opera can be divided into two, the same way as the
musical, i.e. to creative and performing sides. The drama has to be created,
normally in written form as libretto, for the opera to be composed. It then
needs to be performed on stage by performers. In the early days of opera this
division into two used to be fairly clear. However, the situation was further
complicated later by a person interpreting the dramatic contents of the
musical-dramatic activity and instructing the performers in expressing this
interpretation. Here we are talking about a stage director - who acts in a
similar way to the musical arranger on the musical side - creating an
interpretation of a work of art for others to perform. Therefore, in the dramatic
side of opera we find two 'creative' roles: that of the author of the libretto
(often using a myth or a work of another author as the starting point) and that
of a stage director l
 . The stage director, however creative he or she may be,
1 The role of a stage director as an artistic creator is fairly new in the history of opera. Before
his arrival the original librettist (or his adapting in-house counterpart) was often the person
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belongs to the performing side of the production team. This view is based on
the fact that the creative interpretation of a stage director is associated with a
specific performance, not with all the performances of the opera concerned.
The on-stage performing side of the dramatic activity is fairly straightforward
consisting of the persons participating in the drama. There is a division within
this group of people which is based on the importance of the stage role of an
individual, i.e. the theatrical division to 'roles' and 'extras'''.
Visual aspects of opera
The artistically visual aspects — as opposed to the physical limits of the visual
aspects — of opera greatly intertwine with the dramatic aspects. However, in
the context of artistically visual (i.e. concerned with different forms of the
visual arts) aspects of opera we aim to limit the discussion only to the issues
outside the musical or dramatic activities 2 . The description of visual aspects of
opera is easiest to start from the physical objects incorporated in this domain;
the roles of the persons needed to produce or design these objects can then
be derived from this description. It seems inevitable that all aspects that can
be seen on the stage should be included in this category. This goes as far as
the looks of the singer-actors who are chosen (apart from the dominant
issues of singing and acting skills) on the basis of their appearance and then
made further suitable for the role by means of wigs, make-up and costumes.
responsible for the stage action. During different periods of opera history this role has been
assumed by composers or occasionally ballet masters. Before the current tradition of stage-
directors, the singer-actors played an important role in this creation of the dramatic activity on
stage; it being sometimes left completely to them.
1 This category would include dancers in operas where ballet is incorporated, supposing that
the dancers do not have specific roles in the dramatic activity.
2 The division is often difficult. For example one could ask: Is a knife on stage used for a
murder a dramatic or visual aspect? In this we could differentiate between two functions of the
knife: it being a knife and serving the drama as a knife and it being a knife with certain visual
characteristics outside it being recognisable as a knife. The former would define the dramatic
role and the latter the visual role of the knife in the performance concerned.
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The more obvious issues to be incorporated are the objects on the stage, the
physical surroundings of the performance (i.e. sets) and the lighting of the
stage.
The rationale of incorporating everything that can be seen on stage in the
visual objects stems from the fact that so far we have just described activities
and persons taking part in the performance. Therefore, without any visual
planning we would in effect have naked or arbitrarily dressed performers in an
arbitrary place performing the music-drama. Whereas this might be the case
in some contemporary performance exploring the limits of the art form, the
more usual case would be different. Normally all the aspects needed on
stage: costumes, wigs, make-up, props, sets (i.e. surroundings) and lighting
would have received some thought even if the outcome of this process were
to leave them without any special attention. Therefore, inevitably, persons are
needed to make the decisions about the visual aspects of the production.
This can be the responsibility of a single person, i.e. visual designer, or all
these aspects can be decided by different people resulting in a group of
people consisting of set designer, costume designer, make-up artist and
lighting designer. This is currently often the case, especially in larger
productions.
Apart from the person or group making the decisions, the visual aspects need
people to realise these designs, i.e. set builders and painters, props makers,
dress makers, make-up personnel, lighting technicians etc. These issues are
to some extent outside (i.e. interpreted as belonging to a non-artistic l world of
management) the domain of this study. However, this group of people is often
of considerable size, hence causing significant expenses to the organisation.
This inevitably has an impact on the artistic-economic dichotomy investigated
here by limiting the freedom of the visual designer(s) through a limited
1 The skills of set painters etc. are interpreted as belonging more to the category of
craftsmanship than art. However, this interpretation might change if the situation were to be
looked at from another point in history.
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amount of resources. The organisation of these (from the artistic point of
view) auxiliary personnel will therefore be left mostly outside this study.
2.3. Conclusion
Above we have discussed the variables influencing the functioning of the
opera organisation, that can be derived from activities on stage. The
discussion has listed several factors and parameters that need to be taken
into account. These lists and issues will be further categorised and a model of
their relations created later in the course of this chapter. First, however, we
need to explore the other side of the organisational reality in producing opera,
i.e. the acquiring of the resources needed so that the production process can
take place.
3. Economic constraints
In describing the artistic processes needed to produce opera we have, in
effect, described the 'spending' side, since all these activities need human
and material resources to be realised. In a world of limited resources all these
either have to be received as gifts or acquired by exchanging them for money
or services etc. Naturally the source of these funds and the limiting aspect of
their scarceness form the economic, i.e. 'income' side of the artistic-economic
dichotomy explored in this study. Different sources of this 'income' will now be
examined and the effect they have on the organisational structures of opera
companies will be analysed. This discussion is based on the logical division of
this income into four different categories. Additionally, a tripartite division of
values attached to this income based on the division of society into three
different spheres, i.e. civil society, economy and state, modelled on
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Habermas, Cohen & Arato, and Nielsen will be used l . With the help of this
tripartite value model, the logical division of four different income sources will
then be examined and discussed. Additionally, the question of quality as
contextual entity, as proposed by Nielsen (1999) will be incorporated in the
discussion. The argument is at this point deliberately theoretical; the
modelling exercise requires us to create the categories presented here. In the
actual reality of producing opera, and thus in the later analyses, these
categories often interact and overlap. However, defining the 'pure' categories
here will help us later on in describing the more blurred reality.
3.1. Different sources of income
The most straightforward source of the resources needed for the production
process of opera would naturally be the audience that enjoys the 'product',
i.e. performance of the opera. In this case the resources needed for the
production would be provided by the audience in the form of box office
income or some other form of contribution directly linked to the opportunity to
enjoy the performance. However, this approach to income by opera
organisations has not always been the case. The organisations have often
needed additional resources to cover this 'market failure' in gaining their
support directly from the audience. The different sources of income can be
divided into two categories describing the dichotomies to be found in the
contributing bodies. These dichotomies are firstly the division between one
source and multiple sources of income and secondly the division between
private2
 and institutional 3
 sources. The need to combine these two
1 This model will be presented here for clarity's sake despite the fact that it includes some
material that has been briefly presented in the previous chapter.
2 The term 'private' here refers to private individuals as opposed to institutions. The distinction
between this usage of the term and the way 'private' is used in the theory of Habermas below
should be born in mind.
3 Institutional here means all bodies that are not private individuals (i.e. belonging to the
lifeworld), be they commercial enterprises, states etc.
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dichotomies results in four different possible categories of income sources:
single private source, multiple private sources, single institutional source and
multiple institutional sources. As was mentioned above in the actual reality of
producing opera any of these categories seldom appear alone or in a pure
form. However, in the course of the later analyses these categories will help
us in labelling and understanding the different sources of income in question
and their influence on the organisations concerned. The categories
mentioned here label only the source of the income without tackling the issue
of the reason for the support and the values 'attached' to it. In this the division
into civil society, economy and state will be helpful.
3.2. Civil society-economy-state model
The tripartite model of civil society, economy and state is based on the
division of society into categories of lifeworld and system explored by Jurgen
Habermas in The Theory of Communicative Action. In his theory the lifeworld
of the individual is further divided into two, i.e. private sphere and public
sphere. Cohen & Arato, however, in their Civil Society and Political Theory
combine these two categories into one, civil society, which will be adopted for
the purposes of this study. This lifeworld - civil society - is 'opposed' by two
media steered systems, state (steered by the media of power) and economy
(market steered by media of money). The theoretical argument has been
summarised on pages 12-16 and will not, therefore, be repeated here.
This tripartite division has been introduced into the context of arts funding by
Henrik Kaare Nielsen (Nielsen 1996 & 1999.) The application of this theory to
arts support is based on the assumption that the community/audience/public
finds value in the art-form in question in the lifeworld context. Subsequently
these three sources, i.e. state, civil society and economy, provide support for
the art-form found valuable by the surrounding society. Each of them has
different aims and reasons for this support based on their own values and
assumptions. The author's interpretation and understanding of these three
value systems will be briefly presented below one category at a time.
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Civil society
The underlying value system in the support for arts from civil society is the
notion of the members of society accepting common individual responsibility
for the things commonly found valuable. That is to say that whoever has the
means of providing something found communally valuable is expected to
provide it. However, the judgement for the relative value of things and the
amount of support they need, is left to the discretion of the individual. In this
he/she is sensitive to the communal values and to the ethos of shared
responsibility for the 'common good' in his lifeworld.
State
The value system behind support from the state is the bureaucratised form of
accepting common responsibility for the common good on the systems level.
In this form the individuals contribute to the state according to their means
(normally in the form of taxes) and the state then distributes the funds to
provide services according to the priorities decided by the rulers, in
democratic societies through a democratic process. In the case of
democracies the values of competing needs in the society and their relative
priority becomes a more problematic issue (than e.g. in the case of civil
society) since they need to be made more explicit for them to be commonly
discussed and decided by public opinion.
Economy
The value system behind the third source of support, the economy (market
place, market force), is more straightforward. The support is channelled to
things found valuable for the individual or organisation concerned. The value
can be direct, as in the case of a paying audience, or indirect, as in the case
of a sponsoring commercial enterprise. The task of prioritising and valuing the
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things competing for a contribution is, in the case of the market, a more
straightforward process, since it involves only one individual or organisation
which makes the decision on the basis of the greatest good gained for
it/him/herself in relation to the expenditure.
Closely associated with these categories is the notion of quality - used
commonly as a measure of success of an arts organisation - as a contextual
entity as proposed by Nielsen. (Nielsen 1999.) He finds three different
contexts for discussion of quality; the art institution as context, the political
and economic context and the lifeworld as context. The quality in the context
of an arts institution is "determined by a common reference to the 'institution
of art', conceived as an esoteric field of praxis with its own criteria for validity
based on discourses stemming from expert culture". (Nielsen 1999, 191.) In
the political and economic context of quality "the quality of aesthetic artefacts
is directly proportional to their ability to attract broad and positive public
attention." (Nielsen 1999, 192.) The lifeworld as context discusses quality " in
connection with, for instance the concept of aesthetic experience and hence
as the question of the qualitative features of the dialogic exchange between a
certain artefact and the potentials of a certain user shaped by the lifeworld
and the life experience of the user." (Nielsen 1999, 192.) Naturally, the
discussion of quality is very complex and philosophically less clear-cut than
described here. However, these categories seem useful for analysing the
organisational reality in which opera organisations exist, even though they
could be further debated aesthetic-philosophical terms.
With the help of these three categories we can analyse the underlying value
systems of different sources of income for opera organisations. The different
contextual concepts of quality have not been included directly in the model
presented below. However, they will be used in the subsequent analyses. It
cannot be emphasised too much that these are only analytical categories and
seldom exist in pure forms in reality. However, it is argued here that they
clarify the discussion and analyses of opera organisational structures.
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3.3. Conclusion
We have discussed different ways of analysing and categorising the income,
i.e. economic, side of opera organisations. The different ways of obtaining
resources, including the income derived directly from the audience at the box-
office, bear different sets of values. These inevitably have an impact on the
organisation that needs to fulfil the value expectations that come with the
support it receives. These will not be discussed here; this issue is one to
which we hope to gain some insight in the course of the analyses. Hopefully,
some correlation between different organisational structures and income
sources will be detected and thus some insight into this interaction gained in
the course of this study. Before tackling with the actual analyses, the
taxonomies and models based on the discussion above will need to be
explicitly presented. This will be done below.
4. The model of variables and parameters
We have listed issues and topics to be considered in the analyses of opera
organisations. Also, some analytical categories have been discussed in order
for them to be engaged in this process. To present these more explicitly and
to observe their relations with each other we need to examine these in the
forms of taxonomies and models that will then be used as tools in the
analyses to come. This will be done in the same order as in the discussion to
enable comparisons with the text.
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4.1. Venue
In conjunction with the discussion of the physical limits of opera above, the
issue of the venue was brought up. This was done on the assumption that the
art form has influenced the development of the venue in which it has been
performed and this has subsequently had effects on the production of opera
and the management of opera organisations. Therefore, by observing some
aspects of this venue and its development we can find links with the changes
within the organisation of the production.
The variables that came up in the discussion are:
- Type of venue
- Size of venue
- Acoustics of the venue
- Layout of the venue
- Lighting
- Stage
All these variables define the type of performance venue we now know as
'opera house'. They also define the physical realities that need to be
considered when performing opera. The importance of these issues to the
discussion and understanding of opera, and thus opera organisations, comes
clear for example from Wagner's minute attention to the planning of his
Bayreuth theatre. With the help of the variables listed above we can set the
scene for the analyses of the artistic processes, and subsequently of the
organisations, functioning in these specific physical limits. These issues will
be incorporated in the model below as a background in which the model of
the artistic production process exists.
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4.2. Music-dramatic constraints
In the discussion above we adopted the traditional division of opera into
tripartite activity of music, drama and visual aspects as a useful concept for
the purposes of this study. As this division forms the basis for the process of
building a model below, it is presented here in the form of a figure, however
simple this may seem. Below we will contemplate the individual 'corners' of
this figure, i.e. music, drama and visual aspects, one at the time.
Figure 2.
Drama
Music ZN Visualaspects
Off stage
Creative
ArrangerComposer
Soloists Chorus	 Stage
	 Orchestra
ensemble
Conductor
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Music
In the discussion above about the music-dramatic constraints we found two
distinctive roles in the production of music for opera, i.e. creative and
performing. The creative role is limited to composer and in some cases
arranger (whose secondary role is implicated by a dashed line in the model).
The performing side is further divided into two different groups, i.e. performers
on stage and off stage. The former consists of soloists, chorus and in some
cases an ensemble. The latter consists of an orchestra or ensemble and its
leader or conductor. In this process of bringing music about in an opera
production we also defined some extra-musical issues needed, such as
printed music, instruments etc. These, however, were considered to be mainly
outside the scope of this study. The division of music according to this
categorisation is presented in figure 3.
Figure 3.
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Myth, Author
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Drama
The dramatic side of opera in the discussion above was divided into two, i.e.
the creative and performing sides. The creative side consists of a librettist
alonel , often influenced, however, by a myth or an original author. The
librettist creates the drama to be performed. The performing side consists of a
creative stage director2
 (in recent times) and the roles, performed by singer-
actors, and extras, consisting of members of chorus, dancers etc. This
division is presented in the figure 4 below.
Figure 4.
Drama
Visual aspects
The visual aspects of opera production were divided into several different
areas, i.e. costumes, wigs, make-up, props, sets and lighting. These issues
need to be planned and decided by a single person, or each by a different
individual. On the creative side of visual aspects of opera we can therefore
1 Sometimes this role is divided between two people, the original librettist and the in-house
adapting librettist acting in a way similar to that of the arranger on the musical side.
2 The stage director does not appear on the stage him/herself. However, as was described
above, his role is more associated with a specific performance than with more overall creative
responsibilities. Thus, he/she is categorised on the performing side.
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have a different number of people. In the realisation of these designs certain
craftsmen and assistants are needed. In the discussion above, however, we
categorised these people as non-artistic staff, mainly on the basis of current
consensus. Their numbers, however, influence the artistic freedom of the
designers and also the economic implications of their designs. Therefore,
they need to be included in the model. The model is presented in figure 5.
Figure 5.
Visual aspects
Designer(s)
Workshops,
technical crew,
stage crew
4.3. Holistic model of the artistic process
To successfully contemplate the artistic side of opera production we need to
incorporate all the above models into one. This model is presented below in
figure 6. It aims to describe the variables of artistic opera production and their
relationship to each other and to the surrounding physical realities. In the
model, the core artistic roles are highlighted with bold text. There are several
ways in which these key artists interrelate with each other in the artistic
production process. However, these cannot be mapped here as they change
in each individual production team.
C
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/ <
Single private source
Multiple private sources
Single institutional source
Multiple institutional sources
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4.4. Sources of income and their values
In the discussion above we arrived at a logical division of four different
sources of resources for opera organisations, i.e. 1) single private source, 2)
single institutional source, 3) multiple private sources and 4) multiple
institutional sources. In addition to this we defined three different value
systems attached to this income, i.e. civil society, economy and state. It
seems unnecessary to list all twelve combinations of these categories; in the
analyses the first will act as the basis for classifying the income source and
the latter will be used in defining the value system that it represents. Naturally,
these will seldom be clear cut. However, the combinations and conflicts that
may be observed will be illuminating for the analyses. Also, the concept of
quality as contextual entity will be incorporated in the analyses even though it
is not explicitly present in the model. The model for analysing the income
sources is presented below in figure 7.
Figure 7.
Income sources and their social value systems
Economic
resources
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4.5. The model for analysing the organisational environment of opera
organisations
Above we have presented two different sides affecting the functioning of
opera organisations in model form. These models represent the forces at the
respective ends of the artistic-economic continuum. They are incorporated in
a single model below in figure 8. The point of intersection in this model
represents the organisation and its decision-making and organisational
structures. The aim of the research project is to analyse five opera
organisations and explore how the forces mapped in this analytical model
influence their organisational structures.
CD
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5. Conclusion
In this chapter the analytical parameters and model for analysing the
environment influencing organisational structures of opera companies have
been presented. In the next part of the thesis five case-study organisations
are presented and the aspects explored in the analytical model described —
as far as the information has been available — in the context of individual
opera companies. This will enable further analyses and discussion about the
forces and variables listed here in the discussion and conclusion of the thesis.
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PART II- CASE STUDIES
4. INTRODUCTION
1. Preface
In this section of the thesis five case-studies on organisational structures of
opera companies are presented. The aim of the case-studies is to examine
the way in which the variables and structures listed in the analytical model
presented in the first part of the thesis manifest themselves in the selected
opera organisations. Furthermore, the aim is to find patterns and similarities
in their structures that arise from the influences caused by the artistic and the
socio-economic sides of producing opera. The case-study organisations
described are the Deutsche Oper Berlin, the English National Opera, the
Finnish National Opera, the Glyndebourne Festival Opera and the Opera
national de Paris. The Teatro alla Scala, Milan and the Metropolitan Opera
Association were also involved in the initial stages of the case-study material
collection, but unfortunately withdrew in the course of the process.
2. Selection of the case-study organisations
The selection of the case-study organisations was based initially on three
criteria: geographical spread in the historical core area of opera activity (i.e.
Europe and North America), the spread in the income structure of the houses,
and the size and status of the organisation. These criteria will be discussed
below one at the time. The aim was to get as wide a differentiation in the two
first criteria and as uniform a corpus as possible in the third criterion. The
corpus of the organisations analysed in this research was, however, also
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influenced by several practical limitations. These will also be discussed below
in conjunction with the description of the process of data collection.
The first criterion in the case-study selection was the geographical spread of
organisations. The aim was to select a set of organisations that would
represent the main areas of operatic activity. In this selection the importance
of the area in the historical continuum of opera was also considered. These
core areas were deemed to be the Italian peninsula (today's Italy), France,
and the German-speaking area of Europe (today's Austria and Germany).
The organisations included represent these areas, with the exception of Italy
due to the withdrawal of the Teatro alla Scala. North America was to be
included in the research partly for the geographical spread, but mainly due to
the differing income structure of most North-American opera organisations.
Unfortunately, the Metropolitan Opera Association withdrew from the research
project and it could not be replaced due to the time-limitations of the project.
Thus, there is no representative of North America among the case-study
organisations. England was also included in the study, increasing the
geographical spread. However, the reasons for including the English case-
studies were more to do with the income structures of the selected English
opera organisations and practical reasons than geographical considerations.
Unfortunately, the Eastern Europe, as influential as it has often been in the
history of opera especially in the 19th century, had to be excluded. This was
due mainly to the practical reasons of language, as the researcher did not
have command of any of the eastern languages. (The inclusion of, say, the
Marinsky Theatre, would have certainly provided very interesting information.)
However, due to the background of the author, Finland was included to
increase the geographical spread of the case-study organisations.
The second criterion in the selection of the case-study organisations was the
income structure of the organisations. The aim was to get a variation between
The selection of the geographical areas is reinforced by most opera histories; the
geographical structure in the presentation of opera history is often based on the same area
definitions as adopted here.
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a high level of state funding on one hand and high level of reliance on self-
generated income and private patronage on the other. The organisations
included in the research representing the extremes of this dichotomy are the
Deutsche Opel Berlin and the Glyndebourne Festival Opera. There is a
greater number of organisations relying on high levels of state funding in the
case-study organisations than organisations relying on self-generated income
and private patronage. If the Metropolitan Opera Association could have been
included in the research a better balance would have been achieved.
Unfortunately the withdrawal of the MET left the majority of the organisations
as being fairly heavily subsidised, as is the case in most European countries.
Thus, the geographical spread of the organisations influenced the variation in
the income structures. This, however, can be seen as an interesting finding of
the research as the continental European opera houses seem to represent a
fairly uniform income structure.
The third criterion in the selection of the case-study organisations was the
size and status of the organisation. The aim was to find organisations that
have a high artistic status either nationally or internationally. Thus, the artistic
quality of the case-study organisations' output could in this way be assumed
to be fairly uniform — it being either nationally or internationally recognised.
Also, the organisations (with the exception of the Glyndebourne Festival
Opera) are opera houses presenting opera on a continuous basis. This
approach was chosen for several reasons. First, the case-study organisations
chosen this way are at least rudimentarily comparable. The study does not
aim to be comparative research in the strict sense, but aims to perceive
patterns and analyse the structures of the case-study organisations. Thus, the
similarity in status and size helps in this process. Also, as the organisations
operate in a similar realm artistically and have similarities in size and status,
1 However, as General Director Nicholas Snowman points out, the Glyndebourne Festival
Opera with 75 performances at Glyndebourne and 45 on tour annually is more active than La
Scala. (Clark 1999, 10.)
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some comparative data can be based on this selection. 1 Second, there is
more material available about the nationally and internationally important
opera organisations, than about smaller and less significant organisations.
This was deemed important for the practical reasons of data collection. There
is literature available about all the organisations selected as case-studies
which proved to be invaluable in the course of conducting the research
process.
3. The method of data collection
The data presented below in the case-study descriptions has been collected
in three different ways: from existing literature, by correspondence with the
organisations involved resulting in sets of primary and secondary data, and by
conducting semi-structured interviews. These will be presented and explained
below. The actual process of data-collection will also be described.
The first method of data-collection from literature is self-evident. However, it is
important to note, that the information available about the historical
development of the organisations in question was deemed imperative to be
included in the case-study descriptions. This information, however, was not
readily available from the organisations themselves; they seem to have their
hands too full in dealing with the present to trouble themselves with the
historical facts. Thus, the literature and studies of the histories of the
organisations have provided the main sources of information about the
organisational history (i.e. development of legal status etc.) of the case-study
organisations.
1 The inclusion of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera is slightly problematic in this sense.
However, the income-structure of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera provides interesting
information that outweigh the problems in comparability.
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The written information acquired from the organisations through
correspondence constitutes primary and secondary data. The selected
organisations were initially contacted by letter asking their willingness to
participate in the research. After the initial reaction had proved positive in all
seven cases (i.e. the Deutsche Oper Berlin, the English National Opera, the
Finnish National Opera, the Glyndebourne Festival Opera, the Metropolitan
Opera Association, the Opëra national de Paris and the Teatro alla Scala,
Milan) the detailed description of the information requested was sent to the
organisations. The main categories of information requested were: legal
status, composition of the board of directors, organisational structure/chart,
income and expenditure information, information about the employee
structure of the organisation, information about the venue used by the
organisation, and programming and pricing information. The complete set of
information requested is included in Appendix 1. The information gathered —
as far as possible — concerned the calendar year 1998 1 as the financial
information about the organisations was most often based on the calendar
year. This approach was chosen to maintain some degree of comparability
between the organisations. Thus, all other information — e.g. about
programmes etc. is presented for the same period of time (often the calendar
year) wherever possible, even though the actual seasons differ from this
definition in all cases. The material gathered from the organisations
containing the requested information, includes unpublished internal
documents, internal working-papers, publicity materials, annual reports etc.
As the referencing of some of the primary and secondary material would have
proven to be very complex, a simple method of referencing has been adopted
in these cases. The case-study material of each of the organisations (apart
from published literature) is referred to as one entity, the list of all the material
given separately in the bibliography section. For example, in the case of the
1 There are exceptions to this rule due to different time-frame of operations of the
organisations. For example, the data about the Finnish National Opera is about year 1997,
due to the early response of the organisation to the researcher's requests. Further, the data
about the Deutsche Oper Berlin is compiled from different sources, the years varying between
1995 and 1998.
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English National Opera the whole case-study information collected in the
course of the research, but not having a clear separate reference, is referred
to as ENO 1998. The definitions of the sources, both primary and secondary,
can then be found in the bibliography.
In the course of the correspondence process the Metropolitan Opera
Association and the Teatro alla Scala withdrew from the project. The reason
for the MET so doing was obviously the extensive set of information
requested. The management of the organisation considered some of the
information highly confidential due to the private nature (legally the MET is a
private association) of the organisation. This was the case especially about all
financial information over and above the information included in the Annual
Report of the organisation. Similar problems were involved in the process of
data-collection on the Glyndebourne Festival Opera, the other privately-
funded organisation included. However, as the requested information was
discussed, a compromise was achieved that enabled Glyndebourne to
participate in the research without disclosing any confidential information.
Thus, some information available about other case-study organisations is not
available about the Glyndebourne Festival Opera, or is only present in a more
general form. The Teatro alla Scala was undergoing a change in its legal
status from an ente autonomo (a public autonomous body) into a foundation
under the private law operating (at least in principle) more independently of
the government. Thus, during the process of data collection this change
seemed to influence the whole organisation, resulting in reluctance to provide
the information required. Also, there was an Italian research project underway
into the change of status of the organisation, which contributed to the
reluctance to provide the information once again, to a foreign researcher.
Therefore, it was decided not to include the Teatro alla Scala in the study,
since the required set of information could not be completed.
After the completion of the written data collection and initial analysis of the
information gathered, the key figures in the case-study organisations were
interviewed. The aim was to interview the directors dealing with the artistic-
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economic dichotomy. Interviews were requested with the General Director (in
most cases the artistic director) and the Administrative Director of each of the
organisations. Additionally, interviews were requested with the Chair of the
Board of Directors or representative of the funding body, whichever was
applicable. Unfortunately, not all the interviews could be granted, due to the
tight schedules of the directors involved. However, a sufficient number of
interviews were conducted to explore the artistic-economic decision-making
structures of the case-study organisations. The interviews conducted were
semi-structured concentrating on five major topics: the relationship between
the organisation and the funding body, the division of responsibilities between
the directors (general director, administrative director and music director or
whichever set was applicable), the relationship between artistic planning and
budgeting processes, the economic-organisational control of the artistic
production process, and the predicted future trends in the artistic-economic
relationship (e.g. diminishing funding and its implications on policies etc.). As
the issues discussed were of a relatively delicate nature, the interviews were
not recorded. This was deemed important for keeping the interviews
'confidential' in nature. The main points covered in the interviews were
recorded in the interviewer's notes. This semi-structured and 'confidential' way
of conducting the interviews did not produce a defined set of recorded
answers to a defined set of questions. However, as the interviews mainly
supported and confirmed the findings of the analysis of the written case-study
material, the method was deemed most appropriate. Had the interviews been
recorded word for word, the directors would hardly have commented on e.g.
the artistic-economic planning process as freely as they in fact did.
4. Presentation of the case studies
The case-studies will be presented one at the time. Each of the case-study
presentations is divided into nine different topics, that are presented
individually below. There are some minor variations in the presentation of the
material based on the differing structures of the organisations. Even though
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every possible effort has been made to present the material in a uniform
manner, the organisations and the information available about them have
inevitably influenced the nature of the descriptions. There is, for example,
quite comprehensive data available about the income and expenditure
structure of the Deutsche Oper Berlin. Thus, the financial data is presented in
a more detailed manner than in other case-studies. However, it has been
deemed useful to provide such a detailed account about the expenditure
structure of one of the opera organisation since this information is often not
available. The small variations in the structures of the case-study descriptions
are due to factors similar to this. The main areas covered in the case-study
descriptions are: the legal status of the organisation and its historical
development; the income and expenditure structure; the board of directors (or
equivalent) governing structure; the personnel structure; the basic details
about the venue used; the programming, pricing and audience figures (where
available); the organisational structure; and the artistic and financial planning
and decision-making structure. At the end of each of the case-study
descriptions, the data is summarised in table form. The case studies will be
compared and discussed and the emerging conclusions will be examined in
the discussion and conclusions part of the thesis following the case-study
descriptions.
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5. THE DEUTSCHE OPER BERLIN
1. Organisational history and the legal status of the organisation
In 1907, representatives of the Berlin bourgeoisie - e.g. prominent artists,
public figures and journalists - organised themselves into an association
'Grosse Berliner Operverein e. V.' to create a 'Richard Wagner' opera theatre
in Charlottenburg, Berlin. The aim was to erect a bourgeois opera theatre with
democratic seating - all seats facing the stage, no boxes - to compete with the
KOniglichen Hofoper Unter den Linden (Royal Opera Unter den Linden'),
which at that time still did not allow entry to the bourgeois public l . (Berlin
Senatsverwaltung 1983, 4.). The aim was to gain cultural equality with the
aristocracy for the bourgeoisie who had become financially emancipated
during the 19th century. The chair of the association was composer Engelbert
Humperdinck, who had been an assistant to Richard Wagner in Bayreuth.
(Meyer zu Heringdorf 1988, 12.)
The two other opera houses in Berlin - the Hofoper and the Komische Oper -
were financially dependent on subsidies from the Prussian Monarch and a
businessman, J. Epstein, respectively. The 'Grosse Berliner Opemverein e. V.'
aimed at creating a financially independent opera organisation and trying to
run it under the commerce laws in the form of a private company
(Aktiengesellschaft, i.e. PLC). (Meyer zu Heringdorf 1988, 13.) In order to
publicise the project and to raise funds, the association created a publicity
campaign at the end of 1910. It was given an enthusiastic reception by the
opera-loving bourgeoisie, e.g. businessmen, civil servants, doctors, engineers
etc., resulting in a total of 8 350 subscriptions. This raised DM 600 000 2
 of the
1 This was changed only few years later when as a result of the November Revolution of 1918,
the Hofoper changed into the more democratic Staatsoper. The new Ministry of Culture
assumed the responsibility of the Staatsoper in 1919. (Cowden, ed.1992, 86.)
2 In 1911 figures.
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DM 1 000 000 share capital, the rest being donated by the founders of the
association. Thus, the 'Deutsche Opemhaus Betriebs-Aktiengesellschaff was
founded in January 1911. (Meyer zu Heringdorf 1988, 14.)
Even though the bourgeois association had sought independence from all
authorities, financial or other, it did not quite escape the control of the
officialdom. The lease agreement between the Stadt Charlottenburg (City of
Charlottenburg in the western region of Greater Berlin, now an integral part of
Berlin) and the 'Deutsche Opemhaus Betriebs-Aktiengesellschaff created the
instrument for control. The City of Charlottenburg agreed to erect an opera
house, the cost of which would amount to DM 3 000 000, and lease it to the
company for 30 years for an annual rent of DM 250 000. However, the City
retained the rights to decide the ticket prices, to oversee the maintaining of
high artistic quality and to monitor the contracts of the company. In addition to
this, the City had a general right to control the functioning of the company. If
these clauses were not honoured the lease agreement would be terminated.
(Meyer zu Heringdorf 1988, 16.)
The new opera house was opened in November 1912 under the name of
Deutsches Opemhaus'. To begin with it operated as a private company but
faced its first financial difficulties already in 1913, despite the fact that the
performances were sold out every evening. The company asked the City to
raise the ticket prices, which was agreed upon but resulted in tightening
control by the City authorities. The company kept operating with financial
difficulties during its early years of existence - partly due to the First World
War and the high inflation in Germany after the war - and gradually became
more dependent on the City, which granted it partial exemption from rental
payments from 1914 onwards and finally a direct subsidy in 1920. After a
series of speculative attempts by businessmen to take over the company, it
was finally declared bankrupt in December 1924. (Meyer zu Heringdorf 1988,
19-34.)
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In 1925, the Stadt Berlin (City of Berlin, under which all the Cities - including
Charlottenburg - in the Greater Berlin area had been united in 1920) took
responsibility for the organisation, taking over the limited shares on favourable
terms and renamed it Stadtische Oper (City Opera). It came under the
authority of the Prussian Cultural Bureau, remaining however for the time
being as `Aktiengesellschaff , and has since then been controlled and funded
by the cultural authorities of Berlin. (Cowden, ed. 1992, 76-78.) Between
1933-44 the Propaganda Ministry of the German Reich was responsible for
running the company, again named Deutsches Opemhaus for political
purposes. (Berlin Senatsverwaltung 1983, 4.) During this 'take-over' the legal
status of the organisation was changed and it became a public institution
operating under the direct authority of the cultural administration - a model
which has continued until today.
In 1943, the Charlottenburg Opera House was badly damaged in air raids and
the company performed in Admiralspalast am Bahnhof Friedrichstrasse till the
closure of all theatres in Berlin in autumn 1944. After the Second World War
the company performed in the relatively undamaged Theater des Westens as
the Stãdtisches Oper Berlin (Berlin City Opera), operating under the authority
of the western allied forces until the Bundesrepublik Deutschland was formed.
In 1961 the company moved to a new theatre built by the Berlin Senate on
the Charlottenburg site. It changed its name to Deutsche Oper Berlin which
linked the organisation and the New Opera House to the original
Charlottenburg opera house and company. (Cowden, ed. 1992, 79-80.) The
unification of Germany did not have any direct effects on the functioning, legal
or financial, of the company, but it did, however, open it to competition from
the other two Berlin opera houses that had existed in East Berlin.
Currently the Deutsche Oper Berlin operates under the control of Berlin
Senatsverwaltung far Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur (Senate
Administration of Science, Research and Culture). It is a legally non-
independent public organisation and its relationship with the Berlin
Senatsverwaltung is defined in Haushaltsstrukturgesetz of 1996. The financial
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relationship between the Deutsche Oper and the Senatsverwaltung is defined
in the Statute `Allgemeine Anweisung fiber die Finanzierung von Theatem
und Orchestem in Berlin' (General Instructions on the Financing of Theatres
and Orchestras in Berlin) of 25th October 1994. The introduction to the
instructions for the `Staatliche Einrichtungen' (Public Institutions) states that
the "first task of theatres and orchestras is to fulfil the organisation's cultural
aims. However, they must in this framework ensure that as high proportion of
the expenditure as possible is covered by their own income." The more
specific ways in which these statutes dictate the financial control and
management of the Deutsche Oper Berlin will be commented on in the
section addressing the decision-making structures of the organisation.
2. Income structure of the DOB
This section is based on several sources of information, all from different
years (1995-1998). However, it is deemed useful to consider all these sources
as they reveal different aspects about the organisation. The total income of
the Deutsche Oper Berlin in the 1996 financial year - the most recent figures
available from the Senatsverwaltung far Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur
- amounted (in full thousands) to DM 102 100 000 1 . It is divided into two
categories: subsidies DM 88 137 000 (86,3%) and self-generated income, DM
13 963 000 (13.7%) The only source of subsidies is the Berlin Land 2 (State of
Berlin), Senatsverwaltung far Kultur under which the Deutsche Oper exists
organisationally as was explained above. The category of self-generated
income is in the 1996 figures by the Senatsverwaltung far Kultur divided into
three subcategories: Ticket yield DM 9 207 600, sundry income DM 2 167 000
1 The result for the financial year 1996 was DM 2 492 000 in deficit, i.e. the total expenditure
figure was DM 104 592 000.
2 According to the German system of arts subsidies, the Lander (the States) subsidise the arts
organisations functioning in their area. The Bund (Federation) subsidises very few
organisations directly and even then the amount of subsidy is relatively small.
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and sundry operational income DM 2 588 000. (Berlin Senatsverwaltung
1997, 1102.)
The 1998 budget of Deutsche Oper Berlin sheds more light into the division of
the income structure. The anticipated total income for 1998 1
 amounts to DM
100 025 000, consisting of DM 80 231 000 (80%) subsidy from the Land2 and
self-generated income of DM 19 794 000 (20%), divided into DM 9 550 000
box office yield, DM 7 409 000 sundry income and DM 2 835 000 sundry
operational income. The latter two are further broken down in the budget as
follows: (Berlin Senatsverwaltung 1997, 1103-1105.)
Sundry income 1998:
Touring
Rental income
Programme sales
Advertising income
Lease income
Broadcasting income
Sundry
Total Sundry income DM
6 208 DO03
610 000
350 000
120 000
61 000
50 000
10 000
7 409 000
Sundry operational income 1998:
Donations and sponsorship income
	 2 000 000
Reimbursements by third parties
	 350 000
Income from investments 	 20 000
Sales	 5 000
Sundry	 460 000
Total Sundry operational income DM
	 2 835 000
There is more detailed information about box-office income and some other
items in the Deutscher Biihnenverein Theaterstatistik 1995/96. The category
1 The DOB made a surplus for 1998 totalling DM 350 000. However, as the accounts are not
made publicly available the, Budget needs to be the basis for the presentation. This is deemed
sufficiently accurate as the surplus is relatively small in comparison with the whole budget.
2 The Land is the only source of direct subsidies. However, the Federal Government has
granted the Berlin Senate an 'earmarked' sum of DM 17 000 000 for subsidies to the
nationally important Berlin opera houses. This figure is anticipated to rise in the future.
3 The category of sundry income is exceptionally large in 1998 due to the high touring income,
DM 6 208 000. The comparable 1997 figure was only DM 200 000.
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of self-generated income for the financial year 1995 - the most recent figures
available - totalling DM 12 916 000, is broken down accordingly below. The
Deutscher Bahnenverein figures also give a separate category of sponsorship
income amounting to DM 908 000 (0.8% of total income) in 1995. The
amount of sponsorship income has since risen dramatically to DM 2 000 000
in 1998 (2% of total income), more than doubling the 1995 figures in four
years. (Deutscher Bahnenverein 1996, 96-97.)
Self-generated income 1995:
Box office income 9 926 000
Individual tickets 7 294 000
Subscriptions 1 343 000
Sales through 'friends' organisationsl 1 289 000
Sales of programmes 381 000
Costume rentals 375 000
Broadcasting fees 350 000
Touring 112 000
Advertisements income 110 000
Sundry income2 1 662 000
Total self-generated income 1995 DM 12 916 000
3. The expenditure structure of the DOB
The 1996 total expenditure of the Deutsche Oper Berlin amounted to DM 104
592 000 according to the Senatsverwaltung far Kultur. This is divided into four
categories: personnel expenses DM 90 811 000 (87% of total expenditure),
sundry operational expenses DM 9 414 000 (9% of total expenditure),
material expenses DM 3 931 000 (3,6% of total expenditure), and write-offs
DM 436 000 ( 0,4% of total expenditure).
These categories are broken down more specifically - making the information
more useful - in the 1998 budget of the organisation. The total anticipated
expenditure of the Deutsche Oper Berlin is DM 102 590 000. It breaks down
1 Besucherorganisationen.
2 Includes box-office income from certain concession tickets.
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into subcategories as follows: personnel expenses DM 86 640 000 (84.5% of
total expenditure), sundry operational expenses DM 12 631 000 (12.4% of
total expenditure), material expenses DM 3 136 000 (3% of total
expenditure), and taxes DM 183 000 (0.1% of total expenditure). These
categories are further broken down in considerable detail below: (Berlin
Senatsverwaltung 1997, 1104-1105.)
Personnel expenses 1998:
Salaries of civil servantsl 208 000
Remuneration for permanent employees 7 688 000
Remuneration for temporary employees 99 000
Wages for permanent workers 17 882 000
Wages for temporary workers 1 180 000
Expenditure for permanent artistic and artistic-technical
personnel
48 471 000
Expenditure for temporary artistic and artistic-technical
personnel
12 502 000
Expenditure for free-lance staff 96 000
- structural savings in personnel expenses - 1486 000
Total personnel expenses DM 86 640 000
1 For further definitions of the different employee categories, see the section on personnel
structure below. The categories are presented here in the same 'hierarchical order' as in the
budget.
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Sundry operational expenses 1998: Subdivided Total
Artistic expenses 1 5 957 000
Touring 4 510 000
Copyright fees and commissions 807 000
Travel expenses (artistic activities) 640 000
Building related costs 2 249 000
Heating 860 000
Electricity 713 000
Cleaning 381 000
Water and sewage 180 000
Refuse collection 115 000
Rents and maintenance 1 725 000
Rents for vehicles 540 000
Rents for buildings 520 000
Maintenance of machinery 287 000
Computers and their maintenance 154 000
Maintenance of vehicles 22 000
Maintenance of buildings 112 000
Rents for equipment 75 000
Maintenance of office equipment 15 000
Administration 1 407 000
Marketing and public relations 681 000
Consultation 208 000
Auditing 160 000
Telephone 130 000
Postage 135 000
Travel expenses (administration) 42 000
Office stationary 35 000
Publications 11 000
Hospitality 5 000
Sundry 1 293 000
Sundry personnel expenses 223 000
Insurance 205 000
Sundry expenses 865 000
Total sundry operational expenses DM 12 631 000
1 For the sake of clarity this category has been grouped into subcategories. This is, however,
not a feature of the original budget of Deutsche Oper Berlin but has been done here for the
purpose of increased readability and informativity.
 .
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Material expenses 1998:
Material for new productions 1 163 000
Material for revivals 680 000
Sundry contracted material preparation 597 000
Printed materials 385 000
Raw materials for workshops and technical departments 135 000
Contracted material preparation for productions 120 000
Props 50 000
Sundry material expenses 6 000
Total material expenses DM 3 136 000
A different way of breaking down the costs can be found in the Deutscher
BOhnenverein Theaterstatistik 1995/96. It gives details for the financial year
1995, during which the total expenditure of Deutsche Oper Berlin amounted
to DM 105 247 000. This is broken down into three categories, personnel
expenses DM 93 751 000 (89.1% of total expenditure), material expenses DM
11 260 000 (10.7% of total expenditure), and finance related expenses DM
236 000 (0.2% of total expenditure). The first two figures are further broken
down below. (Deutscher Bahnenverein 1996, 114-115.)
Personnel expenditure 1995:
Artistic personnel 62 005 000
Directors etc. 5 917 000 (9.5%)
Soloists 20 736 000 (33.4%)
Ballet ensemble 5 136 000 (8.3%)
Chorus 10 336 000 (16.7%)
Orchestra 19 880 000 (32.1%)
Technical and stage personnel 25 863 000
Administration and front-of-house staff 5 054 000
Sundry personnel expenditure 829 000
Total personnel expenditure DM 93 751 000
Material expenses 1995:
Administration expenses 507 000
Rents and leases 584 000
Publicity materials, publications 1 182 000
Sets and costumes 2 615 000
Copyright and related material costs 910 000
Touring 95 000
Expenses from visiting companies 331 000
Sundry expenses 5 038 000
Total material expenses 11 260 000
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4. The personnel structure
In the Appendix 1 to the 1998 Budget of the Deutsche Oper Berlin the
personnel is divided into four different main categories: civil servants,
employees, workers and artistic-technical personnel. The last three of these
are further divided into two categories based on the nature of employment,
i.e. permanent or temporary. As the organisation is a non-independent public
institution its employment structure and categories are based on the German
public service structures thus giving very good security to the employees. The
category of civil servants 2 (Beamte, 3.5 positions) is a relic of the past, when
most of the employees were granted civil servant status. More recently, this
very restrictive personnel policy has been changed towards more flexible
contracts. The three latter categories can roughly be described according to
the function of the posts and their relative importance in the organisation. The
employees (Angestellte, 110 permanent and 1 temporary positions) are the
administrative personnel and the heads of workshops etc. The workers
(Arbeiter, 259.5 permanent and 37 temporary positions) are the labourers of
the organisation consisting of stage hands, lighting technicians, cleaners etc.
The artistic and artistic-technical personnel (Kiinstlerisches und kiinstlerisch-
technisches Personal, 407 permanent and 30 temporary positions) consist of
the creative artistic personnel (directors, conductors, designers) and their
assistants, soloists, chorus and orchestra etc. The total number of employees
budgeted for the year 1998 is thus 847. The artistic and artistic-technical
personnel has been broken down in the budget in an informative manner and
will be presented below. The other categories consist mainly of separate
professional titles under which a few people are employed, making the
1 As the personnel expenses of the organisation are responsible for 84.5% of the total
expenditure, the Employment Plan (Stellen- und Beschaftigungsplan) is an important part of
the organisation's budget and it is thus attached to the actual budget accepted by the
Senatsverwaltung far Kultur.
2 The categories used are difficult to translate as they also define the contractual relationship
between the employee and the employer. Thus, the original German terms will be included in
parentheses for the sake of clarity.
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breakdown unnecessarily detailed. (Senatsverwaltung 1997, 1108.) A more
useful breakdown of the overall personnel structure can be found in the
Deutscher Bahnenverein Theaterstatistik 1995/96. It can be used as an
alternative source of information comparable to the 1998 figure (847
employees) since the 1995 figure is very similar (867 employees). (Deutscher
Bahnenverein 1996, 86.)
Breakdown of the artistic and artistic-technical personnel (temporary
personnel and trainees included) according to the 1998 Budget of the
Deutsche Oper Berlin:
Artistic and artistic-technical personnel in 1998:
General Director	 1
Music Director	 1
Artistic personnel (directors, conductors, set designers) 	 55
Soloists, opera
	
45
Soloists, ballet
	
18
Chorus members	 100
Ballet chorus members	 35
Orchestra leaders
	
3
Orchestra co-leaders
	
2
Solo violinists	 2
Solo cellists	 2
Orchestra members	 132
Technical director	 1
Assistant to the Technical director	 1
Technical manager 	 1
Heads of make-up artists 	 4
Make-up artists	 14
Head of Costumes department	 1
Planning assistant to the Costumes department
	
1
Production assistant to the Costumes department
	
1
Head of Set workshop	 1
Head of Design department
	
1
Head of Electricity, Light and Audio department 	 1
Total of artistic and artistic-technical personnel	 437
In the budget under the heading of temporary artistic and artistic-technical
personnel (consisting of 30 posts), the visiting artists for ballet, the directors,
conductors, set designers etc., and the visiting opera soloists are also
included, without not mentioning the numbers of employees concerned.
Based on the 1998-99 season (1998 annual figures are not available nor
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extractable) the estimated number of singers is 153, of which the permanent
ensemble consists of 45 singers, leaving 108 visiting soloists. Their fees are
included in this expense category. Additionally the fees for groups such as
boys' choir, additional chorus and extras are included in this category. The
total anticipated expenditure of this category (containing 30 actual posts in
addition to the visitors) in 1998 is DM 12 502 000, 12% of the total
expenditure of the organisation. It is a significant amount also compared with
the expenditure for the category of permanent artistic and artistic-technical
personnel, DM 48 731 000. Therefore, it obviously contains the 'star' visitors'
fees but does not give information on the actual numbers (estimated above
from other sources of information) of the visiting artists or the expenditure
connected with theml.
The breakdown of the personnel structure of the Deutsche Oper Berlin in
1995 according to the Deutscher BOhnenverein Theaterstatistik 1995/96:
Personnel structure in 1995:
Artistic personnel 417
Opera soloists 49
Ballet members 62
Chorus members 109
Orchestra members 139
Sundry artistic personnel 58
Technical personnel 3322
Administration 52
Maintenance and front-of-house personnel 663
Total of personnel employed 867
1 This practice is a fairly clever way of 'disguising' the star fees, a jealously protected secret.
Most opera organisations simply refuse to give out even this detailed information about their
accounts in order to prevent any calculations in this direction.
2 Costume production partly contracted out of the organisation.
3 Cleaning partly contracted out of the organisation.
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5. The Opera House
The original Charlottenburg Opera House, built by the City of Charlottenburg
and subsequently leased to the Deutsches Opemhaus Betriebs-
Aktiengesellschaff, , was reduced to rubble in 1943. Only the foundations and
some of the service areas (some workshops and administration) of the
theatre survived. After the division of Berlin into four sectors following the
Second World War, the company performed in the Theater des Westens in
the British sector. The rebuilding of the lindenopee (home of the Staatsoper
'Linter den Linden), which had also been destroyed in the bombing of Berlin,
was begun soon after the war and completed in 1955. Meanwhile, however,
Berlin had been divided into eastern and western parts, and the rebuilding of
the Charlottenburg Opera House had gained momentum as a project of
national importance in the competition between the east and the west. Thus,
the original concept of Charlottenburg Opera competing with the Oper Unter
den Linden was repeated, however, in a different form. (Roesler 1997, 1.)
In 1953 an architectural competition for rebuilding the Charlottenburg Opera
House was announced. It was won in 1955 by Fritz Bornemann who
integrated the old foundations and the service buildings into his new design of
the auditorium and the foyer. The design remained faithful to the original
ideals of the Charlottenburg bourgeois opera house, the seating being
'democratic' - even the boxes and their seats face the stage - and the
auditorium being modelled in many ways after the design of Bayreuth, thus
serving the original aim of creating a Wagner opera house. (Roesler 1997, 2.)
However, the appearance of the rebuilt parts of the house is strikingly
modern, the design thus having successfully created a modern opera house
which respects its past. The building work on the site started in spring 1956.
The topping-out ceremony was held at the end of 1959 and the inauguration
of the New Opera House took place in September 1961. (Heidelmeyer 1998,
24.) The total cost of the rebuilding project was DM 27 440 000 1 , financed by
1 In 1961 figures.
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the Federal Government within the framework of long-term fund-aid for the
rebuilding of the capital, Berlin l . (DOB 1992, 18.)
The new Charlottenburg opera house, called the Deutsche Oper Berlin after
the company, has one auditorium, with 1900 seats which are all directed
towards the centre of the stage. There are 1200 seats in the stalls, 365 in the
dress circle and 335 in the upper circle. The house does not have a studio
theatre, but the main foyer can be used for small-scale performances. The
stage is cruciform consisting of an 18 X 18 metre main stage (divided into six
individual risers, +- 3 m), a revolving rear stage of the same size that can be
wheeled onto the main stage, and wing stages sized 17 x 19 m (left) and 12 x
25 m (right). The stage trucks of the wing stages can be wheeled onto the
stage, thus making the set changes quick and effective. The fly-tower height
is 27 metres. The proscenium arch is adjustable, its width varying from 11 to
14.7 metres and its height up to a maximum of 8 metres. (DOB 1992, 20.)
The orchestra pit size is 142 square metres. The lighting and sound
technology is state of the art, due to an extensive refit in 1989. The main
technical problem of the Deutsche Oper Berlin is the lack of space to store
sets (see below for the number of different performances during a season),
resulting in the need to store sets outside the house. The technical staff
dismantle the sets etc. after a show and they are transported and stored by a
contractors.
6. Programming, pricing and audience figures
In 19982 the repertory of the Deutsche Oper Berlin consisted of six premieres
in the main auditorium, four operas and two ballets. The opera premieres
were Wagner: Parsifal, Massenet: Manon, Massenet: Werther (Concert
1 Bundeshilfe in Rahmen des langfristigen Aufbauplanes ftir die Hauptstadt Berlin.
2 For the sake of consistency (all the financial data is based on the calendar year 1998) the
repertory is presented by calendar year. The actual 1998/99 season ran from 23rd August
1998 to 11th July 1999.
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version), Ponchielli: La Gioconda and Strauss: Die Frau ohne Schatten. The
ballet premieres were ZaneIla: ...schatten von sensucht..., Last Blues, and de
Oliveira: Cinderella.
The opera repertory of Deutsche Oper Berlin consisted of 30 other operas in
1998 (some performed on tour) listed below: Hansel und Gretel, Carmen,
Boris Godunov, Die ZauberflOte, Der fliegende Hollander (Tokyo),
Tannhauser (Tokyo and Stockholm), Der Rosenkavalier (Yokohama), //
Trovatore, Aida, Das Rhein gold, Die Wa&Ore, Siegfried, GOtterdammerung,
Susannah, Elektra, Don Giovanni, Lucia di Lammermoor, Tosca, Der Prinz
von Homburg, Rigoletto, Lohen grin, Kàta Kabanova, Die Meistersinger von
Altimberg, Eugene One gin, Madame Butterfly, Carmina Burana, Die
Enffahrung aus dem Serail, La Forza del destino, Faust, Die Hugenotten,
Salome.
The repertory of the Deutsche Oper Berlin ballet consisted of eight ballets
(including three triple bills) listed below: Barra: Die Schneektinigin, Bigonzetti /
Kyliân / Forsythe: Stamping Ground etc., Hynd: Rosalinde, de Oliveiras /
Gomes / Pederneiras: Credo, Cranko: One gin, Schaufuss / Bournonville: La
Sylphide, Mart: Ring um den "Ring", MacMillan: Concerto / Bigonzetti:
Turnpike I Petipa: Raymonda.
In 1998 the Deutsche Oper Berlin gave a total of 195 opera and ballet
performances in its main auditorium, 145 operas and 50 ballets. In addition to
this the company performed 10 operas on tour in Japan and Sweden.
Additionally there were 49 performances in the foyer consisting of ballet
matinees, children's programmes, outreach work etc. The number of different
programmes in the foyer was 24. There were a total of 26 concerts (4 of them
on tour) organised by the Deutsche Oper Berlin, ranging from recitals and
chamber music to symphony concerts. There were several venues used for
the concerts: the main auditorium, the foyer, the Konzerthaus Berlin, the
Kloster Chorin and the Philharmonie. In 1998 several visiting companies also
performed at the Deutsche Oper Berlin, mainly during the periods when the
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company was touring. These included the Swedish Royal Opera, the
Netherlands Dance Theatre etc., the total number of guest performances
reaching 24. In addition to this there was a charitable AIDS Opera Gala
organised in the main auditorium. (DOB Die Spielzeit 97/98 &98/99.)
There are six performance categories in the ticket prices for the main
auditorium of the Deutsche Oper Berlin, each divided into six different
categories based on the location of the seat. The performance categories A,
B and C refer to different types of opera performances; price category A is
used mostly for matinees, B is the 'normal' opera performance and category
C is used for premieres, Wagner's operas etc. There are two price categories
for the ballet performances, Ballet I used for performances with music from
tape and Ballet II used for performances with live music. Additionally there is
a category S, special prices, which is applied to concerts, foyer performances,
etc. that need to be individually priced. The range of prices (in autumn 1998)
for the three opera price categories were: A DM 92-17, B DM 112-22 and C
DM 142-32. The ballet price categories were: Ballet I DM 57-17 and Ballet ll
DM 70-22.
The auditorium is divided into six price categories within each performance
price category. For example the most common price category B is divided as
follows. The stalls are divided into four price areas, (from the front) DM 87,
72, 62, 42 (this category including the back of the stalls boxes). The dress
circle is divided into three price areas (from the front), DM 112, 87, 72. The
upper circle is divided similarly into three price areas, DM 62, 42, 22.
Additionally there are eight boxes in the dress circle, places in the first row
costing DM 112 and the remainder DM 87, and eight boxes in the upper
circle, the seats costing DM 72 or DM 42 depending on the location of the
box. Furthermore, there is a different pricing system used for the concerts
given in the Konzerthaus Berlin, prices ranging from DM 50 to DM 20.
There are different subscription schemes in operation at the Deutsche Oper
Berlin, the main form of subscription being a series of eight performances
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annually, either specified performances or a free selection of works (more
expensive). There are two sets of concessions groups that can acquire tickets
a week before the performance at either 25% (pensioners, students and
unemployed) or 50% (school children, persons doing military or community
service, and the unemployed) discount. All tickets are sold at a reduction of
25 on the day of the performance, except price group C performances.
There is no conclusive information available about the audience structure of
the Deutsche Oper Berlin. This is a problem, according to the
Senatsverwaltung representatives, especially since the sold capacities are
relatively lowl . The latest available information on audiences, based on the
capacities and ticket types sold, is from the 1995/96 season. According to
Theaterstatistik 1995/96, the total number of tickets sold was 265 946, of
which tickets sold for opera performances amounted to 202 259, ballet
performances 49 347, concerts 4 263 and other performances (foyer etc.) 10
077. Additionally 6 740 tickets were sold for performances on tour. (Deutscher
Bahnenverein 1996, 48-49.)
The breakdown of audience by the method ticket sales in the 1995/96 season
was as follows: individually bought full-price tickets 86 149, subscriptions 29
993, tickets through friends' organisations 2 44 961, children's, student's etc.
tickets 44 164, discounted tickets for personnel, trade unions, disabled etc. 41
668 and complimentary tickets 19 013. (Deutscher Bahnenverein 1996, 48-
49.) The average capacity sold in the 1995/96 season in the main auditorium
was 70.2% for operas, 41.4% for ballets and 76.1% for concerts. (Deutscher
Bahnenverein 1996, 139.)
1 This issue will be further examined in the section discussing the relationship between the
Deutsche Oper Berlin and the Senatsverwaltung.
2 Besucherorganisation.
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7. The organisational structure of the Deutsche Oper Berlin
The organisational structure of the Deutsche Oper Berlin is described in figure
9 below. It is given in the form in which the organisation itself defines it.
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The Deutsche Oper Berlin is directed by General Director 'Genera!intendant'
Prof. GOtz Friedrich, a prominent stage director, who has sole authority and
responsibility over the organisation. The second layer of directors consist of
four positions: the Music Director (Generalmusikdirektor Christian
Thielemann, conductor), the Opera Director (Opemdirektor Dr. Alan von
Rohr), Principal Stage Director (Chefregisseur Prof. Friedrich), and
Administrative Director (Geschaftsfahrender Direktor Andrê Schmitz, lawyer).
The director of the Deutsche Oper Berlin ballet (Ballet Director Richard
Cragun, dancer) is shown in the chart as being subordinate to the Opera
Director. However, in a letter dated 18.5.1998 the Administrative Director,
Andrê Schmitz, 1 defines the organisation as being led by the General
Director, the Administrative Director, the Music Director and the Ballet
Director. This seems plausible and practical, despite the fact that it
contradicts the actual organisational chart. It would, however, well reflect the
strong artistic position of General Director Friedrich in the organisation, who
has additionally taken on the responsibilities of Principal Stage Director. It
seems evident that he has a strong influence on all matters relating to the
responsibilities of the Opera Director, thus in effect making the post of the
Opera Director weaker than those of the Music Director, the Ballet Director
and the Administrative Director. The artistic matters in the organisation,
excluding the orchestra which is under the responsibility of the Music Director,
are 'horizontally' connected (broken line in the chart) to enable
communication and authority without having to refer to the General Director.
However, this is not the case with the technical department, costumes
department and administration. These are all direct subordinates of the
General Director in the chart. Naturally there are informal links of authority
and information between the artistic and administrative departments, for
example, to enable the organisation to function in practice. These are not,
however, defined in the organisational chart.
I During 1998 there have been changes in the relationship of the General Director and the
Administrative Director giving more responsibility to the latter. This may partly explain the
differing ways of defining the top level of the organisation. This change is further commented
on below.
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8. The relationship between the Deutsche Oper Berlin and the
Senatsverwaltung far Wissenschaft, Forschung und Kultur
The relationship between the Senatsverwaltung fOr Wissenschaft, Forschung
und Kultur and the Deutsche Oper Berlin is defined in three Statutes:
`Haushaltsstrukturgesetz 1996' (15th April, 1996), landeshaushaltsordnung
§26' (Landeshauptkasse 1992) and `Allgemeine Anweisung fiber die
Finanzierung von Theatem und Orchestem in Berlin' (25th October 1994). As
the Deutsche Oper Berlin is a non-independent part of the 'Land Berlin's
administration, the statutes contain a great many general bureaucratic and
budgetary regulations for the whole of the Senate administration, thus not
very relevant for detailed exploration in this study. This is the case especially
with the first two statutes. The statute `Allgemeine anweisung...' is specifically
directed towards the management of arts organisations, thus containing more
practically relevant regulations on the financial relationship between the
Deutsche Oper Berlin and the Senatsverwaltung filr Kultur. It thus merits a
brief description here. The first sentence of the Statute concerning the
`Staatliche Einrichtungen' - i.e. legally non-independent public organisations
such as Deutsche Oper Berlin - defines the first task of the organisations as
the fulfilment of their artistic aims. This is, however, to be achieved with as
high proportion of their own income as possible. The rest of the statute
concentrates on the compulsory methods of financial control and on advice
and constraints on the budgeting process. The aim of this statute in 1994 was
to increase financial accountability and at the same time the financial
independence of the theatres and orchestras. It has to be born in mind that
until the creation of this statute in 1994, the box-office income of the
organisations had gone directly to the Senatsverwaltung, thus giving no
financial incentive to the organisations to increase the sold capacities. In
several ways the arts organisations concerned have previously been more
directly part of the Senatsverwaltung than after this statute came into effect.
The statute compels the organisations to create a comparable (i.e. common
to all organisations in question) cost structure which takes into account all
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cost centres and enables the calculation of returns for each cost class. This
general cost framework (Gemeinschaftskontenrahmen) will be agreed
between the management of the organisation in question, the
Senatsverwaltung fOr Kultur and the Treasury of Berlin (Rechnunghof von
Berlin), and is thereafter binding. After the cost framework and the budget
have been fixed, the organisations are free to decide their ticket prices, but
maintaining accessibility for the socially deprived and for students. The
statute spells out the way in which the general cost framework should be
arrived at (it being implemented for the first time) and how it should operate.
The most interesting clauses concern possible exceeding of estimated
income, which - as distinct from before the 1994 statute - can be rolled over
to the next financial year. This is also the case with possible savings. Should
the estimated income not be achieved, the relevant sum will be reduced
accordingly - based on the actual yield - in the next budget, in order to create
realistic budgets in the long run . However, as the organisations are part of
the Senatsverwaltung, there is no chance of accumulating deficit to be rolled
over to the following financial year. Thus, in the case of a deficit, negotiations
for extra subsidies from the Senate are needed.
The budgets of the theatres and orchestras, as is the case with the Deutsche
Oper Berlin, are defined in great detail in the budget of the 'Land Berlin,
under the heading `Senatsverwaltung fiir Wissenscchaft, Forschung und
Kultur - bereich Kultur'. The budget of the Deutsche Oper Berlin has been
extensively presented above - this gives a feeling of the precision in which the
'Land budget defines the expenditure and income of the organisation,
including the personnel structure. Apart from the financial planning and
control by the Senatsverwaltung, the statutes do not define the relationship -
artistically or otherwise - between the Senatsverwaltung fiir Kultur and the
Deutsche Oper Berlin.
According to Senior Advisor Guido Herrmann from the Senatsverwaltung fik
Kultur, the Deutsche Oper Berlin enjoys artistic autonomy within its financial
framework. The only aspects of the artistic plan the Senatsverwaltung and the
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Directors of the Deutsche Oper Berlin agree upon beforehand are the
numbers of premieres, and the proportions of opera and ballet performances
in the programme. However, the artistic contents of those premieres,
performances etc. are at the discretion of the General Director, GOtz
Friedrich. However, the Senatsverwaltung monitors the development of the
organisation on the basis of these plans, i.e. how well they have been fulfilled.
This monitoring follows the artistic season of the Deutsche Oper Berlin,
instead of being based on the calendar year as in the financial control. The
top management of the Deutsche Oper Berlin present a report on the
previous season to the Senatsverwaltung, on 30th June each year. In this
report they comment on three aspects of the organisation: artistic
achievements, organisational development and the financial situation. In
addition to this main report there are similar quarterly reports following
developments in these areas during the season. Guido Herrmann sees these
reports and the discussions involved in this process the most important tool in
monitoring the organisation. According to him the Senatsverwaltung aims to
create a 'contract' with the General Director and the Administrative Director
about these issues, defining the direction that development of the Deutsche
Oper Berlin should take. In this he sees the person of the General Director as
especially important; in the long run the only direct way for the
Senatsverwaltung to influence the artistic direction of the organisation is in the
selection of the General Director.
The relationship between the Deutsche Oper Berlin and the
Senatsverwaltung has recently been affected by the financial difficulties of the
organisation. The anticipated accumulated deficit l of the Deutsche Oper
Berlin for the period of 1995-1998 was up to DM 20 000 000. There are two
main reasons for this. The first is the change in the funding framework within
the last three years due to the need of the Berlin Senate to cut its
expenditure. Earlier, the funding framework for the Deutsche Oper Berlin (as
for all the Berlin Opera Houses) was agreed three years in advance.
1 The term is slightly misleading as the organisation cannot accumulate deficit due to its non-
independent public status.
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However, the anticipated subsidy of DM 90 000 000 has been reduced to DM
80 000 000 for 1998. Due to its current failure the three-year framework
system has been abandoned and the DM 80 000 000 figure has been
announced as the 'fixed' level of subsidy for the organisation in the future.
The second main reason for the organisation's deficit is the box office income
which has fallen behind the anticipated figure. According to the Financial
Director, Heinz-Dieter Sense, this is due to the General Director's emphasis
on the artistic profile of the organisation rather than the financial situation. In
order to prevent the deficit for 1998, the Senatsverwaltung strengthened the
position of the Administrative Director, thus limiting the artistic freedom of the
General Director. Savings were achieved, for instance, by paying special
attention to production costs etc.
The Deutsche Oper Berlin is not the only opera house in Berlin going through
a financially difficult period; the Komische Oper was taken under tight
financial control by the Senatsverwaltung in October 1998. All the financial
decisions of the organisation for future commitments are to be accepted by
the Senatsverwaltung for the time being. Due to these common problems in
the Berlin Opera Houses the Senatsverwaltung has devised a plan to stabilise
the situation in order to avoid closing down one of the houses to make
savings. This plan involves `privatising' the opera organisations and
introducing a two-manager structure to replace the powerful artistic General
Director. The management structure of the Deutsche Oper Berlin will be
under scrutiny when Gtitz Friedrich steps down from his position in 2001. The
Administrative Director is also leaving the organisation thus giving the
Senatsverwaltung a good opportunity to reorganise the relationship between
the two top directorial roles. The `privatisation' - i.e. changing the legal status
of the organisations into public limited company (GmbH) form - would bring
two main advantages compared with the current situation: the employment
structure of the organisations would not be a rigid public service structure,
and the Plc. form would enable the organisations to accumulate deficit, thus
making the management responsible for the possible losses in the long run.
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The two-manager structure - i.e. equally powerful artistic and administrative
directors - aims to further enhance this financial accountability.
In addition to these two main reforms there are several somewhat less radical
proposed changes that are spelled out in a discussion paper on cultural
administration in Berlin by the Senatsverwaltung; `Materialen zum Offentlich
gefOrderten Kulturangebot in Berlin' from 1996. This paper, while assuring the
artistic autonomy of different opera organisations, proposes the following
changes: creating the cost framework defined in the 1994 Statute, sharpening
and differentiating the artistic profiles of the different opera organisations,
optimising production resources between the opera organisations (possibility
of centralised workshops), increasing marketing efforts and sharing these
between the opera organisations, optimising the relationship between yield
and expenditure in production and programming, reducing the administrative
functions in opera organisations (possibility of centralised administration), and
creating a special admissions tariff for the inhabitants of Berlin (i.e. the
taxpayers subsidising the organisations). (Senatsverwaltung flir Kultur 1996,
16.) The majority of these propositions are currently under discussion, not
however, being implemented in reality and thus not affecting the relationship
between the Senatsverwaltung far Kultur and the Deutsche Oper Berlin other
than on the discussion level.
9. The artistic and financial planning and decision-making structure
The organisational structure and the socio-economic environment of the
Deutsche Oper Berlin have been presented above. The aim of this section is
to discuss the artistic and financial decision-making and planning structures of
the organisation. This section is mainly based on three interviews with
members of the organisation and the Senatsverwaltung far Ku'fur Financial
Manager (Betriebs-Manager) Heinz-Dieter Sense, Chief Dramaturg Curt A.
Roesler, and Senior Advisor Guido Herrmann.
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The starting point for the artistic and financial planning of the organisation
consists of the artistic considerations. This is in accordance with the Statute
of 25th October 1994 which, as stated earlier, places the cultural aims of the
organisation as the top priority, financial considerations being secondary.
According to the Financial Manager, Heinz-Dieter Sense, the programming
and casting plans of the Deutsche Oper Berlin, made roughly three years in
advance, are first made by the General Director, GOtz Friedrich, and the cost
of the plan is then calculated. Normally, the plan exceeds the estimated
budget and thus needs to be adjusted until the plan meets the budget. This
process, with all necessary negotiations and calculations normally takes
about six months. When the artistic plan has been made to comply with the
anticipated financial situation of the organisation, the contracts with the artists
can be negotiated and finalised. According to the Financial Manager, the
contracts refer fairly specifically to the financial constraints, i.e. budgets,
numbers of rehearsals etc., of the project, leading to fairly good enforceability
of the economic framework. Control of this is achieved through constant
monitoring of the costs per production by the accounts department. However,
the cost of new productions annually amount to approximately 3% 1 of the
budget thus, according to Sense, making this control relatively unimportant in
the framework of the organisation's overall budget.
The financially more important factor in the artistic planning process is the
programming and the style of productions, the factors that create the artistic
profile of the organisation and appeal to the audience, thus influencing the
box-office takings. According to Senior Advisor Guido Herrmann the failure of
the box office is one of the main reasons for the financial problems of the
organisation in 1995-1998. This was also admitted by the Financial Manager.
1 This figure is based on the estimate of the Financial Manager. The numerical basis on which
this has been calculated is, therefore, not known. However, the budget of the Deutsche Oper
Berlin supports the range of the figure since the annual material cost for new productions is
DM 1 163 000, i.e. 1.1% of the total budget. The rest of the increased personnel costs etc. for
new productions compared with revivals seem likely to amount to something within the range
of the 'other' 2%.
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The policy of the General Director is to produce operas that are relevant
today and also to emphasise contemporary music theatre in the production of
the classics. This approach has had its effects on the sold capacities of the
Deutsche Oper Berlin - a fact that is recognised and has so far been accepted
by the Senatsverwaltung, particularly in view of the fact that the
Charlottenburg Opera House is deemed 'oversized' for contemporary music
theatre. (Senatsverwaltung ftir Kultur 1996, 19.) However, from the 1980/81
season when the average capacity of the house was 85% (Priestley 1983,
258.) the audience figures have fallen considerably, the figure for opera
having been 70.2% in the 1995/96 season. (Deutscher BOhnenverein 1996,
139.) This trend with the tightening financial situation of the Berlin opera
houses - partly due to the new competition for funds and audiences between
the former East-Berlin and West-Berlin companies - has led the
Senatsverwaltung to question the audience figures. However, the artistic
weight of Prof. Friedrich and the artistic success of his organisation have
been able to counter-balance the financial difficulties and the deficits of the
Deutsche Oper Berlin up to 1998. However, the Senatsverwaltung fiir Kultur
has become more aware of the need to increase financial accountability of
the organisation in the future especially in the relationship between artistic
planning and box-office takings. This has led to action — i.e. new emphasis on
the role of the Administrative Director — during 1998 and is obviously the
ultimate reason why the General Director is leaving the organisation. The
artistic-financial dichotomy thus exists in the relationship between the
Deutsche Oper Berlin and the Senatsverwaltung far Kultur. The discussions
about 'privatising' the organisation and changing its management structure by
bringing the Administrative Director onto the same level as the artistic head
(currently the General Director) of the organisation are attempts to break the
artistic-financial tension between the Senatsverwaltung far Kultur and the
Deutsche Oper Berlin and bring it into the organisation itself. This, according
to Guido Herrmann would give the Senatsverwaltung far Kultur more freedom
for its policy-making role and move the financial responsibility more onto the
organisation. In reality this would mean that the organisation would receive a
fixed amount of funding annually and would have to manage with that, instead
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of the Generalintendant constantly arm-wrestling with the Senatsverwaltung
far Kultur for more funds using his artistic weight and the artistic success of
his organisation as an instrument for making the Land accept deficits at the
end of the year.
10. Summary
In this section, the main points of the information presented above are
collected in table form. The information is based — where applicable — on
annual figures, the sources of which have been defined in the above text. The
information will be compared with other case-studies and discussed in the
next part of the thesis.
Organisational history
and legal status
Governing bodies
Established as a bourgeois opera theatre in 1911
by civil-society initiative. The City of Berlin
assumed responsibility for the organisation in
1925 changing it into a public institution under the
authority of the cultural administration. The
authority over the organisation has changed
several times from the City of Berlin to the
German Reich to the Allied Forces. Currently the
organisation operates under the authority of the
Senatsverwaltung fiir Wissensch aft, Forschung
und Kultur as a non-independent public
organisation.
No board of directors structure. Organisation
governed through the Berlin Senate
Administration.
Management structure 	 The organisation is directed by the General
Director. The management team also includes the
Administrative Director, the Music Director and the
ballet Director. (Schmitz 1998.)
Number of employees
Personnel structure
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Organisational structure
Income structure
Expenditure structure
Opera House
The organisational structure is relatively flat and
the role of the General Director is strong. The
second managerial layer of the organisation
consists of the Music Director, the Opera Director,
the Principal Stage Director and the Managing
Director. Additionally there are seven other
Directors under the General Director on a level
below the second managerial level.
Total income in 1998 budget DM 100 025 000.
Land subsidy 80%, Box Office 9.5%, Other self-
generated income (mainly touring) 10.5%.
Personnel 84.5%, Operational 12.5%, Materials
3%.
867 employees + 108 visiting artists
Artistic personnel 417 (ensemble 45, ballet 53,
chorus 100, orchestra 141, other artistic personnel
55), technical staff 332, administration 52,
maintenance 66.
The New Charlottenburg Opera House was
inaugurated in 1961. Capacity of 1900 seats, all
facing the stage (i.e. democratic layout). The
cruciform main stage is 18 x 18 m, with similar
size wing (right wing stage slightly narrower) and
rear stages. The lighting and sound technology
have been refitted in 1989, being thus state-of-the-
art.
Programming and
number of performances
in the main auditorium
Ticket prices and sold
Total number of performances 195, 145 opera
performances and 50 ballet performances.
Additionally 10 opera performances on tour.
Number of different productions 36, out of which
six new (four operas, two ballets). Programming
principle — semi-stagione / repertory. Repertory
fairly traditional, Wagner emphasised.
Ticket prices DM 17 - 142. Sold capacities 70% for
capacities	 opera, 41% for ballet.
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6. THE ENGLISH NATIONAL OPERA
1. Organisational history and the legal status of the organisation
The English National Opera as an organisation was created - under the name
of Sadler's Wells Opera - as the result of the expansion of Lillian Baylis's
theatrical activities in London. She was running the Old Vic Theatre on the
south side of the Thames "to further the cause of drama and opera at popular
prices". (Arundel' 1978, 185.) In the 1920s she started to consider expanding
operations to North London and persuaded the Duke of Devonshire to launch
an appeal in March 1925 to purchase the freehold of the historic Sadler's
Wells Theatre (at that point of time in poor structural condition) and establish
it as a non-profit-making Foundation to provide a base for the North London
operations of the Old Vic. The appeal proved successful enough to allow the
Foundation to be formed, with several eminent public figures as
Commissioners, and to take an option on the property. The fund, not yet big
enough to purchase the property, was enlarged during the summer of 1925
by benefit concerts, fetes and performances. Support for the scheme was
widespread and subscribers included, for example, the Finsbury Borough
Council, the Islington Gazette and the Carnegie Trust. Some of the leading
performers of the time, such as Dame Nellie Melba, also took part in the fund-
raising campaign. By December the Theatre had been purchased, but the
appeal for funds for repairing and equipping it still continued. (Arundel! 1978,
185-187.) In late 1928 the rebuilding of Sadler's Wells Theatre began. It was
not, however, finished until the end of 1930 after several fresh appeals for
funds.
The Theatre opened in January 1931 and operated on the principle of a
fortnight of plays followed by a fortnight of opera. The repertory alternated
with the Old Vic Theatre. This made it possible for Lillian Baylis to establish a
permanent opera company, the idea being to engage English singers and
perform all the operas in English. Also, Ninette de Valois was engaged to
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establish a ballet company to collaborate with the Vic-Wells 1 theatre
companies. The first spring season resulted in a loss of £3 229, added to the
debts after the refurbishment of £21 000. As the cheaper seats in the spring
season had sold best the decision was made to reduce the prices to make
more through the Box Office, rather than raise them. This policy of 'affordable
prices' has subsequently been a trademark of the company, and the practice
is still carried on today by the English National Opera. (Arundell 1978, 188-
192 & ENO 1998.)
In May 1932, the Sadler's Wells Foundation published its Declaration of
Trust. The aim of the organisation was to put on drama and opera in a way
that was affordable and beneficial to the less well-off classes. Some
performances of high-class opera or high-class drama could also be allowed
in the Theatre when it would financially benefit the Foundation in achieving its
principal objectives. (Arundell 1978, 195.) During the same year the Sadler's
Wells Society was founded by Lord and Lady Hamilton to support the work of
the company. Gradually over the years, opera proved to be more successful
at Sadler's Wells than drama, and thus the proportion of opera was gradually
increased and ballet also gained ground at the expense of plays. As a result,
in 1936 the Charity Commissioners cancelled the Trust's interchange with the
Old Vic, and Sadler's Wells operated from the 1936-37 season onwards as a
separate opera and ballet company. (Arundell 1978, 209.)
Financially Sadler's Wells had difficulties in breaking even despite the rising
artistic standards throughout the 1930s. The refurbishing and equipping
process of the Theatre had left a considerable debt to be carried forward and
the first three seasons increased that deficit. The first season to show a profit
was the 1933-34 season (E5 11s. 1d.). Showing a profit was not to become
the rule, but rather an exception that was repeated a few times during the late
1930s. The company was kept afloat by donations and grants. In 1931 the
1 The company operating in the Old Vic Theatre and the Sadler's Wells Theatre soon began to
be called Vic-Wells company for practical reasons even though the organisations were legally
separate entities.
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Government had channelled funds to encourage opera through the BBC and
Sadler's Wells was engaged to broadcast. In 1934 the company was granted
exemption from Entertainment Tax. Also in 1934 a new appeal was launched
to free the Vic-Wells companies from debt and in 1936 a five-year project to
raise funds for the Vic-Wells ballet was launched. This scheme provided
funds for the organisation till CEMA (during the Second World) and
subsequently the Arts Council (after the war) started funding the company;
the scheme started in 1936 turning into the Sadler's Wells Benevolent Fund.
(Arundell 1978, 188-219.) Lillian Baylis, the founder of the company, had died
in 1937. With the assistance of a Memorial appeal to modernise the Sadler's
Wells Theatre, the company - still £18 000 in debt - managed to conduct a
refurbishment process on the theatre in 1938. The organisation had one
successful season in the renovated theatre before the war forced it to close
down its operations in London.
After the war the pattern in the operations that still form the framework in
which the English National Opera operates started to emerge. The company
was benefiting from the refurbished theatre, which had not been used much
before the war. Also, the resident ensemble and the orchestra were more
numerous that before. The Arts Council began to subsidise the company,
starting with £10 000 for the 1945-46 season, the amount of funding rising
rapidly, being £40 000 for the 1948-49 season. (Arundell 1978, 219 & 224.)
However, there were negative aspects in the development of the company as
well. When Covent Garden was established after the war Sadler's Wells
Ballet moved there in 1946 to form the resident ballet company. Thus Sadler's
Wells Opera lost a considerable source of income, the reserves of the
company subsequently falling from a figure of £75 000 in 1946 to a point
where the theatre was threatened with closure in the 1950-51 season due to
economic hardship. (Arundell 1978, 220 & 229.) Sadler's Wells created a new
ballet company, the Sadler's Wells Theatre Ballet, which soon replaced the
previous ballet company. However, this consumed its resources with the
maintenance of the ballet school. The new ballet company was lost in 1956,
when the Sadler's Wells Theatre Ballet and the Sadler's Wells School of
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Ballet were amalgamated with the Sadler's Wells Ballet (the original Sadler's
Wells ballet company) resident at the Covent Garden, to form the Royal
Ballet. (Arundell 1978, 239 & ACGB 1966, 11.) Since then the Sadler's Wells
Opera (subsequently the English National Opera) has operated with just a
resident opera-ballet if even that.
The legal organisational framework in which the English National Opera
operates was created after the war. In 1946, Sadler's Wells Trust Limited was
incorporated as the legal organisational structure of the Sadler's Wells
operations. The Sadler's Wells Theatre was owned by the Sadler's Wells
Foundation (with a board of governors often referred to as the Wells
Governors), but from 1946 onwards the operations were run by the new Trust.
(Arundell 1978, 245.) The Trust operated as a charitable company limited by
guarantee and with no share capital. Its the name was subsequently changed
through different forms to the English National Opera (in 1975). (ENO 1998.)
In 1957 the Arts Council realised that the resources it had for funding opera
were not sufficient when divided among all the companies it was supporting.
Thus an amalgamation of some of the companies was proposed as a
solution. The initial scheme suggested by the Sadler's Wells Trust was to
merge the company with the Carl Rosa Opera Company (a formerly
successful touring company in financial difficulties) and put on eighteen
weeks of opera at the Wells and thirty weeks of opera on tour. However, the
whole top management of Sadler's Wells Opera resigned over problems in
agreeing the practicalities of the merger. Therefore, the Sadler's Wells Trust
and the Wells Governors abandoned the idea of amalgamation and launched
an appeal for funds to maintain the independent status of the Sadler's Wells
Opera. The appeal proved successful; an anonymous donor gave £15 000,
the London County Council granted £25 000 and ABC Television gave £3 000
annually for seven years. Thus, Sadler's Wells was able to maintain its
independence. The Carl Rosa Opera Company was not as successful. In the
confusion that followed the abandoned amalgamation, the Carl Rosa Opera
Company lost all its support from the Arts Council and was subsequently
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forced to close down. The members of the company joined the revitalised
Sadler's Wells Opera which added touring to its operations, now having two
interchangeable companies and orchestras etc. (Arundell 1978, 244-248.)
The next process that led to an organisational change affecting the English
National Opera began in 1961. The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Selwyn
Lloyd, announced on the 12th July that a project to build a National Theatre
on the South Bank was to commence. The companies to be housed in the
new building were to be the Old Vic Company, the Stratford-upon-Avon
Shakespeare Company (now known as the Royal Shakespeare Company)
and Sadler's Wells Opera. The Governors of the Sadler's Wells Foundation
and the Trustees of the Sadler's Wells Trust were enthusiastic about the
proposal and the Governors were willing to sell the Sadler's Wells Theatre to
provide funds for the new National Theatre building. The Theatre was put on
sale in 1962, but attracted only a 3 000 name petition opposed to the sale
and fierce criticism of the proposal to sell and severe doubts about whether
the Governors had the legal right to sell the property. (Arundell 1978, 255-
264.) Although the National Theatre was eventually built, the scheme to
house Sadler's Wells Opera on the South Bank did not materialise, so the
company started to look elsewhere for a new home. Sadler's Wells Theatre
with its poor acoustics was felt to be too small and outdated for the company's
operations. Thus, in 1968, Sadler's Wells Opera moved "with the approval of
the Arts Council and the Greater London Council" to the Coliseum in central
London, on which the company had acquired a ten-year lease. (ACGB 1969,
11.) The increased seating capacity and a £75 000 (10%) increase in the
Arts Council grant made the move possible financially. Funds to cover the
cost of essential refurbishing and alterations had already been acquired
through donations. (Arundell 1978, 277 & ENO 1988.) After the move to the
Coliseum, the operations of Sadler's Wells Opera were separated from the
Sadler's Wells Theatre (run and owned by the Governors of the Sadler's
Wells Foundation). This, however, was not an easy process, since the
ownership of the Theatre remained in the hands of the Governors - a fact not
well liked by the Trust. However, in 1992 after twenty-five years as a lessee at
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the Coliseum, the English National Opera (the former Sadler's Wells Trust
Limited) purchased the freehold of the theatre with the assistance of the Arts
Council and the Foundation for Sport and the Arts. It still operates at the
Coliseum even though the theatre is in urgent need of redevelopment and the
English National Opera had plans to move to a new purpose-built theatre.
These, however, have been shelved at least until 2001 when the original
agreement for the purchase of the freehold of the theatre ends. The Arts
Council, the Foundation for Sports and the Arts and the ENO will then be free
from previous commitments to contemplate their options. (Eyre 1998, 33-34 &
77.)
The present legal status of the organisation is a charitable company limited by
guarantee and with no share capital. The legal organisation is the same one
that was established in 1946 under the name Sadler's Wells Trust Limited,
subsequently changing its name through various forms to English National
Opera. It operates in the London Coliseum and pursues a policy of performing
opera in English sung mostly by English performers, who form a resident
ensemble. Its objective is still to maintain Lillian Baylis's original aim of opera
at prices affordable by the 'man in the street'. (ENO 1998.)
2. Income structure of the ENO
The total income of the English National Opera amounted to £26 680 000
during the financial year 1997-98. The breakdown based on the statement of
financial activities of the company is following:
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Grants
Box Office
Rental income
Sponsorship and donations
Catering and sales
Other income
Lottery fundingl
Total income
£12 187
£7 047
£1 010
£1 547
£795
£466
£3 628
000
000
000
000
000
000
000
£26
46%
26%
4%
5%
3%
2%
14%
680 000
Some of the income categories are divided in more detail in the statement of
financial activities of the company. The categories of Grants and Sponsorship
and donations are presented below, as they are deemed to shed more light
on the description of income sources of the English National Opera given
above.
Grant income:
Arts Council of England, Core grant £11 955 000 98.1%
Westminster City Council, Core Grant £160000 1.3%
Arts Council of England, Commissioning £22 000 0.2%
Dance Umbrella, Co-presentation grant' £50 000 0.4%
Total of Grants £12 187 000
Sponsorship and donations:
Corporate membership and premium seat schemes £454 000 29.4%
Donations, legacies and major gifts £383000 24.7%
Individual membership and subscription schemes £324 000 20.9%
Production and performance sponsorship and support £138 000 8.9%
Project sponsorship and support £71 000 4.6%
Special appeals £135 000 8.8%
Fund-raising events £42 000 2.7%
Total of Sponsorship and donations £1 547 000
1 The Lottery Funding is given to the company in conjunction with the Arts Council Stabilisation
pilot project. This project aims to ensure the company's efficiency in the future by enabling it
analyse and develop its working practices etc.. This funding is not considered to form a part of
the company's revenue funding from the Arts Council.
2 This co-presentation grant related to the Handel's L'Allegro oratorio performed with the
Dance Umbrella, who provided the stage choreography.
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Unfortunately, the statement of financial activities of the English National
Opera does not reveal in any more detail the division of its Box Office income.
3. The expenditure structure
The total expenditure of the English National Opera in the financial year 1997-
98 was £23 723 000. This total expenditure is divided into two in the
statement of financial activities of the company, i.e. Direct charitable
expenditure £21 330 000 and Other expenditure £2 393 000. The surplus for
the financial year was £2 957 000 as the total income amounted to £26 680
000. However, if Lottery funding and the costs related to the Lottery project
(the Arts Council Stabilisation programme) are excluded, the deficit of the
company amounted to £65 000. Below, the total expenditure is broken down
as in the statement of financial activities of the company.
Direct charitable expenditure:
Production and performance £12 935 000 54.5%
Technical and transport £4 284 000 18.0%
Education, outreach and information £579 000 2.4%
Cost of catering and sales £467 000 2.0%
Donations payable £40 000 0.2%
Support costs £3 019 000 12.8%
Other expenditure:
Fund-raising and marketing £1 924 000 8.1%
Management and administration £385000 1.7%
Interest payable £84 000 0.3%
Total expenditure £23 723 000
In the statement of financial activities of the company the above expenditure
structure is further divided item by item into staff costs, other direct costs and
depreciation. This division is presented below.
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Staff Other Depr. Total
costs
£1000s
direct
costs
£1000s
£1000s
Production and performance 8 466 4 433 42 £12 935 000
Technical and transport 3 366 822 96 £4 284 000
Education, outreach and
information
249 313 17 £579000
Cost of catering and sales 2 459 6 £467 000
Donations payable 40 - £40 000
Support costs 1 187 1 466 366 £3 019 000
Fund-raising and marketing 439 1 422 63 £1 924 000
Management and
administration
287 53 45 £385 000
Interest payable 84 £84 000
Total 13 996 9 092 635 £23 723 000
Thus, apart from dividing the expenditure categories into the subtotals of staff
costs, other direct costs and depreciation, the above division also provides
the information about the total expenditure divided into these subcategories.
The amounts are: Staff costs £13 996 000 (59% of total expenditure), Other
direct costs (i.e. materials etc.) £9 092 000 (38% of total expenditure) and
depreciation (of equipment, sets etc.) £635 000 (3% of total expenditure).
4. The Board of Directors of the English National Opera
According to the Articles of Association of the English National Opera the
business of the company is managed by the Board of Directors. The Directors
are to be members of the company and their number varies between six and
twenty. According to the English practice the members of the company
consist of the members of the board, there not being a group of members of
the Association from among whom the Board members could be elected.
Thus, in practice, the Board is a self-appointing body. The Directors retire
from office in rotation, a quarter of them each year and are eligible for re-
election. In case a re-election is not made the Board Nominations Committee
recommends a new Board member for election. The Chairman of the Board
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of Directors is to be approved (unofficially) by the Arts Council. The Eyre
Review recommends this practice for the appointment of the members as
well. According to Chairman John Baker, the current custom is to appoint the
Board members for a term of three years, the appointment being renewable
once. (Baker 1998.) This is to ensure the appropriate renewal of the Board
membership base.
The responsibilities of the Board (partly as the sole members of the company)
are to manage the business of the company, keep accounts of the company
and make them available to the General Meeting of the company, and appoint
the executives of the company. The General Manager and the Finance
Director of the company then become members of the Board ex-officio. The
members of the Board (as only members of the company) are liable to
contribute to the assets of the company if it is wound up. This liability,
however, is limited to £10 per member.
During the 1997-98 financial year of the company the Board of Directors
consisted of 16 members, headed by Chairman John Baker. The Board
convened quarterly and the relationship between the Board and the
executives of the company was not ideal due to the lack of a clear division of
responsibilities between them. Also, Board membership was often considered
as an honorary position, leading to weak Boards. To rectify this and to
anticipate the criticism towards the Board structures of the opera houses by
the Eyre Review (The future of the Lyric Theatre in London), the Chairman
has subsequently modified the Board working practices. Currently, there are
twelve members of the Board who are (and will be even more so in the future)
appointed more in a functional role, having expertise in a field relevant to the
functioning of the company. The Board meets once a month, to ensure a
close relationship with and control of the organisation. The function of the
Board is much like that in a commercial organisation, i.e. to ensure that the
operations of the company are in line with its objectives and that its financial
performance is satisfactory. (Eyre 1998, 96 & Baker 1998.)
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5. The personnel structure
The English National Opera is legally a private charitable company and all its
employees have normal English employee status. This is relatively weak
compared with, e.g. German employee status due to the rather unrestricted
English 'hire and fire' policy. There are no legally different categories of
employees within the permanent employees of the ENO. According to the
statement of financial activities the average weekly number of employees of
the English National Opera during the 1997-98 financial year was 570. This is
divided into subcategories below, according the statement of financial
activities. These figures include 23 opera company staff and 69 technical staff
who were not permanent members (i.e. employees) of the company. Further,
the number of visiting artists, totalling approximately 100 1 , have not been
included in these numbers.
Opera company	 151
Orchestra and music staff 	 87
Technical staff	 191
Front of house and premises
	
84
Finance, administration and marketing 	 57
Total number of employees 	 570
The English National Opera publish a list of the company members annually
in the programme books. Based on the 1997-98 list the company structure
was as presented below. This division is deemed to shed more light to some
of the categories above.
1 The names of the visiting singers and conductors are listed in the programme book, the total
number being 90. However, the directors and designers are not included in this number,
raising the grand total to approximately 100.
Ill
Music director 1
Company principals (ensemble) 20
Orchestra 79
Chorus 68
Artistic administration 24
Opera Studio 2
Music staff 22
Baylis Programme 7
Total of artistic staff 223
Technical direction and production planning 17
Stage management 9
Production wardrobe 18
Theatre wardrobe 18
Wig and make-up department 10
Props workshop 6
Transport 4
Lilian Baylis House 2
Stage department 31
Electrics department 17
Sound department 4
Theatre management and front-of-house staff 18
Maintenance 32
Total of technical staff 156
Executive Director 1
Finance and administration department 19
Human resources department 6
Development and sponsorship department 15
Public relations (press and marketing) department 11
Box Office staff 24
Company doctor 1
Total of administrative staff 77
Total of company members 456
As can be seen the total number of employees based on the list of company
members in the 1997-98 programme books differs somewhat from the 570
figure given in the statement of financial activities. When the 23 non-
permanent opera company members and the 69 non-permanent technical
staff members are added to this figure the total rises to 548, the difference
arising evidently from different categorisation. However, the figures of 548
and 570 are close enough to the above list to be a useful clarification of the
division of different staff groups presented in the statement of financial
activities of the English National Opera.
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6. The Opera House
The English National Opera has throughout its history been accommodated in
theatres not originally built or designed for the company. The first Opera
House in which it operated was the historic Sadler's Wells theatre, which -
even though refurbished through the appeals of Lilian Baylis - soon proved to
be inadequate for the company. The acoustics and the technical facilities
especially were problematic. The company thus relocated to the London
Coliseum, when it had become evident that the intended National Theatre
scheme was not to host the ENO (then Sadler's Wells Opera). The Coliseum
had originally been built as a variety hall on a grand scale by the entrepreneur
Oswald Stoll in 1904 and was used for Cinerama performances in the 1960s.
Since these were not successful, the owner, Prince Little, agreed to (ease the
theatre to the Sadler's Wells Opera. The theatre is situated in a central
position near Charing Cross Station and its location, added to its size and
splendour seemed to provide a good solution to the Sadler's Wells Opera's
venue problems in 1968. In 1992 the English National Opera purchased the
freehold of the Coliseum with the assistance of the Arts Council and the
Foundation for Sport and the Arts on condition that they redevelop and
refurbish the theatre, which was at that point recognised as being in a very
dilapidated state. (ENO 1998 & Jarman 1982.) The relocation of the
company to the Coliseum is, however, currently causing a series of problems.
The physical state of the theatre is felt to be much worse and the company's
need for space more pressing than was anticipated in the early 1990s and
thus an attempt to build a new theatre was launched in the early 1990s. This
scheme, which was counting on new National Lottery Capital Project Funding,
proved to be a failure leading to the departure of the General Director, Dennis
Marks, in 1997. Additionally, the company is facing a series of practical
problems in its everyday operations due to the technical and space limitations
of the Coliseum. It is widely recognised that to keep the theatre even up to the
standard required by the Health and Safety Laws it urgently needs
redeveloping. This, however, will not solve the space problems experienced
by the company. However, the company has agreed to stay at the Coliseum
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at least till 2001 and the discussion about relocation versus redevelopment is
currently being conducted outside the public domain.
The auditorium of the Coliseum has a seating capacity of 2350 people
providing good visibility from all seats. In addition to the stalls there are two
circles and a balcony, the ceilings of the circles being very low, which in some
areas creates problems with the acoustics. The Coliseum has only one stage,
the size l
 of which is 16 m x 16 m with three-metre wide wings on both sides.
The seven-metre deep back-stage area is used for storing scenery, there
being additionally a small scenery storage area adjacent to the prompt side
wing stage. The proscenium opening is 15 m wide and 9 m high, the opening
being variable (width from 12 m to 14 m and height from 7 to 9 m) by a false
proscenium. The orchestra pit size is 6 m x 18 m and the pit depth is 2.5 m.
The fly-tower height is 21 m from stage surface to the grid. (ENO 1998.) The
technical equipment is antiquated and cannot easily be made up-to-date due
to the limited scale of modifications possible at the Coliseum. The theatre
does not offer additional rehearsal rooms or workshop facilities leading the
company to be located in five different sites. Additionally, there are no
scenery storing facilities apart from the stage area leading to a need to
transport scenes to storage facilities outside the theatre. This, in turn is made
difficult by the residential nature of Bedfordbury Street onto which the loading
dock opens. (ENO 1998.)
1 The numerical information on the Coliseum is derived from the theatre plans used by the
company for lighting and design purposes.
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7. Programming, pricing and audience figures
In the financial year 1997-98 1 , from the beginning of April 1997 to end of
March 1998, the English National Opera had seven opera premieres in its
programme at the Coliseum. The new productions were Berlioz: The
Damnation of Faust, Handel: L'Allegro, il Penseroso ed il Moderato (oratorio
with choreography), Wagner: Der Fliegende Hollander, Janacek: From the
House of the Dead, Verdi: Falstaff, Donizetti: L'Elisir d'amore and Offenbach:
Les Contes d'Hoffmann. Additionally the English National Opera gave the
world premiere of a double bill by Mark Anthony Turnage (Twice Through the
Hart, Country of the Blind) at the Aldeburgh Festival, bringing the total number
of premieres to nine.
In addition to the premieres there were 13 other operas in the repertory at the
Coliseum. These were Madam Butterfly, Orpheus and Eurydice, Ariadne auf
Naxos, La traviata, Carmen, Don Pasquale, Tosca, The Mikado, Cosi fan
tutte, Die Zauberfleite, Eugene Onegin, Xerxes and La bohéme. The total
number of opera performances by the English National Opera amounted to
193. The company does not provide ballet performances itself. Thus, the
company leased its venue to two ballet companies, the Kirov Ballet and the
English National Ballet, for a total of ten weeks of ballet performances during
the financial year. (ENO 1998.)
The admission price structure of the English National Opera is divided by the
location of the seat in the auditorium and by the day of performance, i.e.
Saturday evening performances are sold at increased prices. All the
productions are in general priced homogeneously. The exception in spring
1997 was Handel's Allegro, which was offered at reduced prices due to its
1 The information about the programming of the ENO is presented based on the financial year
of the company, 1st April 1997 - 31st March 1998. This is done in order to keep the
description consistent with the financial data included. The actual 1997-98 season lasted from
6th September 1997 to 4th July 1998.
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exceptional nature as a staged oratorio. The prices did not remain constant
during the financial year ending in March 1998, having been slightly different
in the spring - summer 1997 season from the autumn - winter 1998 season.
The prices went down in some categories and were increased in others, the
differences being relatively small (roughly +1- 10%). Thus, the pricing structure
will be presented based on the autumn - winter 1998 prices, since the period
forms the majority of the financial year in question. (ENO 1998.)
The auditorium is divided into 12 different price categories, from £52 to £5.
On Saturday evenings the range is from £55 to £5. The stalls are divided into
two price categories, the centre belonging to the higher category and the
sides and rear of the auditorium to the lower category. The prices for the two
categories are £47.50 (49.59 on Saturday evenings) and £37 (£42). The
stalls box seat prices and the dress circle box seat prices are £52 (£55) and
the stage box seat price is £25 (£32). The dress circle is divided into four
price categories higher at the front and lower at the back, the range being
from £47.50 (£49.50) to £22.50 (£25). The upper circle is divided similarly into
four price categories, the range being from £25 (£32) to £12.50 (£17.50). The
upper circle box seat price is £27.50 (£32). The balcony is divided into two
price categories, higher prices at the front, cheaper in the middle due to a
railing obstructing the view and higher again at the back. The prices are £10
(£12) and £5 (£8.50), respectively. There are a number of seats and areas in
the auditorium, especially in the circles, in which the acoustics are especially
difficult. These seats and areas have not, however, been priced differently but
are, if possible, left unsold. (EN01998.)
The English National Opera offers a range of discount and subscription
schemes, belonging to three different categories, i.e. day seats, reduced
prices, and flexible subscription scheme. The day seats scheme offers a
limited number of seats for sale on the day of the performance for a reduced
price. Additionally, tickets still available three hours before the performance
1 In order to avoid repetition the Saturday evening price will be provided in parenthesis after
the weekday price without repeating the 'on Saturday evenings'.
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are sold for reduced prices to concessions groups (i.e. students, senior
citizens etc.) members, and on Saturdays also to the general public (who pay
more than concessions group members). The reduced prices scheme is
available to groups of over ten persons (saving 25%) and to children under 18
accompanied by an adult (one child per adult, saving 50%). The flexible
subscription scheme offers a free selection of operas and dates from three
performances upwards, the discount starting from 15% with three operas and
reaching 30% with seven operas. The bookings for the flexible subscription
scheme are processed before general booking opens, thus giving the extra
benefit of good seats. (ENO 1998.)
The numbers of the paying audience at the English National Opera during the
financial year ended 31st March1998 totalled 342 335. This gives an average
of 1774 per performance, 75% of the total capacity. (ENO 1998.) The
company does not make other audience information publicly available.
However, the audience survey carried out by Caroline Gardiner for the
organisation in 1989 gives an indication of the composition of the audience.
Due to the fact that the 1985 and 1989 audience surveys by Gardiner give
fairly similar pictures of the ENO audience it seems possible to assume that
the situation has not dramatically changed over the period since the 1989
survey. Thus the results can be regarded as indicative - if not conclusive - of
the structure of the current audience. Based on the survey in 1989 by
Gardiner the majority of the audience comes from the Greater London area
and only 15% of the audience comes from further than 60 kilometres outside
London. The audience is composed relatively equally of men and women,
however, the 1989 survey found differences between performances. For
example, some productions appealed more to women than to men. With
respect to age, the general finding about opera audiences was confirmed, the
average age being 45. Further, the average age of a regular ENO visitor was
48. The audience of the ENO is relatively loyal to the organisation, the
average number of visits to the ENO by the audience surveyed being three
(excluding the performance surveyed) within last 12 months. Further, 11% of
the audience surveyed had made at least 12 visits to the ENO during the last
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12 months. Thus, the survey confirms the assumption of the organisation that
it has a relatively supportive and loyal audience base in the Greater London
area. (Gardiner 1989, 3-8.)
8. The organisational structure of the English National Opera
The English National Opera describe their organisational structure in a very
detailed manner in a hierarchical organisational chart. This chart extends to
the level of each individual in the organisation describing the formal chains of
command. The top levels of the organisation consist of the Chairman of the
Board, the Board of Directors and the General Director assisted by the
Executive Director. Under this structure there exist two entities in the chart:
the Contemporary Opera Studio (as a somewhat autonomous unit) and the
English National Opera structure, the top level of which consists of the ENO
Directorate. This directorate is formed by the Directors of each department of
the organisation, i.e. the Director of Artistic Administration and Dramaturgy,
the Director of Business and Administration, the Director of Development, the
Director of Human Resources, the Music Director, the Director of Public
Relations and the Technical Director. Additionally, the Head of Finance is a
member of this Directorate even though organisationally placed under the
authority of the Director of Business and Administration. This structure is
described, including the responsibilities of each department in figure 10
describing the English National Opera's organisational structure. In the
organisational chart prepared by the organisation each of the departments is
described with a tree-structure. This is deemed, however, too detailed for the
purposes of this study.
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There have been changes in the management of the English National Opera
since the creation of the organisational chart (dated May 1997) by the
company. General Director Dennis Marks resigned due to failures in the
company's relocation plans soon after Paul Daniel took over the position of
Music Director in 1997. This led to a situation where the new Music Director
needed to assume responsibility over the whole organisation temporarily.
Since then, the current management trio has been formed consisting of
General Director Nicholas Payne (with a background in Arts Administration,
especially in opera) and Executive Director Russell Willis-Taylor (with a
background in management and fund-raising for the arts) in addition to Music
Director Paul Daniel (conductor). This arrangement is somewhat contradictory
to the organisational chart created by the company in which the Music
Director is one of the departmental directors. However, in the interviews
conducted at the organisation the trio was recognised as the top management
of the organisation, the General Director being the Primus inter pares and
ultimately responsible for the organisation.
9. The artistic and financial planning and decision-making structure
This section describing the artistic and financial planning and decision making
structure of the English National Opera is based mainly on three interviews,
two within the organisation i.e. Chairman John Baker and General Director
Nicholas Payne (both on 10th February 1999) and one at the Arts Council
with the Music Director Kathryn McDowell (on 23rd February 1999).
The artistic planning process is started with a five year 'idea structure', an
artistic policy for the organisation not involving a great deal of budgeting. This
is compiled by the General Director in cooperation with the Music Director and
subsequently discussed in principle with the Board of Directors. Through this
process, the Arts Council of England - the main funding body which has a
right to attend the Board meetings - is also informed about future trends in the
organisation. After the initial plan has been approved (informally, however, by
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the Arts Council) by all parties, more detailed plans are drawn up and
budgeted with the assistance of the Executive Director. The final plans need
to be executable normally three years in advance, the final deadline for
changes being 18 months 1 before the season in question. Thus, the planning
operation is three-tiered, there being the five-year plan which deals with the
future artistic policy of the organisation, the three-year plan dealing with the
long-term financial and artistic planning and, finally, the eighteen month plan
which does not allow much scope for changes - no matter whether due to
threats or opportunities - due to high costs involved in last minute changes.
The process includes all the parties concerned, the Board, the three
executive Directors and the Arts Council. However, according to General
Director Payne, the responsibility for the success of the plans and the
budgets rests finally with him.
The financial control mechanism of the artistic production process starts from
the contracts level. The budgets and timetables of the production in question
are incorporated into the contracts of the directors and designers, the two
groups most likely to cause extra expenses in the process. The General
Director and the Executive Director of the company monitor the production
timetables and costs on a continuous basis and, if there seem to be
problems, will be involved in the process using a mixture of incentives and
fines in order to keep the process under control. In addition, the Board of
Directors receive monthly reports on the development of the Box Office and
the costs of the organisation. This information, due to the right of the Arts
Council to have their representative present at Board meetings, is available to
the Arts Council as well. Additionally, the Board of Directors receives reports
on the cost development 'per department' and can take action if there are
problems regularly within a department.
The relationship between the English National Opera and the Arts Counctit of
England concerning the artistic and financial planning and control processes
1 According to General Director Nicholas Payne, this is the time when only emergency
changes can be made due to costs included in last minute changes.
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is based on informal links, as has been described above. The ENO is a
legally independent body and the Board of Directors is officially independent
from the funding body. However, links naturally exist between the two
organisations due to the fact that the Arts Council provides nearly half (60% if
the Lottery Stabilisation scheme funding is included) of the income of the
organisation. The Arts Council is included in the five-year policy discussion
and in the general process of defining the artistic direction of the organisation.
However, the role is only advisory and the only actual way of reacting to the
development of the ENO is through the funding decisions and the three-year
funding agreement framework in operation. In relation to these decisions the
ENO and the ACE create an annual agreement including the numbers of
performances and productions, the ticket prices, the general policy of the
organisation etc. The artistic development of the organisation, apart from the
planning and annual agreement process, is monitored by the Arts Council
through peer-group reports (the Arts Council advisory panels) on
approximately ten performances per year. In general, the relationship
between the English National Opera and the Arts Council of England is
acknowledged by both parties to rely on mutual trust and understanding, due
to the independent nature of the organisations. This trust is maintained - with
greater or lesser success - through frequent contacts between the Arts
Council lead assessor of the organisation (in 1998 Music Director Kathryn
McDowell) and the Directors of the ENO. In exceptional cases the Chairmen
of both organisations can be included in the communication and negotiation
process, if necessary. The Arts Council insists that the 'arm's length' principle
exists in the process, even though the influence of the funding body is used in
the manner described above.
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10. Summary
In this section the main points of the information presented above are
collected in table form. The information is based — where applicable — on
annual figures, the sources of which are defined in the text above. The
information will be compared with other case-studies and discussed in the
next part of the thesis.
Organisational history
and legal status
Governing bodies
Management structure
Founded in 1925 (opened in 1931 at the Sadler's
Wells Theatre) on the initiative of Lillian Baylis to
offer opera and drama at popular prices. Legal
status Charitable Company limited by guarantee -
Sadler's Wells Trust Limited (non-profit-making
organisation) established in 1946. Company
changed its name to the English National Opera in
1974 after moving to the London Coliseum.
Board of Directors elected by the general meeting
from the members of the Company. In practice the
members of the Company and the Board of
Directors are the same, making the Board a self-
nominating body.
Three top managers: General Director, Executive
Director and Music Director. General Director
ultimately responsible.
Organisational structure Seven departmental directors (senior
management team) under the General Director
leading to a fairly flat organisational structure.
Structure defined, however, hierarchically to the
level of individual workers.
Income structure Total income £26 680 000: 46% Arts Council
subsidy, 26% Box Office, 14% Subsidy from
National Lottery Funds, 5% Sponsorship and
donations, 9% Other income (sales etc.).
Expenditure structure 59% personnel, 38% other operational costs, 3%
depreciation. Divided by activity (including staff
costs): 55% production and performance, 18%
technical and transport, 13% support costs, 8%
fund-raising and marketing, 6% other.
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Number of employees 	 570 + 92 visiting artists
Personnel structure
Opera House
Artistic personnel 238 (ensemble 20, chorus 68,
orchestra 79, other artistic personnel 71),
technical staff 191, administration 57, front-of-
house and maintenance staff 84.
London Coliseum, built in 1904 as a variety hall.
Auditorium capacity 2350. Stage 16 x 16 m, with
very limited wing and rear-stage spaces.
Technically fairly outdated, the limitations in space
and stage-technology hinder effective working.
Some of the workshops and majority of storage
space not located in the theatre.
Programming and	 Total number of performances 193. 22 different
number of performances productions, out of which 9 new productions. The
in the main auditorium	 English National Ballet visited the theatre with 78
ballet performances.
Ticket prices and sold
	 Ticket prices £5 - £55. Sold capacities 75% (for
capacities	 the opera performances by the company).
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7. THE FINNISH NATIONAL OPERA
1. Organisational history and the legal status of the organisation
The Finnish National Opera was founded in 1911 under the name Kotimainen
ooppera (Domestic Opera), as an artists' cooperative. The initiative came
from two people, internationally known soprano Aino Ackte and a wealthy
businessman and artists manager Edvard Fazer (brother of the founder of the
Fazer confectionery company). They invited four other prominent figures from
the Finnish operatic scene to participate in the cooperative. The founders
agreed to work for the company without pay and contribute towards any
losses. Other soloists and the orchestra were to receive salaries. If there was
a surplus, it was to be divided between the founders. (Lampila 1997, 114.)
In 1914, the artists cooperative changed its name to Suomalainen Ooppera
(the Finnish Opera) and became a limited company, the founders remaining
the only shareholders with the exception of Aino Acktê, who had left the
company after a bitter disagreement with the other members two years
earlier. The company was again transformed in 1917 to comply with the
Company Law by a prominent lawyer, Emil ForsstrOrn, who had been invited
to join the Board of Directors as an advisory member. In this transformation
the shareholders (the founding members) agreed to forego most of the funds
they had invested in the company over the years. Edvard Fazer especially
had subsidised the work of the company from his own personal wealth and he
continued to do so in this transformation by donating the entire share capital
of the new company from his personal funds. At the same time the basis on
which the company was governed was broadened; the Board was to consist
of the Director of the company, a number of artists' representatives and other
stakeholders from society at large. (Lampila 1997, 132-133.) In 1922 an
addition to the company was formed when Suomalainen baletti (the Finnish
Ballet) was founded. The Finnish National Ballet still exists within the
organisational structure of the Finnish National Opera.
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The next transformation in the legal status of the Finnish Opera took place in
1956 when the limited company was dismantled and Suomen
Kansallisoopperan Sãetid (The Finnish National Opera Foundation) was
founded. This took on all the responsibilities and liabilities of the Finnish
Opera and thus the actual opera company continued as before. The new
Foundation was formed in close cooperation with the Ministry of Education,
which appointed seven out of twelve members of the Board of Governors.
(Lampila 1997, 476.) This development is closely linked to developments in
the Finnish National Opera's income structure, i.e. increased State subsidy.
The present legal status of the Finnish National Opera is a Foundation; i.e.
non-profit-making organisation with limited own capital (FIM 1 000 000). It is
governed by a Board of Governors with 20 members representing different
stakeholders and its subordinate executive committee, the Board of Directors,
which has 12 members. (FNO 1992: 3-6.) The composition, duties and the
criteria of appointment of the members of these Boards will be examined
below when commenting on the organisational role of these bodies.
2. Income structure of the FNO
In the beginning of its existence the Finnish National Opera (then the
Domestic Opera) operated as an artists' cooperative and was thus subsidised
by the labour and personal wealth of the founder members. This continued to
some extent in the case of Edvard Fazer, the first Director of the opera, until
1923. Only then did the Board of Directors realise that he had directed the
opera without a salary for the first 12 years. (Lampila 1997, 115.) However,
soon after the opera had been founded it became evident that additional
funds were necessary. These were available to some extent from lotteries
organised by a group of prominent society ladies, and from the City of
Helsinki. The State did not find it necessary to allocate funds for the opera in
the early years of its existence. (Lampila 1997, 131-133.)
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The first form of subsidy from the State - which had recently become
independent - to the opera was a rent-free lease for 80 years of a former
Russian Military Theatre, Aleksanterin Teatteri. The theatre had recently been
confiscated by the new State of Finland and was given to the opera in rather
run-down condition. The Opera itself was to fund all necessary refurbishment
work and modernisation. However, in the same year — 1918, Parliament
granted a small subsidy to the Opera, amounting to FIM 25 000 - small
compared with the grand total of FIM 600 000 used to renovate the theatre.
(Lampila 1997, 149.) The rest of the sum was collected from individual
donors, e.g. Edvard Fazer donated FIM 100 000, and by raising the 'share
capital' of the company. However, the sole benefit the shareholders enjoyed
was a right to reserve seats for performances before the tickets went on sale
publicly. (Lampila 1997, 153-54.)
In the early years of 1920s the need for subsidies to finance the opera
became greater and greater. In 1921 the Board of Directors gave an
ultimatum to Parliament; the opera would need an extra FIM 240 000 to cover
its accumulated deficit or it would cease to exist. After fierce debate
Parliament granted the sum of FIM 200 000. In 1923 a similar situation
occurred and the Board of Directors made a proposition to Parliament for a
Lottery, the surplus of which would be used to fund the opera. The proposal
was not accepted. The opera kept accumulating deficit and gave Parliament
several ultimatums over the following years. In spring 1925, the Board of
Directors carried out their threats and closed the opera down. During autumn
1925, Parliament proposed a motion to allow a Lottery to fund useful
purposes in general and the Finnish Opera in particular. This law came into
effect in April 1926 and formed the basis on which the Finnish National Opera
still is funded. The opera resumed its activities and the pattern of its State
subsidy had been created. (Lampila 1997, 166-80.)
The total income of the Finnish National Opera in 1997 was FIM 204 324 000.
The State subsidy from the surplus of Veikkaus Oy (the State-owned Lottery
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company) channelled through the Ministry of Education in the State Budget
amounted to FIM 137 000 000, 67% of its total income. (FNO 1997, 46.) This
subsidy is based on Statute no. 725 (24 September, 1982) which defines the
way in which the Lottery surplus is to be divided. This Statute determines the
Finnish National Opera's share as 8% of the surplus of Veikkaus Oy. In 1997
this surplus, however, amounted to FIM 1 920 000 000 (Veikkaus Oy 1997,
32.) of which 8% is FIM 153 600 000, FIM 16 600 000 more than was actually
granted to the FNO. This discrepancy is explained by the financial difficulties
the Finnish State was experiencing in 1990s; the annual budget laws
accompanying the State Budget allow an exception to be made to the 8%
figure fixed in Statute no. 725. There is currently a new Law under
preparation which will clarify this practice in the future.
The next source of income in terms of size is self-generated income, FIM 47
000 000 in 1997, 23% of total income, out of which box office income
amounts to FIM 40 850 000, 20% of the total, the rest consisting of
sponsorship and trade income. (FNO 1997, 46.)
In addition to the State subsidy, the local authorities in the Greater Helsinki
Area (Helsinki, Espoo, Vantaa, Kauniainen) subsidise the FNO according
separate to cooperation agreements made with these authorities. The
respective amounts of subsidy are: Helsinki FIM 13 260 000 (6.5% of total
income), Espoo FIM 4 450 000 (2.2% of total income), Vantaa FIM 2 225 000
(1.1% of total income) and Kauniainen FIM 400 000 (0.1% of total income).
(FNO 1997, 46.) In exchange for their subsidies the authorities are
represented on the governing bodies of the FNO and additionally receive
'services' (touring, education projects etc.). This arrangement will be further
commented on in conjunction with the governing bodies and their functioning.
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3. The expenditure structure
The 1997 the total annual expenditure of the Finnish National Opera was (in
full thousands) FIM 204 324 000. It is broken down into three main
categories: personnel expenditure FIM 163 614 000 (80%), operating
expenditure FIM 37 964 000 (18.6%) and rents and leases FIM 2 745 000
(1.4%). The first two are further broken down in the table below. (FNO 1997,
46-49.)
Total expenditure in 1997: Subdivided Total
Personnel expenditure 163 614 000
Salaries and fees 124 434 000
Statutory pension expenditure 14 294 000
Other statutory social security expenditure 11 544 000
Complementary pension expenditure 11 419 000
Sundry personnel expenditure 1 922 000
Operating expenditure 37 964 000
Production expenditure 11 016 000
Marketing expenditure 9 882 000
Property and equipment expenditure 8 619 000
Administration expenditure 2 928 000
Bought in services and sundry fees 2 506 000
Visiting artists' sundry expenditure 1 804 000
Sundry operating expenditure 1 205 000
Rents and leases 2 745 000
Total expenditure FIM 204 324 000
In these figures the high proportion of personnel expenditure (80%) seems
striking, especially when compared with the production expenditure (5.4%),
the biggest single item in the operating expenses. This is partly due to the
employment structure of the Finnish National Opera which, especially under
Juhani Raiskinen's direction, emphasises the importance of a permanent
ensemble. (FNO 1997, 4.) Thus, for example, most of the soloists' fees (as
they are permanent employees) are included in personnel expenses as
opposed to production expenses.
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4. The Board of Governors and the Board of Directors
The Suomen Kansaffisoopperan Sãatiei, the Finnish National Opera
Foundation, is governed by two bodies, the Board of Governors and the
Board of Directors, with the assistance of the managers of the organisation,
i.e. General Director (Opera Director), Administrative Director and Ballet
Director.
According to the Statutes of the Foundation the Board of Governors consists
of twenty members and their personal substitutes, who serve for a fixed term
of three years. Eight members are nominated by the Ministry of Education,
two each by the Cities of Helsinki, Espoo and Vantaa, and one by the City of
Kauniainen. Three members represent the permanent employees of the
opera. Additionally, the Board of Governors independently appoints two
expert members and their substitutes. (FNO 1992, 4.) The members of the
1996-1998 Board consisted of politically prominent figures, e.g. the Speaker
of Parliament, two MPs, high civil servants from the Ministry of Education,
prominent municipal politicians (appointed by the three cities), etc.
Interestingly enough, the two expert members are the General Managers of
two main sponsors. (FNO 1997, 55.)
The Board of Governors meets twice a year, or when requested by five of its
members or the Board of Directors. The main responsibilities of the Board of
Governors are: to appoint the Board of Directors and the Auditors of the
Foundation, to appoint the General Manager and the Administrative Director,
to confirm the number of executives of the opera and their job descriptions, to
approve the Annual Report of the Foundation, and to confirm the budget and
the plan of operations for the next fiscal year. (FNO 1992, 5-6.)
The Board of Directors is the executive governing body of the Finnish
National Opera. It consists of twelve members, appointed annually 1 by the
1 However, to ensure continuity in the government of the FNO the members serve terms of
three years. This is a matter of practicality even though according to the Statutes of the
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Board of Governors. The members of the Board of Directors are not selected
from amongst the members of the Board of Governors. Three members are
nominated by the Ministry of Education, two by the City of Helsinki, one each
by the Cities of Espoo and Vantaa, three by the permanent employees of the
opera, and two are appointed directly by the Board of Governors. Additionally,
the General Director and the Administrative Director are ex officio members of
the Board of Directors. (FNO 1992, 6-7.) The 1996-98 members included a
high civil servant from the Treasury (chair), the managing director of Veikkaus
Oy (State Lottery company) (vice-chair), the mayor of Helsinki, the principal of
the Sibelius Academy (University of Music) etc. (FNO 1997, 56.)
The Board of Directors meets at least four times per opera season, or
whenever summoned by the chair, or - when he is unavailable - by the vice-
chair or the General Director. It represents the Foundation and works as its
executive body. The main responsibilities of the Board of Directors are: to
execute the decisions of the Board of Governors and oversee that the
financial situation of the Foundation is in accord with its budget, to decide on
issues relating to loan capital, to prepare a budget for the next calendar year
and a preliminary budget for the year after that for the Board of Governors, to
prepare the Annual Report for the Board of Governors, to decide on
appointments and resignations of permanent employees, and to decide on
the programming of the opera company according to the recommendations of
the relevant personnel groups. (FNO 1992, 7-8.)
The Board of Directors appoints a working committee from amongst its
members. This working committee consists of the chair and the vice-chair of
the Board of Directors, the General Manager and the Administrative Director
of the opera and two other members, one of whom is a representative of the
personnel. The working committee meets monthly during the opera season
and otherwise whenever necessary. It prepares the issues on the agenda of
the Board of Directors deemed to require this level of preparation by the
Foundation the Board of Governors appoints the members of the Board of Directors annually.
(FNO 1992, 6 & FNO 1997, 56.)
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General Manager or the Administrative Director. It also deals with the
everyday business matters delegated to it by the Board of Directors and
decides on matters within the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors that needs
immediate attention. In this case the decisions are further subjected to the
approval of the Board as a whole. (FNO 1992, 8.)
5. The personnel structure
The personnel of the FNO is divided into three different categories:
permanent personnel, fixed-term contract personnel and visiting personnel
(generally artists). The Finnish employment laws govern this structure and
grant strong statutory rights to the permanent personnel; once a permanent
appointment has been made it is relatively difficult to dismiss an employee
without very strong reasons. The fixed term contract personnel are well
protected, too; only the termination of their contract has been fixed in
advance. However, the same person cannot be employed 'permanently' with
a series of fixed term contracts; in this case the employee can be deemed as
permanent employee by a Court of Law in a case of dispute.
The policy of the Finnish National Opera currently is to favour permanent
employment. In the Annual Report for 1997, General Manager Juhani
Raiskinen writes as follows: "In January 1997 the Board of Directors decided
to grant permanent employment status to over 80 musicians, singers, dancers
and members of technical personnel and thus expressed its support towards
ensemble practise. This means that the orchestra, chorus and a majority of
dancers, members of the technical staff and administrative staff currently form
a whole that cannot be adjusted according to economic trends without
interfering with the artistic achievements." (FNO 1997, 4.)
In 1997 the Finnish National Opera employed a total of 583 persons as
permanent and fixed-term employees, out of which 355 were artistic
Permanent and fixed-term contract personnel
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personnel. It also employed 172 visiting artists l , the Opera 121 and the Ballet
51. The breakdown of these figures are in the tables below. (FNO 1997, 16-
19, 35 & FNO 1998.)
Artistic personnel 271/84 355
Soloists (singers) 25/4 29
Orchestra 100/151 115
Chorus 5317
Dancers 55/25 80
Ballet school 5/13 18
Other artistic personnel2 33/20 53
Technical personnel 147/37 184
Stage technical personnel 82/31 113
Workshops 49/4 53
Maintenance3 16/2 18
Administration 33/11 44
Total permanent and fixed term personnel 451/132 583
1 This number includes all artists who worked for the organisation as guest artists, even if the
visit was for only one performance.
2 This category consists of in-house conductors, directors, set designers, singers' coaches,
chorus masters, ballet coaches etc.
3 The cleaning related activities are contracted to a cleaning company.
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Numbers of visiting artists: 	 Subdivided	 Total
Total visiting artists, the Opera	 121
Soloists (singers)	 74
Conductors (incl. assistants) 	 13
Directors (incl. assistants) 	 9
Set designers (incl. Assistants) 	 8
Costume designers (incl. Assistants) 	 8
Choreographers	 3
Actors	 3
Dancers	 2
Translators	 1
Total visiting artists, the Ballet 	 51
Soloists (dancers) 	 11
Conductors	 7
Choreographers	 6
Choreographers' assistants	 11
Teachers	 13
Visual designers	 3
Total visiting artists 	 172
6. The Opera House
In 1993 the Finnish National Opera moved from its 'temporary' home of over
70 years, the Alexander Theatre, to a new purpose-built modern opera house
overlooking TOOIO Bay in central Helsinki. The process leading to the
realisation of this moment had been long; the first plans for an opera house
had been made in Helsinki as early as 1817. After several futile attempts to
implement these plans the process leading to the New Opera House was
started in 1950s when two Societies for a New Opera House were founded
(they later merged) to assist in raising the capital needed. These organised
fund raising in several forms and lobbied for the new building. The Finnish
National Opera Foundation became officially involved in the process in 1971,
when the Board of Governors decided to found a New Opera House
Foundation (taking over the responsibilities of the former Society) its aim
being solely to coordinate and raise funds for the project. The City of Helsinki
provisionally promised to donate a site for the New Opera House in central
Helsinki in 1975. On the basis of this the New Opera House Foundation
134
organised an architectural competition for the New House. In 1978 the State
finally granted funds to further develop the winning proposal 'Scalapuikko' by
architects Hyvamaki, Karhunen & Parkkinen. In the 1980 State Budget some
additional funds were granted for project planning and, at the same time,
Parliament assumed responsibility for the project and its funding. With this
decision the New Opera House Foundation was transformed into an advisory
body concentrating on suggestions about the interior design and raising funds
for the works of art in the lobby areas. The National Board of Public Building
took over the implementation of the actual building process. Despite this the
project faced severe delays in many phases of its realisation due to economic
and planning difficulties. Finally, at the end of 1987, the actual building work
commenced. (Lampila 1997, 785-789 & Eskola 1995, 14-18.) In 1993, when
the New Opera House was finished, the total cost of its building had
exceeded FIM 750 000 000; a huge change from the original estimate of FIM
120 000 000 in 1977. (Later estimates were FIM 205 000 000 in 1980, FIM
318 000 000 in 1981, 384 000 000 in 1983 etc.) (Lampila 1997, 788.)
However much the ever-rising cost of building was debated at the time, in
hindsight the New Opera House is generally deemed worth the investment. It
remains the property of the State but its usage has been granted to the
Finnish National Opera Foundation rent-free.
The New Opera House has two auditoria. The horseshoe-shaped main
auditorium with three balconies has a seating capacity of 1365 (1499 in
concerts when the orchestra pit seating 110 musicians has been covered),
and a multi-purpose studio theatre (the Almi Hall) which has the seating
capacity varying from 200 to 500 depending on usage. The main auditorium
stage is cruciform, consisting of 16 x 16 metre (four 4 x 16 metre risers) main
stage with an adjustable (width 13-16 metres and height 7-10 metres)
proscenium arch, and wing and rear stages of the same size. The fly-tower
height is 28 metres. The revolving rear stage can be wheeled on to the main
stage. Also, a whole setting can be wheeled in from the wing stages as they
consist of stage trucks that can be driven onto the main stage silently. The
technical solutions in lighting and sound are computerised and state-of-the-
135
art; there are also reserve capacities in technical spaces, cable routes and
equipment racks to enable future expansion and evolving functional
requirements. The studio theatre, doubling as a rehearsal stage, is a flexible
theatre space and its size, layout and acoustics can be widely adjusted. If
necessary in the rehearsals, the layout and technical functions of the main
stage can be simulated in the studio theatre. (Eskola 1995, 53, 63-65, 71,
104-107.)
7. Programming, pricing and audience figures
In 1997 1 the Finnish National Opera had four opera premieres in the main
auditorium and the Finnish National Ballet (operating under the same
organisational structure) had three. The opera premieres were: Musorgski:
Boris Godunov; Beethoven: Fidelio; Sondheim: Sweeney Todd; and Wagner:
Die Valkare. The ballet premieres were: Lacotte after Taglioni: La sylphide;
Duato, Preljocaj, Uotinen: Contemporary Triple Bill; and Makarova after
Petipa: La Bayad6re. The Opera also had nine other operas in its repertory
during the year 1997: Tosca, La Traviata, Salome, Don Giovanni, L'elisir
d'amore, 11 barbiere di Siviglia, Le nozze di Figaro, Carmen and
Hysfinteisel5maa (a contemporary Finnish Opera by Kalevi Aho). The Ballet
repertory consisted of The Nutcracker, Romeo and Juliet, Don Quixote and a
Triple Bill of Le Sacre du printemps, Petrushka and the second detail
(Willems). The Ballet also had two Gala Nights - its 75th Anniversary gala and
a New Year's Eve gala - and two contemporary programmes in the studio
theatre. In addition there were various visits and cooperation projects by both
the Opera and the Ballet, partly to satisfy the terms of the funding agreement
between the company and the cities in the Greater Helsinki area. (FNO 1997,
8-35.)
1 For the sake of consistency (all financial figures etc. are based on a calendar year) the
programming and pricing is presented as the calendar year 1997 instead of the 1997-98
season which covered August 1997 to June 1998.
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The ticket prices (1997) at the Finnish National Opera vary from FIM 50 to
400. The auditorium has been divided into six different price groups A-F, of
which B is highest (the dress circle). In 1997, the prices for a 'normal' (i.e. not
a premiere, guest performance etc.) opera or ballet performance were A =
220, B = 300, C = 180, D = 100, E = 80 and F = 50. For certain performances
(e.g. Die Valkare), visits etc. the prices were higher, the top reaching FIM 400.
The studio theatre performance prices were from FIM 120 to 40. There were
some concessions available for students, groups etc., the terms of which
varied according to the performance at the discretion of the management.
Since 1997, prices at the Finnish National Opera have been raised for
'normal' performances, the Autumn 1998 season range being FIM 350 to 50,
i.e. the bottom end has remained fixed. (FNO: 1997.)
In 1997 the Finnish National Opera had 286 performances (including all visits,
concerts etc.) and 273 899 tickets were sold, a total of 87% of the capacity.
The total box office intake was FIM 40 848 000. In the main auditorium there
were 125 opera performances and 74 ballet performances, they attracted
capacities of 91% and 86%, respectively. In addition there were 11 studio
theatre performances (70% capacity), 16 concerts (64% capacity), 49 guest
and visit performances 1 (32 by the Opera, 17 by the Ballet), 8 Ballet School
performances and 3 pre-performance talks. (FNO 1997, 40-41.)
The audience profile of the Finnish National Opera, based on two audience
surveys by Taloustutkimus Oy (Suomi Tan55n 3/1996 and Suur-Helsinki
T5n5an 1/1998), differs somewhat from the demographic figures of the
Finnish population. In 1996, 11% of the population had visited a performance
in the New Opera House, 8% within the last year. 27% of the population had
visited an opera or ballet performance at least once during their life-time. An
additional 18% were interested in seeing one, thus giving a total of 45% of the
population as potential opera audience. (Taloustutkimus Oy 1996, 3.)
1 The capacity information is not relevant due to differing venues etc. for the rest of the
performance categories.
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Women represent 63% of the audience, leaving 37% for men, i.e. almost two-
thirds of the audience were women. The age structure of the audience was in
1996 as follows: below 20 years 6%, 20-34 years 22%, 35-49 years 30% and
over 50 years 42%. Almost half of the audience, 47% lived in the Greater-
Helsinki area (Helsinki 27%, Espoo 11%, Vantaa 9% and Kauniainen l 1%),
14% of the audience lived in other cities having over 50 000 inhabitant. 19%
of the audience lived in small cities (under 50 000 inhabitants) and another
19% of the audience lived in rural communities. Classified according to total
household income, the structure of the audience was as follows: below FIM
120 000 p.a. 24%, FIM 120 001-240 000 p.a. 29%, FIM 240 001-360 000 p.a.
26% and over FIM 360 000 p.a. 13%. The educational level of the audience
makes interesting reading; 33% had academic qualifications, 29% had high
school education (A-level equivalent), and only 36% of the audience had
lower qualifications.
The 1996 audience survey gives some interesting comparisons between the
general population and the 11°A of the population t hat had visited the New
Opera House. The greatest deviations (in percentage of the group in question
that have visited the New Opera House) were: persons with academic
qualifications 32%, inhabitants of Helsinki 34%, Espoo 32%, Vantaa 28% and
Kauniainen 48%, members of over FIM 360 000 p.a. income households
35%, persons that have attended music 33% and opera 40% festivals.
(Taloustutkimus Oy 1996, 5.)
1 The percentage of visitors from Kauniainen does not seem significant. However, as 48% of
the inhabitants of Kauniainen had visited the New Opera House, the density of opera audience
is significantly high in Kauniainen. This is explained by the very high average social and
educational status among the inhabitants.
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8. The organisational structure of the Finnish National Opera
The organisational structure of the Finnish National Opera is described in
figure 11 below in the form that the organisation it defines.
CC)
blO	 70 0
C	 viCt.C) CI	 ••,,	 0
:28 .1 1.	 ;26- !c5
rZ)
.°
0
ca 0 c • —
••-n
u	 -0
cti	 c.)
P.	 E	 E *(7)
0 0	 E
E 7,d 2
C21
C.)
•	 — C)
C)
•	 DI
•-•	 0
•n•-n 	 c/C 7 
CC
a.)	 c)
CD
E...)
•	 u
c
••	 E
•-•	
C.
0 a- cd
C
CU
cn
0C.) <
LL9
c's
Lel
140
The top layers of the organisation, the Board of Governors and the Board of
Directors have been extensively discussed above and thus will not be
commented on here, the internal organisational and decision-making
structures being the emphasis of this section.
The top management, General Manager Juhani Raiskinen (pianist,
composer) and Administrative Director John-Eric WestO (economist) form the
highest operating level of the organisation and belong to the working
committee of the Board of Directors. Based on the bylaws of the organisation,
approved by the Board of Governors, there is a top management group of five
members that assist the two top managers in their task. In addition to the
General Manager and the Administrative Director this group includes Ballet
Director Jorma Uotinen (dancer, choreographer), Music Director Okko Kamu
(conductor) and Production Director Keijo Kupiainen theatre tethnithn).
effect this group consists of the heads of all the four 'departments' of the
organisation (Opera/music, Ballet, Production, Administration) that are the
direct subordinates of the General Manager. The main responsibilities of this
management group according to the bylaws are: to plan the opera and ballet
activities and define the resources needed, to monitor the arkistic arNd
economic performance of the organisation, to ensure that all relevant safety
and union regulations are followed, and to inform the personnel of any likely
changes in the functioning of the organisation. (FNO 1994, 5.)
The way in which the four departments of the organisation have been
subsequently divided is clearly visible in the organisational chart. In addition
to this division into four departments there clearly exists a dual structure
within the organisation, i.e. the artistic structure (Opera/music and Ballet) and
the production-administrative structure. To bridge this gap and the gaps
between different departments there are certain cooperation groups defined
in the bylaws of the organisation: a production group responsible for creating
the detailed rehearsal, production and performance plans based on the
management group's long term planning; an operations group responsible for
short-term planning and execution of the aforementioned plans; and
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production group(s) responsible for the planning and monitoring of individual
productions. (FNO 1994, 5.) There are representatives from all relevant
departments in all these groups operating at different levels of the
organisation to ensure communication between departments and especially
between the artistic structure and the production-administrative structures.
9. The artistic and financial planning and decision-making structure
The organisational environment and structure of the Finnish National Opera
have been presented above. In this section the artistic and financier decision-
making and planning structures wili be discussed and commented On. The
information included in this section is based mainly on interviews with peopCe
within the Treasury and within the organisation: Chair of the Board of
Directors Pekka Laajanen (high civil servant, the Treasury), General Manager
Juhani Raiskinen (FNO) and Administrative Director John-Eric WestO (FNO).
As was mentioned earlier, State funding for the Finnish National Opera is
based on Statute no. 725 (1982) which fixes the 8% share for the FNO from
Veikkaus Oy's (National Lottery) surplus which is allocated to the FNO in the
State budget through the Ministry of Education. However, as the funding has
not reached this figure for the last few years (i.e. the figure is not the sole
basis for State funding) there is obviously another mechanism to determine
the level of funding needed. This happens in the State Budget negotiations by
the Cabinet and is subsequently approved by Parliament. The Ministry of
Education negotiates with the Finnish National Opera to reach agreement on
the level of subsidy needed; this is then incorporated in the budget under the
Ministry of Education's allocations and subsequently approved (or adjusted)
by the Cabinet and the Parliament. The Finnish National Opera has been
negotiating for a four-year funding frame agreement, i.e. provisional figures of
funding for the next four years, with the Ministry of Education and the
Treasury, but however sympathetically the proposal is received, the State
seems unable (partly for legal reasons) to commit itself beyond one budget
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year. However, all the parties seem confident enough that mutual trust exists
and the 3% growth rate in the State subsidy (slightly above the inflation rate)
proposed by the FNO seems to be accepted as fair and reasonable.
In order to maintain this mutual trust there is an unofficial 'results review'
meeting twice a year with representatives of the Ministry of Education in
addition to the more formal monthly economic report submitted to the Ministry
by the Finnish National Opera. However, it must be born in mind that the
Ministry appoints several members of the Board of Governors and Board of
Directors thus having influence through these bodies as well. The policy of the
State is, however, not to directly influence the artistic planning of the
organisation but rather control the economic side of its functions. The Chair of
the Board of Directors, Pekka Laajanen, pointed out that the only direct
artistic decision that the Board Of Directors make is the appointment of the
General Manager and the Ballet Director on the basis of their artistic merits
thus to some extent determining the artistic direction of the organisation. In a
case of a possible economic deficit the Board would rather confront the
management with the task of 'saving x millions' by adjusting artistic plans.
According to Laajanen the decision on how this would be achieved would
remain the General Manager's.
As was described earlier, according to the Statutes of the Finnish National
Opera Foundation the Board of Directors, and especially its working
committee (i.e. chair, vice-chair, two other members, General Manager and
Administrative Director), prepare the artistic plans and budget of the
organisation having consulted relevant personnel groups. These are then
approved by the Board of Governors through a process deemed normally a
mere formality. In practice this process is initiated by the General Manager
(and in the case of the Ballet the Ballet Director) as initial artistic plans. In this
planning the framework is determined by the ensemble (as the policy is to
utilise permanent ensemble as far as possible), the selection of the
production group, the Zeitgeist, the need to balance the books and thus
produce 'cash cows' against experimental productions etc. According to
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General Manager Raiskinen this process is - and has to be - based on 'gut
feeling' to a certain extent to maintain the artistic virility of the organisation.
According to him there is no definite way to predict the success of a
production and thus create a certain, calculated artistic plan and budget. The
creation of the budget and calculations to justify this plan is then the task of
the Administrative Director. In this process, according to the Administrative
Director, John-Eric WestO, the key elements are trust and cooperation
between the General Manager and the Administrative Director. The same
point was emphasised by Raiskinen as he stated that opera house
management is on a sound basis "when the Artistic Director is more
concerned about the economic side of the operations and the Administrative
Director about the artistic side".
After the selection of the programme, production groups and ensembles - the
main tasks of the General Manager - the detailed planning and budgeting
process takes place. The aim of the Finnish National Opera has, for the last
few years, been to increase the accuracy of its budgeting process. This has
led to more delegated approach to budgeting in which departments are more
responsible for their own resources, and to creation of production based
budgeting and monitoring systems l . Currently there are 'cost centres'
responsible for their own budgeting (within given limits) and keeping to those
budgets.
The are several different ways in which the artistic and economic processes
are controlled. The 'control' of the artistic process takes place to a great
extent in the planning process. The selection of productions, production
groups and ensembles largely determine the outcome and expenditure of
production processes. Naturally, there are legal measures in contracts to
control the artistic personnel. However, according to Raiskinen, in reality
these are relied on very seldom. In the case of a dispute, the General
1 This development is strikingly similar to the development in the UK organisations in the
1980s and early 1990s when the Arts Council started to emphasise financial accountability
and reliable financial planning. See Auvinen 1996 'On the Processes of Opera Production'.
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Manager's role is to look for solutions and facilitate cooperation in order to
avoid walk-outs of soloists, directors etc. In an extreme situation, a director
could forbid the production to go into performance giving him/her the upper
hand in any negotiations. There is a recent example of this when Professor
GOtz Friedrich insisted on rebuilding a set at a late date of a rehearsal
process of Siegfried in spring 1998. This resulted in an urgent need to exceed
the budget for the production. However, this inevitably worked out cheaper
than any dispute leading to a possible walk-out of the prominent director.
According to Administrative Director WestO, the younger generation of artists
(directors, set-designers, etc.) more readily accept budget limitations and are
more willing to fulfil their artistic visions within this framework. However, the
more prominent the artist, the less room there is for control or negotiations.
The economic control mechanism for a production process is twofold: there
are management accounts for single productions making the top
management aware of the expenditure-development, and each production
process has a producerl . He/she is responsible for overseeing the production
process economically and timetable-wise. However, the management of the
FNO emphasises that the producer does not have power over any important
artistic decisions. Should a problematic situation arise - like the one with
Professor Friedrich - he/she makes the General Manager aware of it so that
the top management can deal with the problem, artistically and economically.
Thus, in effect the producer acts as a controller of the process as long as the
plans are met and budgets kept to, reporting any deviations to top
management.
1 This is the term the FNO uses. It refers to the film-industry type producer not a director in
'artistic producer' meaning.
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10. Summary
In this section the main points of the information presented above are
collected in table form. The information is based — where applicable — on
annual figures, the sources of which are defined in the text above. The
information will be compared with other case-studies and discussed in the
next part of the thesis.
Organisational history
	 Founded in 1911 as an artists' cooperative.
and legal status Formed into a foundation in 1956 in cooperation
with the Ministry of Education. Current legal
status: a private foundation (non-profit-making
organisation) with close links to the Ministry of
Education.
Governing bodies Board of Governors (20 members, 15 nominated
by the funding bodies) and Board of Directors (12
members, 7 nominated by the funding bodies).
Management structure Two top managers: General Director and
Administrative Director. Management team
includes: Music Director, Ballet Director and
Technical Director
Organisational structure
	 Flat organisational structure. Departments directly
under the General Director.
Income structure Total income FIM 204 324 000: 67% from the
State subsidy (National Lottery Funds), 20% Box
Office, 10% subsidies from local authorities, 3%
other income.
Expenditure structure
	 80% personnel, 18,6% operational, 1,4% rents.
Number of employees
	 583 + 172 visiting artists
Personnel structure Artistic personnel 355 (ensemble 29, ballet 80,
chorus 60, orchestra 115, other artistic personnel
53, ballet school 18), technical staff 184,
administration 44.
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Opera House New Opera House, inaugurated in 1993. Main
auditorium capacity 1365. Stage cruciform-
shaped, size 16 x 16 metres with good wing and
rear stage spaces. State of the art equipment.
Programming and	 Total number of performances 199; 125 opera
number of performances performances, 74 ballet performances. 20
in the main auditorium	 different productions, out of which 7 new
productions (4 operas, 3 ballets). Programming
principle — semi-stagione / repertory. Repertory
fairly traditional apart from new Finnish works.
Ticket prices and sold 	 Ticket prices FIM 50 - 400. Sold capacities 91%
capacities	 for opera, 86% for ballet.
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8. THE GLYNDEBOURNE FESTIVAL OPERA
1. Organisational history and the legal status of the organisation
The first season of opera at Glyndebourne was presented in 1934 in a
purpose built opera house by a wealthy aristocrat, John Christie. The idea of
a privately built and funded opera organisation in 20th century Europe seems
surprising. However, the background of Mr. Christie provides some rationality
for this development and the history of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera
gives the reasons for its current legal organisation.
John Christie had been an assistant master at Eton before assuming his full-
time responsibilities as owner of Glyndebourne in 1922. (Hughes 1981, 25.)
The Glyndebourne Manor House included an Organ Room in which John
Christie organised musical activities with those near him. These started
initially as playing music for the pleasure of the participants, but gradually
developed towards more performance-oriented evenings, the audience being
the estate employees, tenants and house guests. The first operatic
endeavour in the Organ Room was the third act of Wagner's Die
Meistersinger performed in 1928 by six amateur singers, including John
Christie. An organ and a piano substituted for the orchestra. The second
operatic performance took place the following year in the form of the first act
of Die Enfftihrung aus dem Serail, this time with an orchestra of nineteen
players. The next opera production, more of Die Enffiihrung at Christmas
1929, was to be a turning point in the life of John Christie, as well as the
Glyndebourne Festival Opera - the two being inseparably intertwined. For that
performance the first professional soloists were engaged, including Audrey
Mildmay who was to become John Christie's wife. (Hughes 1981, 28-31.)
After the marriage of John Christie and Audrey Mildmay in 1931, plans for an
expansion of the Organ Room to host extended operatic endeavours
emerged. First the idea was to extend the amateur performances in a newly-
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built auditorium of approximately 150 seats. The work had already been
started, when Mrs. Christie persuaded her husband that the only way forward
was to aspire to the highest possible international standards. Thus, the
building work was halted and a new project for an opera house with a seating
capacity of 311 started afresh. (Hughes 1981, 32-33.) The building project
was completed in 1934 with varying degrees of success; the lighting and
steam effects equipment was to have been the best in Europe, but the
orchestra pit size had been badly miscalculated and the scenery storage
facilities were practically non-existent. (Hughes 1981, 35.)
John Christie's initial idea of had been to present mainly Wagner in his new
opera house. In 1933 he announced that the plan for next summer's opening
was to start with either Mozart's Don Giovanni or Wagner's Die Walktire and
additionally present Wagner's Ring cycle and Parsifal. However, by the time
of the actual festival in 1934 the realities had become clearer to the Christies
and the first programme consisted of twelve performances of Mozart's Le
nozze di Figaro and Cosi fan tutte. The men behind the change in the
intended repertory were conductor Friz Busch and stage director Carl Ebert,
two men to be of extreme importance in realising the aspirations of the
Christies. Together they had explained the practicalities of producing opera to
John Christie and provided him with a budget describing the resources
needed. This soon convinced John Christie to start off with Mozart, though
still determined to produce Wagner the following season. (Hughes 1981, 40-
47.) The initial season was an artistic success, and even though the
performances were not sold out the audience found its way to Glyndebourne.
The deficit for the operation was £7 000, the amount John Christie had been
reported to be prepared to lose. During the winter between the seasons, the
pattern of enlarging and developing the opera house was assumed (see
below the section on the opera house). After the first season, changes were
made especially to enable the backstage operations to run more smoothly.
(Hughes 1981, 49 & 74-76.) The programme for the second season in 1935
consisted of the productions from the first season plus Mozart's German
operas Die Zauberfleite and Die Entfahrung aus dem Serail. The high artistic
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standards of the first season were not always achieved, especially with some
of the soloists, but generally the season was an artistic success. However, the
deficit for the operation rose to £10 000, but was underwritten by John
Christie who was still convinced that the operation would provide a surplus in
years to come. (Hughes 1981, 90-100.)
The pattern of operations in the 1930s remained fairly constant, the
programme was to include the four Mozart operas in the repertory and
additionally Don Giovanni. Ventures beyond Mozart included Verdi's Macbeth
and Donizetti's Don Pasquale. The artistic standards were generally high
under the guidance of Fritz Busch and Carl Ebert, but the finances left scope
for improvement. The best season financially was the 1937 season, whith
provided a profit of £2 723, due to an enlarged auditorium and good wine
sales. (Hughes 1981, 102-122.) The operations of the Festival Opera were
interrupted by the Second World War and the 1940 season never took place.
The first years had, however, established Glyndebourne among the leading
opera festivals, at a cost of approximately £100 000 to John Christie. (Hughes
1981, 150; Higgins 1984, 118.)
After the war, re-establishing the Glyndebourne Festival Opera seemed a
huge task. In his letter to William Haley, the Director General of the BBC,
John Christie wrote in 1946: "We have undertaken to restart Glyndebourne
with our own resources this year and next. How much is involved financially
we cannot yet tell." (Christie as cited in Higgins 1984, 118.) Obviously John
Christie had come to realise the fact that an opera endeavour could not
become profitable, especially during the post-war economic stringency. It took
several years and cooperation with the Edinburgh Festival before the pattern
of the Opera Festival finally became re-established at Glyndebourne.
Permanent opera seasons in Glyndebourne were not reinstated until 1950
and only then by sharing productions with the Edinburgh Festival to begin
with. Artistically, Glyndebourne soon reached its pre-war levels. However, the
matter of financing the enterprise had become a pressing issue. John Christie
was not willing to finance the operations year after year as the sole
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benefactor. So several changes in the way in which the operation was run
financially were conceived.
Public funding was not available for Glyndebourne (before 1968, when the
Arts Council started to finance the Glyndebourne Touring Opera), apart from
a one-off Treasury guarantee against losses in 1951 for participating in the
Festival of Britain. Thus the needed funds had to be found elsewhere. A
combination of private support and corporate sponsorship was the answer.
The first corporate benefactor of Glyndebourne was the John Lewis
Partnership, which guaranteed £12 000 to underwrite two operas in 1950.
The following year the Glyndebourne Festival Society was set up to attract
further individual and corporate support. The Society had three-tiered
membership structure, each benefactor group entitled to a defined set of
benefits. The Society tuned out to be a success, having 806 members by the
start of the next season. One of the functions of the Society was to attract
advertisers for the annual programme. In spite of the increased support,
however, the 1952 season still produced a deficit of £17 790. At that time, the
idea of the financial organisation of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera that is
still in use today was devised. (Higgins 1984, 120-122.)
During the war, John Christie had come up with an idea of running the Opera
Festival through a Trust and had set up two charitable companies in 1939,
Glyndebourne Productions Limited and the Glyndebourne Arts Trust. The
former was to run the operations of the Glyndebourne Opera. However, only
in 1952, as financial difficulties became apparent, did the scheme take
practical form. The idea of the Glyndebourne Arts Trust was revived in 1952
and the Trust became fully operational in 1954 1 . The theatre and gardens at
Glyndebourne were leased to the Trust at a peppercorn rent. (Higgins 1984,
122; Hughes 1981, 184-185.) Today, however, Glyndebourne Productions
1 There is contradictory evidence in Higgins and Hughes about the formal setting up of the
Glyndebourne Arts Trust. However, the Charity Commission register notes that both
companies were incorporated on 16th December, 1939. The practical operations were,
however, started later especially in the case of the Arts Trust.
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Limited also runs the theatre and was responsible for building the new theatre
in 1990. The Arts Trust administers the Glyndebourne Festival Society and
other fund-raising activities. The funds are then donated towards the
operations of Glyndebourne Productions Limited. Furthermore, the general
supervision of Glyndebourne Productions Limited is one of the functions of
the Arts Trust. The operational side of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera and
Glyndebourne Touring Opera is handled by Glyndebourne Productions
Limited. This somewhat confusing legal concept is deemed necessary in
order to separate the Christie family and the Glyndebourne Estate and the
Opera House from the financial operations of the opera production company.
It further enables the separation of the fund-raising activities from the day-to-
day running of the opera house. An addition to this structure was created in
1975, when a finance committee - a subsidiary of the Arts Trust - was
established. In the mid 1970s the inflation was burdening the organisation
with costs rising faster than potential box-office receipts. Therefore, the
finance committee was set up to tap into new sources of finance. Its
operations were a success, enabling the box-office figure to drop from
approximately 80% to 70% of total income - a ratio still valid. (Higgins 1984,
125.) This division of responsibilities still exists, the organisation being legally
divided into two charities, the Glyndebourne Arts Trust and Glyndebourne
Productions Limited.
2. Income structure of the GFO
The Glyndebourne Festival Opera is a privately funded organisation. There
have been only two exceptions to this rule. First, in 1951 the Festival received
a one-off guarantee against losses from the Treasury worth £25 000 for its
participation in the Festival of Britain, and second, since 1968 the Arts
Council has subsidised the touring activities of the Glyndebourne Touring
Opera. As the organisation is of a private nature, there is no information
available on the income structure apart from the statement of financial
accounts.
152
In the financial year 1997, the total income of Glyndebourne Productions
Limited - the company running the Glyndebourne Festival Opera, the
Glyndebourne Touring Opera and Glyndebourne Education activities - was
£12 725 914. The income of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera amounted to
£10 476 646, leaving £2 249 268 (18%) of the income to have been
generated by the Glyndebourne Touring Opera and Glyndebourne Education.
The income structure of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera in 1997 based on
the statement of financial accounts was following:
Trading income
Donations and grants
Investment income
Surplus on sale of assets
Transfer from the Building Fund
Total income
£7 986
£1 416
£417
£54
£ 601
908
668
298
312
460
£10
(76%)
(14%)
(4%)
(1%)(5%)
476 646
The report of the directors gives out a different division of the income sources
in percentages. They shed light on the category of trading income above and
are thus worth spelling out here. The income sources, in percentages, of the
Glyndebourne Festival Opera in 1997 were:
Box Office	 70%
Glyndebourne Festival Society (donations) 	 15%
Sponsorship and donations	 6%
Programmes, Catering, Merchandising etc. 	 9%
The total operational surplus on the ordinary activities of Glyndebourne
Productions Limited was £36 606. After exceptional items and transfers from
the building fund reserve the Company had a retained surplus of £1 414 071.
Added to the general reserve of £4 990 647 brought forward from previous
years, the general reserve to be carried forward amounted to £6 404 718.
This is an exceptionally healthy situation for an opera company, when the
general rule is rather a deficit of similar size to be carried forward.
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In addition to the actual statement of financial activities, Glyndebourne
Productions Limited has included detailed income and expenditure accounts
for the three operational units, the Glyndebourne Festival Opera,
Glyndebourne Touring Opera and Glyndebourne Education as appendices to
the statement. As these do not form a statutory part of the financial
statements, they differ somewhat due to different accounting policies from the
actual statements. The information about the income structure of the
Glyndebourne Festival Opera does not shed any more light on the income
structure of the Festival than can be obtained form the actual statements.
However, it will be used in considering the expenditure structure of the
Festival.
3. The expenditure structure
The expenditure structure of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera is not
separated in the statement of financial activities of Glyndebourne Productions
Limited from the general activities of the company. The income of the Festival
Opera as a percentage of the whole income of the Company was 82%. This
figure must therefore be assumed as a rough guide to the expenditure
structure as well. The expenditure structure is presented below as the
expenditure of the whole Company, which should be borne in mind when
contemplating the figures. The figure of 82% should thus be applied, where
relevant.
The total operational expenditure in 1997 of Glyndebourne Productions
Limited was £12 087 848. It is divided in the statements between direct
charitable expenditure £7 147 429 (59%) and administration expenditure £4
940 419 (41%). These categories are divided in the statements as follows:
154
Artistic costs £3 974 264 (of Total) (33%)
Technical and production costs £2 749 419 (23%)
Specific touring expenses £174 715 (1%)
Education projects £249 031 (2%)
Total direct charitable expenditure £7 147 429
Administration £1 807 207 (15%)
Marketing and fund-raising £296 435 (2%)
Overheads E1 511 789 (13%)
Cost of sales and ancillary trading £431 000 (4%)
Depreciation and amortisation £893 988 (7%)
Total administration expenditure £4 940 419
Total Operational expenditure 02 087 848
A detailed income and expenditure account of Glyndebourne Festival Opera
activities is given in the appendix to the financial statement. This is a very
detailed description of the financial division of expenditure in producing opera
and thus is worth repeating here.
Administration charges and salaries £1 512 417
Staff pension scheme premiums etc. £102 120
Total Fixed Overhead Costs £1 614 591
Conductors £191 745
Orchestra £1 092 349
Principal singers £732 537
Chorus and understudies £570 676
Music staff £107233
Artistic administration £68 219
Principal associate director's fee £46 030
Music library £106 530
Total Artistic Costs £2 915 319
Wigs £88 237
Make-up £20 779
Wardrobe £474726
Props £71 389
Scenery £495487
Stage staff £349 347
Stage management £80 567
Production electrics £160 492
Production performers £155 133
Production team £161 745
Scenery storage £18 721
Technical and production administration £50 165
Total Technical and Production Costs £2 126 788
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Glyndebourne House and gardens £194 909
General expenses £31 932
Press and publicity costs £93 421
Archives £26 601
Professional fees £149 524
Insurance £69246
Front of house £292 469
Building and services £300 518
Finance £7610
Office services £112 387
Transport and car park £71 620
Box office £145641
Information technology £59 798
Depreciation:
Freehold property £12 825
Opera House £815 241
Motor vehicle £26 168
Equipment £39 754
Total Overhead Costs £2 449 664
Bank overdraft interests £151
Total Finance Expenses £151
Total Expenditure (Festival Opera) £9 106 513
4. The Board of Directors and related bodies of the Glyndeboume
Festival Opera
The Glyndebourne Festival Opera - as spelled out above in the section on the
legal status of the organisation - is governed by two Charitable Companies,
Glyndebourne Productions Limited and the Glyndebourne Arts Trust. The
Board of Directors 1
 of the former consisted in 1998 of Sir George Christie, the
Chairman, and four other members, John Botts, David Davies, Sir Dennis
Stevenson (who replaced Augustus Christie during the year) and the Hon.
Mrs. Julian Fane, all belonging to that section of the society often described
as 'the Great and Good'. The Directors are selected by the Board of Directors
from among the members of the association, which according to the British
custom is not a wide membership-base. Rather, the only members of the
1 The legal term used in the Articles of the Association is Trustees. However, even the
Glyndebourne Festival Opera uses the term Directors, as a term more relevant to the role of
the Trustees in the Company.
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association tend to be the Directors, as the Board of Directors approve the
new members of the association. In the course of the election of a new
Director, the candidate will first be admitted as a member of the company and
subsequently appointed as a Director. The business of the association (i.e.
the company) is to be managed by the Trustees who are additionally
responsible for the preparation of the accounts of the association. However,
the financial responsibility of the members of the company is limited to E1
each. The powers of the Board of Directors can be delegated to the
executives of the company, as is the case with Glyndebourne Productions
Limited. The General Director and the Finance Director were Advisory
Trustees, ex-officio members of the Board of Directors without voting rights
during the year 1998.
The Board of Trustees of the Glyndebourne Arts Trust function in a manner
similar to the Board of Directors of Glyndebourne Productions Limited. In
1998, it consisted of John Botts, chairman, and eleven other members, David
Astor CBE, the Hon. Lady Cazalet, Lady Christie, Paul Collins, Lady
Kelvedon, Sir Nicholas Monck, Brian Nicholson, Sir Michael Perry CBE, Lord
Rees-Mogg, Sir David Scholey CBE and the Hon. David Sieff. As the aim of
the Trust is to attract private funding to the Glyndebourne Festival Opera, the
Trustees are from the wealthier part of society. Also, as can be seen from the
list of the Trustees, the majority are titled. Additionally, the cooperation
between the two Boards of Trustees is visible from the dual membership of
John Botts and from the representation of the Christie family on both Boards.
In addition to the legally defined Boards of Directors/Trustees of
Glyndebourne Productions Limited and the Glyndebourne Arts Trust there is
a third organ of an informal nature, the Glyndebourne Council. It was
originally a working-committee that consisted of members of both Boards and
the executives of the Opera. However, currently the Council is - as defined in
the 1998 Programme Book - "a body of eminent people connected with
Glyndebourne, who give help and advice". The Members of the Council in
1998 were Sir Bernard Miller, the Countess of Albemarle DBE, Christopher
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Arnander, Lord Briggs, Moran Caplat CBE, the Rt. Hon. Lord Carr of Hadley,
Brian Dickie, Tony Garret CBE, Lord Gibson, Sir Emmanuel Kaye CBE, Lord
Kingsdown, the Rt. Hon. Lord Lloyd of Berwick, Sir Claus Moser, Lady Rupert
NeviII, the Rt. Hon. Lord Richardson of Duntisbourne KG MBE TD, and
Leopold de Rothschild CBE.
5. The personnel structure of the Glyndeboume Festival Opera
The Glyndebourne Festival Opera operates on a seasonal basis, the core of
the operations taking place during the summer months. Therefore, the
majority of the personnel employed by the Company is not on a full-time
basis. The core administration, heads of workshops etc. are employed full-
time. The company, however, did not wish to spell out in detail the proportions
of full-time and part-time personnel. The average weekly number of
employees of the Company was 230 in 1997 according to the financial
statements, consisting of 69 people in administration and 161 in production.
According to the 1998 programme book the total number of employees of the
Glyndebourne Festival Opera during the 1998 festival was 603. The figure
includes all permanent staff, seasonal staff and visiting artists. Additionally the
two orchestras involved in the festival - the London Philharmonic Orchestra
and the Orchestra of the Age of Enlightenment - are both included in the
figure even though they operate on a contractual basis. Further, the catering,
scenery construction and painting, and parts of the wardrobe production and
maintenance had been contracted out, thus this work is not included in the
personnel table below. The break-down of the personnel structure during the
1998 Festival was as follows:
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Music Director 1
Director of Productions 1
Conductors 5
Directors 6
Designers 9
Lighting Designers 7
Choreographers 1
Principal singers 53
Chorus 66
Dancers 4
Actors (extras) 25
Orchestras 118 + 36 154
Music Staff & Coaches 25
Sundry artistic personnel 12
Total artistic personnel 369
General Director 1
Artistic administration 14
Finance and resources department 15
House management & maintenance 35
Building and services department 8
Press and publications office 13
Shop and gallery 11
Box office 12
Total Administration 118
Technical Direction 5
Stage management 11
Stage personnel and carpenters 22
Night stage staff 14
Lighting personnel 10
Props personnel 8
Wardrobe personnel 21
Running wardrobe personnel 16
Make-up and wigs 9
Total Technical and Production personnel 116
Total personnel during 1998 Festival 603
6. The Opera House
The original Glyndebourne Opera House, completed in 1934, had a seating
capacity of 311. It lacked many of the practicalities of an opera house of its
time - e.g. it had no way of flying the scenery, no scenery dock, its orchestra
pit was small etc. - while its lighting equipment and steam effects were among
the best in Europe. (Hughes 1981, 32 & 44.) Further, the backstage facilities
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for the artists were poor, there were only two dressing rooms for the principals
and two for the chorus. (Hughes 1981, 70.) After the first season in 1934, the
Opera House went through the first of its many periods of alteration during the
winter. A scenery dock was built adjoining the stage and another scenery
store was built. Additionally, twenty-four dressing rooms were built onto the
backstage area with a green room. Also, some improvements to the facilities
provided for the audience were made. (Hughes 1981, 76.) Between the 1936
and 1937 seasons the auditorium underwent its first major change, increasing
the capacity to 433 by widening the auditorium and by adding a balcony of 40
seats. Also, two dining rooms were added to the structure for the convenience
of the audience, since the practice of picnicking had not yet developed.
(Hughes 1981, 119.)
After the Second World War, the Opera House underwent a major overhaul,
the equipment having been idle for several years. However, after the
Glyndebourne Opera Festival had been properly reinstated and the current
legal and financial framework for the operations established, the Opera
House was enlarged once more in 1953. The changes to the auditorium
included a newly constructed roof with the columns moved outwards, thus
enabling the stalls to accommodate 507 seats. Visibility was improved by this
and by widening the proscenium arch. Additionally, the balcony was
extended to provide a total of 178 seats plus three boxes with 30 seats each.
Thus, the total capacity of the auditorium was increased to 718. Also, a new
scenery dock was built to enable it to take backdrops. (Hughes 1981, 185.)
After the 1953 changes there were minor expansions over the years in the
actual Opera House raising its capacity to 800 seats. Additional buildings
were developed around the Opera House in order to cope with the technical
demands of the evolving traditions of opera production. Nevertheless, the
Glyndebourne Touring Opera had expanded the audience outside
Glyndebourne since 1968, and the Opera House had reached the limit of its
capacity by 1980s so that it could no longer deal with the technical demands
of the artists nor with the intensive demand for more seats from the audience.
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Therefore, a New Opera House project was launched in 1990. (ACE 1994,
65.)
The Glyndebourne Arts Trust proved to be very successful in its building fund
appeal. The new Opera House was built in seventeen months between the
1992 and 1994 seasons, and the project was funded almost entirely by
private donations. The cost of the New Opera House totalled £33 000 000. It
has a capacity of 1200, 1.5 times the capacity of the old theatre. Naturally, the
design was a very delicate matter in order to maintain the 'sprit of
Glyndebourne' in the transition. The design of Michael Hopkins & Partners
incorporates the old structure of workshops and service facilities outside the
actual Opera House into the design, thus keeping the new structure relatively
light. The auditorium is horse-shoe shaped to provide the maximum number
of seats without losing the intimate feeling of the original auditorium. The back
wall of the new auditorium is actually two metres closer to the proscenium
arch than in the old theatre. It has a gently raked bank of stalls and three
horseshoe shaped balconies, one at the stalls level and two above that. The
decoration of the auditorium is very 'anti-gilt-and-plush' consisting mainly of
waxed timber and black textiles. (ACE 1994, 36-65.)This is very much in line
with, for example the Opera Bastille and the New Helsinki Opera House.
The stage size l is 16 m x 16 m and it has wings of same depth and
approximately half the width. The proscenium arch opening is 9 m wide, its
height being variable. The backstage area is a semicircle with a radius of 19
metres. This reflects the circular shape in the overall design on the auditorium
side of the building. The spacious backstage enables the scenery for a whole
season to be stored in the stage area, up in the flies and in the back and two
side stages. Around the stage area there are a generous loading-bay (as
opposed to the original Opera House) and a rehearsal room, similar in layout
1 The numerical information about the New Opera House has been obtained from plans in a
reprint of The Architectural Review, published by the Arts Council of England. The plans are at
a very small scale of approximately 1:850 and thus there may be some errors in the
dimensions. However, they provide a reliable overall view of the scale of the building.
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to the main stage. The stage area is easily accessed from the workshops
outside the main Opera House through the loading-bay. The lighting and
technical systems, as in the original Opera House at the time of its
inauguration, are state-of-the-art. In addition to the lighting facilities in the
stage area there are lighting rails incorporated in the design of the auditorium
balconies, and the main dome also contains a circular lighting rig which
complements the proscenium lighting bridge. (ACE 1994, 36-65.)
7. Programming, pricing and audience figures
The 1998 festival l took place from 21st May till 28th August 1998. During the
festival there were a total of 6 operas in the programme, 3 premieres and 3
revivals. The premieres were Mozart's Cosi fan tutte, Handel's Rodelinda and
Verdi's Simon Boccanegra. The other operas in the programme were
Janacek's Kãta Kabanov5, Strauss's Capriccio and Rossini's Le Comte Ory.
There were a total of 76 performances.
The pricing structure of the new opera house is divided into six seat price
categories plus standing room category. The prices vary between £118 and
£10 (standing room). The stalls, foyer circle and circle belong mainly to the
top price category, some rear seats to the £86 category and sides - due to the
restricted view2
 - to the lower categories of £59, £37, £21 and £16. The upper
circle has been divided into two price categories of £59 and £37, some space
provided for standing room priced at £10. The structure is relatively simple,
1 The financial information about the Glyndebourne Festival Opera is from the financial year
1997. The information about operations is from the following year, 1998 creating a slight
discrepancy in the description. The 1998 financial records did not arrive in time for inclusion in
this thesis.
2 According to the programme booklet "A number of seats have a restricted view owing to the
horseshoe shape of the auditorium, which was adopted for acoustic reasons." In this case, the
acoustic excellence has been prioritised over 'democratic' seating layout. See the section on
the Opera Bastille.
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there being no different categories based on the programme, first-nights etc.
The emphasis in the sales brochure is placed on the booking arrangements,
since the tickets are in great demand. Priority is given to the members of the
Festival Society, followed by those on the waiting list to become members'
and those patrons on the mailing list. Booking opens first by mail (first
members, then general public), then in person (queue tickets are issued 24
hours before the box office opens) and last by telephone.
As a private company the Glyndebourne Festival Opera does not make public
their audience figures. However, the average was agreed by the
administrative personnel to be somewhat above 90% 2 . Further, the
composition of the audience is deemed a private matter, and thus no data is
available. However, the list of the members of the Festival Society (as listed in
the annual programme book) gives an idea of the composition, the higher
sections of society being well represented.
8. The organisational structure of the Glyndeboume Festival Opera
The Glyndebourne Festival Opera do not define their organisational structure
internally by a hierarchical organisation diagram. The preferred way is a list
giving out the names and positions of the employees in each department.
However, some observations about the chain of command and the division of
responsibilities can be made on the basis of the list. Additionally, figure 12
shows a diagram describing the organisation hierarchically. This is based on
interpretation of the list of the personnel and the departments.
1 There are currently approximately 7000 names on the waiting list, which costs £100 to join.
2 A fact that can be suspected also from the emphasis given to the booking arrangements
(even if discounting them partly as a skilful marketing ploy).
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Figure 12.
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During the 1998 festival, the Glyndebourne Festival Opera had l three
directors, General Director Anthony Whitworth-Jones (background in arts
administration), Music Director Andrew Davis (conductor) and Director of
Productions Graham Wick (stage director). Under the three top directors there
are three other directors in the organisation: Director of Artistic Administration,
Director of Finance and Resources, and Technical Director. In addition to
these directors there are several managers, some (based on the listing)
responsible for small 'departments'. (For example, the House Manager is the
highest title in the department responsible for security, maintenance and
cleaning.) However, as the organisation is fairly small and operates partly on
1 The description of the organisational structure is based on information about the 1998
Festival period, as spelled out in the 1998 programme book, in order to keep the case-study
description consistent. After the festival the structure changed as General Director Anthony
Whitworth-Jones retired from his post and Nicholas Snowman took over. This development is
commented on in the section on the artistic decision-making structure.
164
a part-time basis, the manager level is not described in the organisational
chart above.
In the listing of staff, the Glyndebourne Festival Opera spells out the artistic
staffl
 (excluding the singers, however) in addition to the other staff employed.
The artistic staff has been divided 2 in the listing into subgroups, e.g.
conductors, music staff (working under the Head of Music Staff), directors and
designers etc. It seems reasonable to assume that the two first categories
operate under the artistic authority of the Music Director and the two latter
under the artistic authority of the Director of Productions, even though this is
not directly indicated in the listings. All other departments operate under the
authority of the General Director. This will be the case with the artistic staff as
well in the future, when Nicholas Snowman will be the sole top-level director
in the organisation. The division of responsibilities between the departments
is described in the chart in a way that is deemed self-explanatory, and will
therefore not be commented on here. However, as the Glyndebourne Festival
Opera operates on a seasonal basis, it needs to be borne in mind that some
of the employees are not full-time staff but employed only on a seasonal
basis.
9. The artistic and financial planning and decision-making structure
During the first years of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera's existence, a top
organisational structure was created, where John Christie was the Chairman
of the organisation and the executives included the General Manager Rudolf
Bing and the artistic directors Fritz Busch and Carl Ebert, a conductor and a
1 The division and inclusion of the artistic staff into the organisational structure differs
somewhat from the way in which the other case-study organisations define their organisational
structures. This, however, is probably due to the festival nature of Glyndebourne operations.
2 The chorus and the two orchestras are listed elsewhere in the Glyndebourne programme
book and have thus been included in the chart. The singers are listed in the credits of each
production, and have thus not been included in the chart (based on the listings of the staff).
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stage director, respectively. This structure has prevailed, according to the
information given in the description of Glyndebourne seasons between 1934-
1980 by Hughes (1981), with some slight changes and nuances according to
the personalities involved over the sixty years of Glyndebourne Festival
Opera. The three executive posts were held during the 1998 festival by
Anthony Whitworth-Jones (General Director), Andrew Davis (Music Director)
and Graham Vick (Director of Productions).
In late 1998, however, when Nicholas Snowman took over the position of
General Manager, the situation started to change from the customary three
Directors model. This description is based on an interview with Nicholas
Snowman on 31st March 1999 and an article published in Opera magazine,
dealing with the artistic and financial planning and decision-making structures
that he is implementing. Over the period between autumn 1998 and autumn
2000, the whole Glyndebourne top management, including the Chairman, will
have changed. The current Music Director and Director of Productions are to
retire after the festival of summer 2000. The change of General Director took
place in autumn 1998 and the change of Chairman took place in the end of
the year 1999, when Sir George Christie handed over the chairmanship to his
son Augustus Christie. In many opera organisations this pace of change
would not be considered fast. However, in the case of Glynciebourne, where
the directors and chairmen have generally worked for decades, this provides
a chance for changes. Especially so, when the organisation has only recently
been established in the New Opera House.
The new system will emphasise the executive power of the General Manager.
The post of Director of Productions will cease to exist after Graham Wick has
departed. According to Snowman this will streamline operations and avoid
possible conflicts of authority. In his view, the General Director is in any case
responsible for the quality of the productions. Similarly, even though the post
of Music Director is to be maintained, the role will be directed more towards
exchange of ideas and advice to the General Manager. However, the post
has not yet been filled even though the vacancy will occur shortly. The reason
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for this is the search for new top-rank conductors to appear at Glyndebourne
in the future, and a strong Music Director might be perceived as a hindrance
in this situation. It seems, that the General Director, Snowman, is looking to
the future, possibly hoping to attract one of the future top-rank conductors to
act as Music Director and is thus not willing to commit the organisation at this
point. (Clark 1999, 14.)
This development is well in rapport with his view of the role of the General
Director at the Glyndebourne Festival Opera. The General Director is in
charge of the organisation under the supervision of the Board, especially the
Chairman Sir George Christie. Plans for the future are conceived in the
General Director's office and then presented to the Board for approval. The
strong imprint of Nicholas Snowman's vision can already be seen in the long-
term plan devised for future Glyndebourne Festivals. The approved plans are
then budgeted in more detail, and if necessary over time, modified to fit the
financial constraints etc. Snowman sees the responsibility of the artistic
success and financial stability of the plans to be his responsibility. This will be
ever more so now that the long-time Chairman has stepped down. Should
artistic or financial plans fail, Snowman sees this to be a reason for the
termination of his contract. Thus, Glyndebourne will in future be very much
centred around the General Manager, Snowman, whose responsibility it is to
maintain the trust of the board by succeeding in executing the plans and by
keeping the organisation under control, both artistically and financially. In this
he finds constant communication and personal presence essential, thus
making it possible for him to deal with any problematic issues - especially in
the artistic realm - before they become obstacles to the functioning of the
organisation.
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10. Summary
In this section the main points of the information presented above are
collected into table form. The information is based — where applicable — on
annual figures, the sources of which are defined in the text above. The
information will be compared with other case-studies and discussed in the
next part of the thesis.
Organisational history 	 The festival grew from the domestic cultural
and legal status activities of an aristocratic family. The first festival
took place in 1934, in the purpose-built opera
house adjacent to the manor house. The legal
organisational structure was created in 1939 as a
charitable company — Glyndebourne Production
Limited. When activities resumed after the Second
World War a supporting Trust was also
established,
	 in	 practice	 in	 1954.	 The
Glyndebourne Festival Opera currently operates
through	 the	 two	 charitable	 companies,
Glyndebourne Production Limited being
responsible for the day-to-day activities of the
organisation and the Glyndebourne Arts Trust
concentrating on fund-raising.
Governing bodies
Management structure
Official governing bodies: Board of Directors
(Trustees) of Glyndebourne Production Limited
and the Board of Directors (Trustees) of the
Glyndebourne Arts Trust. Members of the board
appointed from the members of the company in
both cases, these two being in practice the same.
Thus, the boards are in reality self-appointing
bodies. Both boards have close ties with the
Christie family. There is also a Glyndebourne
Council, which consists of eminent supporters of
the Festival. Initially the Council has been a
working-committee, but has later become more of
an honorary committee.
In 1998: the General Director responsible for the
organisation. Two co-directors: Music Director and
Director of Productions. New General Director is
changing the structure concentrating both artistic
and economic decision-making in himself.
(Director of Productions to retire, no Music
Director at the present time.)
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Organisational structure Departments directly under the General Director.
Exceptionally (partly due to the festival nature of
the organisation) the artists are included in the
description of the organisation (i.e. listing of
personnel by department). Fairly flat and
streamlined structure, partly due to the seasonal
nature of the company's operations.
Income structure Total income £10 476 646: Box Office 70%,
Glyndebourne Festival Society donations (through
the Glyndebourne Arts Trust) 15%, programmes,
catering and merchandising 9%, sponsorship and
donations 6%.
Expenditure structure 	 The personnel costs are not separated in the
accounts. All costs stated here include personnel.
Artistic costs 32%, technical and production costs
23%, overhead costs 27%, administration and
pensions 18%.
Number of employees	 603 including part time personnel and visiting
artists.
Personnel structure Artistic personnel 369 (principal singers 53,
dancers 4, chorus 66, orchestras 118 + 36 — total
154, music staff 25, extras 25, other artistic
personnel 42),administration (incl. maintenance)
118, technical and production personnel 116.
Opera House The new opera house was inaugurated in 1994
and has auditorium capacity of 1200. The stage is
16 m x 16 m in size and has some wing and rear
stage areas being not, however, completely
cruciform-shaped. The technical facilities are
state-of-the-art.
Programming and	 Total number of performances 76, all opera. Six
number of performances different productions three of which are new.
in the main auditorium
	 Programming
	 principle	 —	 semi-stagione.
Programming relatively conservative, some less
well known work included.
Ticket prices and sold
	
Ticket prices £10 - £118. Sold capacities not
capacities	 publicly available, amounting , however, to over
90%.
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9. THE OPERA NATIONAL DE PARIS
1. Organisational history and the legal status of the organisation
During the 17th century a distinctly French lyric art-form (as opposed to Italian
Opera) had started to develop, especially in the 'Pastorale' of Pierre 'Abbe'
Perrin and Robert Cambert. (Demuth 1963, 97-100.) This became very
popular among the aristocracy and the court. Thus, in 1669 Louis XIV granted
Perrin a royal patent to form `Academie d'Opera', giving him a monopoly on
lyric performances. The Academie d'Opera, founded in 1669 is seen as the
organisational creation of the Opera national de Pads. (Demuth 1963, 105.1
From 1669 onwards, therefore, anyone wishing to perform opera needed
Perrin's permission and had to pay a heavy fee to obtain it. Furthermore, all
spectators attending the performances were ordered in the patent to pay fees,
making no exceptions even for the members of the court - a fact which was to
cause a considerable measure of unrest and unruly behaviour at the first
performances. The first performance given by the Academie d'Opera took
place in 1671, the intervening years having been spent on gathering an
ensemble, creating a theatre and organising the finances needed. (Demuth
1963, 106 - 109.) The organisational beginning of the Academie d'Opera did
not seem to promise centuries of existence. In order to finance his enterprise,
Perrin had sold shares in his monopoly and formed a syndicate. The new
enterprise was not altogether successful and Perrin soon found himself
incarcerated for debts to the landlord of the theatre. However, as his
signature was needed for any transactions, he continued his business from
his debtor's cell. However, the situation did not improve and the syndicate
was divided into two parts, both convinced of their right to continue the
Academie d'Opera. (Demuth 1963, 113.)
Louis XIV's superintendent of music, Jean-Baptiste Lully, an opera composer
of growing influence and with great ambitions at court, however, saw his
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moment in this quibble. He purchased the royal patent from Perrin in prison,
who had kept the original letters patent even though selling shares of it to his
syndicate members. The King subsequently annulled the initial letters patent
and issued a new one to Lully in order to avoid any dispute over the
ownership of the monopoly. He also changed the name of the enterprise to
'Academie royale de Musique' to distinguish it from the first Academie
d'Opera. (Demuth 1963, 116-117.) Lully was able to run the Academie royale
de Musique successfully and even gained financially from his monopoly.
(Crosten 1948, 32.)
After Lully's death in 1687, his successors were not as fortunate in running
the Academic. It soon acquired the habit of accumulating deficits and thus in
January 1713, Louis XIV issued a Royal Ordinance (supplemented in
November 1714) which placed the director of the Academie royale de
Musique under the supervision of an inspector general, thus taking the
organisation under direct control of the monarch. The Royal Ordinances
defined the numbers of artists engaged and their fees, among other
administrative matters. This added supervision was not, however, enough to
ensure the financial stability of the organisation. Thus, new sources oVincome
were granted by the King in the form of new patents between 1716 and 1769
providing the Academie royale de Musique a near complete control of music
production in Paris. (Crosten 1948, 12.)
With the 1789 revolution, the monopoly of the Academie royale de Musique
was broken when a law giving any citizen the right to establish a theatre was
introduced in 1791. As a result, in 1793 a total of eighteen theatres presenting
lyric drama were in operation in Paris. The Commune, however, retained the
right to close any theatre that presented a programme not deemed suitable.
(Crosten 1948, 12.) Even this relative freedom, however, was not to last. The
administration of the Opera (as it was now called) was placed under the strict
1 The name of organisation changed frequently during the revolution and the following years.
The changes have been documented, e.g. in Bereson 1998, 89, and will thus not all be
included here. The term Opëra will used as a general name for the organisation.
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control of the government in 1794. With the rise of Napoleon the situation
gradually started to resemble the time before the revolution. The changes
took place between 1806-1811. First, the Minister of the Interior was to
determine the productions of the Opera and any other theatre producing the
same programme was to pay a fee to the Opera. Then, Napoleon further
reduced the number of theatres to eight (thus ending the freedom to establish
a theatre) and subsequently ordered the theatres of 'second rank' to pay a fee
to the Opera for the use of music. The circle was thus completed. Even the
pre-revolution format of a director of the Opera under the Superintendent of
Theatres was re-established and the habit of accumulating deficit and relying
on State subsidies was resumed. (Crosten 1948, 13-16.)
The next change in the administration of the Opera took place after the 1830
revolution. The new 'bourgeois-king' Louis-Philippe organised the
administration on a basis similar to that in Lully's time, bringing together
official and commercial aspects. (Fulcher 1987, 54.) The Opera was to
operate as a private business and the director's personal finances were to be
at risk if the organisation made a loss. However, the Opera did not become
the property of its director, Louis Veron, but he was to run it at his own risk.
Additionally, State subsidies were to be continued for a period of a few years,
but were then to diminish gradually. Veron's artistic collaborations resulted in
the successful period of French Grand Opera, a tradition that carried the
Opera on for half a decade. (Crosten 1948, 17-18.) However, Vêron's
successors were not to be as successful financially, resulting in the need for
State funds for the Opera. The third and final exception - after Lully and
Veron - to the rule of Opera directors losing rather than making money was
Hyacinthe Halanzier (also known as Halanzier-Dufresnoy), who benefited
from the new Palais Gamier and the 1878 Paris Exposition during his tenure
between 1875-79 and created a fortune for himself. (Gourret 1977, 63 & 71-
76.)
After the fall of Napoleon III, the French State took over the responsibility of
the Opera in 1871 - now called The6tre National de /'Opera - an arrangement
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that has continued ever since. The Opera functioned in the new Palais
Gamier with advancing levels of stagnation. In 1939 the Opera and the
Opera-Comique were merged as Reunion des Theatres Lyriques Nationaux,
and later that year taken under the control of the Vichy government. (Gourret
1977, 86.) After the Second World War the organisation became less and
less adventurous in its programming and artistic standards started to fall. The
appointment of Rolf Liebermann in 1973 marked a turn for the better. The
ensemble system was abolished and the stagione principle replaced the
repertory system. (Gourret 1977, 86-101.) These principles are still in use at
the Opera national de Paris. With the inauguration of the new Opera Bastille,
the three centuries old company has been re-vitalised, and its artistic and
working practices brought up to modern standards.
The current legal status of Opera national de Paris is defined in Statute no.
94-111 of 5th February 1994, `Statut de /'Opera national de Paris' l . The
Opera is a public institution operating by commercial and industrial principles
under the control of the Ministry of Culture ('un etablissement public a
caractere industriel et commercial place sous la tutelle du ministre chargé de
la culture'). The French State controls and monitors the organisation - as its
main source of income - very closely, even though the Opera is not directly
part of the State administration. This is an understandable continuation of the
close relationship of the Opera and the State - whether a monarchy or a
republic - and well in line with the historical development described above.
1 In a manner and detail resembling the Royal Ordinances of Louis XIV
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2. The income and expenditure structure of the Opêra national de Paris
The total income of the Opera national de Paris in 1998, according to the
1998 budget l , was FF 874 900 000. This is divided in the budget into three
categories: subsidies FE 571 300 000 (65% of the total income), box-office
income FF 219 500 000 (25% of the total income) and other self-generated
income FE 84 100 000 (10% of the total income). The way in which these are
broken down in the budget (in French Francs) is as follows:
Total income in 1998 Budget: Subdivided Total
Subsidies 571 300 000
State subsidy 571 300 000
Box office income 219 500 000
Box office for performances 213 000 000
Touring income 6 500 000
Other self-generated income 84 100 000
Sponsorship 12 700 000
Tours of the buildings 11 400 000
Income from audio-visual recordings 10 500 000
Commercial activities (shops etc.) 28 900 000
Sundry income 20 700 000
Total income FF 874 900 000
The total anticipated expenditure of the Opera national de Paris according to
the 1998 Budget is FF 866 100 000. It is broken down into four categories;
the Opera is not willing to give out any more detaiIed information of its
expenditure structure. The information available is presented below (in French
Francs):
Total expenditure in 1998 Budget:
Personnel expenditure 497 200 000 (57%)
Artistic production expenditure 198 900 000 (23%)
General operational expenses 138 600 000 (16%)
Expenses for sundry cultural activities 31 300 000 (4%)
Total expenses 866 100 000 (100%)
1 The budget in question is the 'skeleton' version made available to the press and the public.
The actual operational budget is considered confidential and was not available for analysis in
this study.
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The budget of 1998 thus shows a profit of FF 8 800 000 (income FE 874 900
000 - expenditure FF 866 100 000) before depreciation of equipment etc. The
budget also contains a separate section for investments, the amount invested
in equipment etc. being FE 33 100 000 and the State subsidy for such
investments being FF 29 400 000.
3. The Board of Directors
The role of the Board of Directors of Opera national de Paris and its
functioning is defined in the Statute no. 94-111 of 5th February 1994, `Statut
de l'Opera national de Paris'. The Board consists of five representatives of
the State, four representatives of the employees of the Opera, and two
'experts in the field° who are appointed on the recomm endation of the
Ministry of Culture. The five representatives of the State include three
members from the Ministry of Culture (Director of Music, Director of Dance
and Director of General Administration) and one member from the Exchequer
(the Director of Budget). The Chair of the Board of Directors is the fifth
representative of the State, though his/her background is not defined in the
Statute. The members of the Board receive a remuneration for their services
equivalent to sixteen hours of work per month. Additionally, at meetings of the
Board of Directors, the General Director is present with the State financial
controller, who is a full-time employee of the State monitoring the financial
state of the Opera national de Paris. A representative of the accountants -
appointed by the Exchequer - is also present at the meetings. These three,
however, have only an advisory role.
The Board meets at least twice a year or whenever the Chair or the Minister
of Culture deems necessary. The role of the Board of Directors is to monitor
the organisation, to ensure that it fulfils the objectives set by the State in the
1 'Personnalitès qualifiees'.
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Statute 94-111, to approve the financial plans and budget, to ensure that the
financial status of the Opera remains sound and is based on the budget
approved by the Board etc. On top of its controlling role in organisational
issues, the Board of Directors approves the programming plans prepared for
it by the General Director one year in advance of the season in question, and
sets the admission prices.
The Board of Directors has a subcommittee - the Financial Committee -
which is in charge of the day-to-day financial monitoring of the administration
of Opera national de Paris. It consists of the Chair of the Board of Directors,
three representatives of the Ministry of Culture (the Director of Music, the
Director of Dance and the Director of General Administration) or their
representatives, the Director of Budget (Exchequer) or his/her representative,
the General Director, the State financial controller, and the State appointed
accountant. Also, the Directors of the departments of the Opera are present
whenever requested by the Chair or the General Director. In effect the
financial committee consists of the State representatives of the Board of
Directors. The representatives of the personnel and the expert members of
the Board of Directors are not included in the Financial Committee, thus
giving the State an even tighter grip on the financial management of the
Opera national de Paris. The Financial Committee has a meeting every two
months. It monitors the financial status of the Opera on the basis of reports
prepared by the General Director. It also monitors the current activities of the
Opera, especially in relation to expenses and income. If necessary, it informs
the Board of Directors about developments, in order for it to react accordingly.
(French Statute 94-111, 5th February 1994.)
4. The personnel structure
The personnel structure of the Opera national de Paris is divided into three
different groups, based on the nature of their employment contracts. The
permanent employees are divided into `cadres' and `non cadres', i.e. higher
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rank employees (directors, heads of workshops etc.) with a status similar to
civil servant status, and other permanent employees at the non-managerial
level. The employment contracts are made between the OpOra and the
employee, thus not giving the employees a state employee status. However,
this is not always recognised by the employees and the labour unions, which
often try to negotiate with the Opera as they were direct state employees. The
third employment status at the Opôra are the temporary contracts, which
cover most of the artistic personnel, since the organisation has not had a
permanent ensemble since 1971. There is a further division within the
employment structure of the Opêra national de Paris between the personnel
working solely in the Palais Gamier or in the Opêra Bastille. This is especially
the case with the technical staff, who often work in only one of the houses.
The total number of employees at the Opera national de Paris is 1388, of
which 537 are artistic personnel, 195 are administrative personnel, and 656
are technical personnel. Additionally the Opêra national de Paris has
approximately 300 visiting artists contracted per annum. The employment
structure will be presented below based on the way in which the company it
divides 1
 internally, avoiding unnecessarily detailed divisions. (The
presentation will follow the format: cadre/non cadre - total, e.g. 4/5 9.)
1 In 1996 figures as produced and made available for this study by the Opëra.
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Personnel structure Sub-
divided,
cadre/
Sub-
divided,
total
Total,
cadre/
non-
Grand
total
non cadre
cadre
Technical Department, Bastille 821265 347
Technical direction 10/4 14
Technical laboratory l 3/6 9
Costume workshop 9/26 35
Stage technicians, stage hands 10/71 81
Audio-visual technicians 9/13 22
Props department 7/17 24
Lighting technicians 7/40 47
Sets workshop 13/31 44
Make-up department 4/7 11
Music staff, pit managers 1/9 10
Wardrobe staff 7/18 25
Storage 1/6 7
Transportation and maintenance 2/14 16
'Genie scênique2' department 10/6 16
Technical Department, Gamier 48/142 190
Technical direction 4/4 8
Costume workshop 9/23 32
Stage technicians, stage-hands 5/39 44
Audio-visual department 3/9 12
Props department 3/8 11
Lighting technicians 7/29 36
Technical archives 2/4 6
Costume workshop 6/12 18
Transportation 3/6 9
Storage 1/3 4
Music staff, pit managers 1/3 4
Decorations office 1/1 2
Make-up department 3/1 4
Buildings and maintenance department 20/99 119
Buildings, Bastille 12/4 16
Buildings, Gamier 2/1 3
Interiors maintenance 4/43 47
Security, Bastille 1/26 27
Security, Gamier 1/25 26
Artistic personnel 55/482 537
1 Due to the exceptional nature of the technical equipment at the Bastille and the potential it
offers, the Opera national de Paris has a technical laboratory in which designers are
introduced to the stage technology and offered the opportunity to experiment. See also the
section on the Opera Houses below.
2 Genie scanique, i.e. the automated stage mechanism of Opera Bastille.
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Programming and planning 7/2 9
Audio-visual planning 1/1 2
Stage planning 19/7 26
Musical direction 10/8 18
Chorus 0/93 93
Orchestra 0/150 150
Chorus principals 0/2 2
Orchestra music staff 2/3 5
Dance direction 9/24 33
Ballet dancers 0/152 152
Opera studio 2/3 5
Ballet school 5/37 42
Administrative personnel 92/103 195
Directors 4/0 4
Assistant directors 4/0 4
Department of human resources 17/16 33
Committee of employees 1/2 3
Dept. of administration and finance 6/5 11
Computer department 10/2 12
Accounts department 8/11 19
Heads of general administration 9/1 10
Budget administration 6/4 10
Press office 7/1 8
Audience development 8/37 45
Book-keeping 2/21 23
Print office 1/1 2
Education department 9/2 11
Total of all personnel 297110 1388
SA
5. The Opera Houses
The Opëra national de Paris operates in two venues, the Palais Gamier
(inaugurated in 1875) and OpOra Bastille (inaugurated in 1990). The two
venues will be described below one at the time.
The Paris Opèra has occupied several venues during its existence. Most have
been destroyed by fire, as was Salle Lepelletier — the °Ora's permanent
venue for 52 years before Palais Gamier - only two seasons before the new
venue was completed. Thus, Theatre de l'Opêra (as the Paris Opera was
called at that time) performed in Salle Ventadour for two years before moving
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into Palais Gamier. (Cowden, ed. 1992, 67.) The new opera house was a
lavish project by Napoleon III, who announced an architectural competition for
it in 1860. It was won by an unknown young architect Charles Gamier in
1861. (Mead 1991, 45-50.) This started a long and costly project before the
Palais Gamier was finally inaugurated in 1875. There were several reasons
for the delay. Gamier, as a state architect, had to submit reports and apply for
funding from the French State annually. This all was very bureaucratic and
the budgetary issues remained a constant battle, especially when the
revolution made the Third Republic paymaster for the project in 1871. (Mead
1991, 135.) Further, the Franco-Prussian war and the revolution itself
considerably delayed the project. (Cowden, ed. 1992, 67-68.) The Palais
Gamier, a grand personal project of Napoleon III, was finally inaugurated by
the newly elected President on the 5th January, 1875. The total cost of the
new opera house had risen from the original estimates by the Conseil des
Betiments Civils of 15 million Francs to the huge total of 36 million Francs,
closer to Garnier's original unofficial estimate of 29 million Francs. (Mead
1991, 140 & 197.)
The current seating capacity of the Palais Gamier's horse-shoe shaped
auditorium is 1990, in surroundings of exceptional splendour and luxury. It is
therefore no wonder that, for a century, the Paris Opera (as organisation) and
the Opera (as building) became synonymous and embodied all bourgeois
values. Technically, however, the theatre suffers from the problems of all
older opera houses that date from the time before modern stage layout and
machinery. The stage complies with the conventions of its period of origin,
having no real side or back stages (as they are now understood). The stage is
53 metres wide overall, out of which 28 metres is freely in use, leaving in
effect 11 metre wide side stages to each wing. The total stage depth is 27.25
metres, of which 24.5 metres is behind the fire curtain. This leaves in effect a
stage size of 28 m x 24,5 m. The maximum (recommendation by the technical
department of the ONP) proscenium arch opening is 15.25 metres wide and 9
metres high and it is adjustable with black velvet curtains. The fly-tower height
is 34 metres. The orchestra pit size is 16,6 m x 5,2 m and it can
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accommodate only 90 musicians. The Palais Gamier has recently undergone
a process of modernising the stage machinery and lighting technology in
order to avoid unnecessarily high technical staffing levels to compensate for
its lack of adequate technology. However, due to the historical importance of
the theatre, there are still limitations, e.g. to the size of scenery blocks etc.
Further, storage space - both around the stage and in-house - is a problem
resulting in frequent dismantling of sets. Therefore, it has to be possible to
build and dismantle all sets in one four-hour shift of the technical staff. (ONP
1998.)
"Opera is by nature a costly art form and the Palais Gamier unites all the
conditions for least democracy and greatest expense, the smallest number of
spectators and the most splendid productions, with running costs well out of
proportion to its own takings, despite the very high cost of seats..." (Francois
Bloch-Lainè in 1976, as translated in Charlet 1989, 3.) This notion was the
starting point for the process that resulted in the opening of the new Opêra
Bastille in 1990. The Palais Gamier was perceived as a stronghold of the
Paris bourgeoisie with high admission prices and over-demand for tickets.
Also, the technical problems of the old theatre made opera production very
uneconomical and labour-intensive (problems that were partly solved in the
1990s refurbishment). Therefore, the French Government set out a project for
a new 'more democratic' opera house in 1981. The house was to be larger,
more accessible and to provide an increased number of performances per
year than had been the case in the Palais Gamier. The aim was to "present
top quality performances 250-300 times a year to a total audience of 7-800
000." (Charlet 1989, 25.) The Government set up a commission 'Mission
Opëra Bastille' to define the characteristics of the new opera house, the result
being an extensive dossier sent out to all participants of the architectural
competition that was announced in 1983. The competition was won by a
Canadian, Carlos Ott. The ultimate winner of the competition was selected by
President Francois Mitterrand from among the finalists, whose plans the jury
of architects deemed suitable for the new opera house. (Charlet 1989, 78-83.)
The implementation process of the new opera house, however, proved to be
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difficult. The first phase was the redesign of Carlos Ott's proposal, since some
alterations were necessary due to the historically important location of the
new house in the Place de la Bastille, as well as for practical and acoustic
reasons. After the plans had been finalised, the project met several political
problems even during the process of construction. A good indication of the
seriousness of the political arm-wrestling surrounding the project is the fact
that in July 1986, Finance Minister Edouard Balladur halted the building
process temporarily - at a cost of 750 000 francs a day. The building process
was definitely not made any easier by the simultaneous squabble over the
future programming and artistic policy of the new house, manifested in the
problems between Daniel Barenboim (appointed as the artistic and musical
director of the new opera house in 1987) and Pierre Bêrge (appointed as
chairman of the Association des Th6atres de /Opera de Paris in 1988.1
(Charlet 1989, 167-168.) However, on 13th July 1990 the new house was
inaugurated and has proven - since its initial technical problems have been
solved - to be a well-functioning modern opera theatre.
The Opera Bastille has three stages; the main auditorium with a capacity of
2700, the 'Greek-style' amphitheatre below the main auditorium with a
capacity of 650, and a studio theatre with a capacity of 237. (ONP 1998.) The
main stage fulfils the 'democratic' objectives set for the new opera house by
having no boxes, all seats having a direct view of the stage, and the black and
white colour scheme with wood being perceived as relatively neutral without
any bourgeois connotations.
The main stage of the new Opera Bastille is the most striking technical
feature of the theatre. It represents the most modern step in the evolution
from the traditional stage through the cruciform stage to 'the Bastille plan'.
This development is demonstrated in figure 13. The illustrations describe a
traditional stage (1), the cross plan stage (2), the Munich solution (3) and the
Bastille plan (4). (Charlet 1989, 22.)
-4---• -1--1.
1
Stage
1)
Stage
Auditorium
3)
Auditorium
2)
Auditorium
4)
Auditorium
182
Figure 13.
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The Opera Bastille main stage area consists of six 19,5 m x 19,5 m stage
sized `modules'; all automatically interchangeable. The rear stage consists of
a revolving stage 27.6 metres in diameter. Thus the set changes can be
conducted very effectively as a total of four different sets can be prepared
before the performance and wheeled onto the stage with 'a press of a button'.
Additionally there are three stage-sized areas behind the actual stage. One of
these is a rehearsal stage, and one connected to the studio theatre stage
making the interchange of sets between rehearsal room and stages efficient.
Also, there is storage space on a level below the stage, into which whole
stage-size sets can be lowered for storage. Normally the sets for all
performances in the repertory at the same time can be stored in-house,
without any major striking. (Naturally, the performances in the repertory but
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not currently running are stored elsewhere.) The proscenium arch opening is
variable, its width varying from 12 metres to 19.7 metres and its height
varying from 8 metres to 12 metres. Additionally, the location of the
proscenium arch can be adjusted in depth. The orchestra pit size is 18.5 m x
18.5 m and consists of four elements, all individually variable vertically. The
lighting and technical aspects of the stage are 'state-of-the-art', all
computerised and individually programmable l . (ONP 1998 & Charlet 1989,
162- 166.)
6. Programming, pricing and audience figures
In the calendar year 19982, the Opera national de Paris had seven opera
premieres, four at the Opera Bastille and three (two of which as a double bill)
at the Palais Gamier. The premieres at the Opera Bastille were Wagner:
Tristan und lsolde, Berg: Lulu, Fènelon: Salammbe• (World Premiere), and
Verdi: Don Carlos. The premieres at the Palais Gamier were Rossini:
L'Italiana in Algeri, von Zemlinsky: Der Zwerg, and Ravel: L'Enfant et les
sortiléges (von Zemlinsky and Ravel as a double bill). There were additionally
fourteen operas in the repertory of the Opera in 1998, twelve at the Opera
Bastille and two at the Palais Gamier. The operas performed at the Bastille
were: La Traviata, Tosca, Carmen, Billy Budd, Eugene One gin, Norma,
Manon, Madame Butterfly, Der Rosenkavalier, Rigoletto, I Capuleti e i
Montecchi, and Die lustige Witwe. The operas performed at the Palais
Gamier were: Cosi fan tutte and La Cenerentola.
1 The technical features of the Opera Bastille are so advanced that the Opera national de
Paris runs a 'workshop' for instructing future designers in the potential and operation of the
'Genie scenique', as it is called.
2 The programming is presented for the calendar year to keep the analysis consistent with the
financial data, which is based on the calendar year. The actual 1998-99 season ran from 12th
September 1998 to 15th July 1999.
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The Ballet de Opara national de Paris had three premieres in 1998, all at the
Palais Gamier. The premieres were: Bart and Polyakov after Corralli and
Perrot: Giselle, Angelin Preljocaj: Untitled, and Soirée de ballets Veunes
Danseurs' by several choreographers. Additionally the Ecole de danse had
two premieres: Spectacle de l'Ecole de danse, and Demonstrations de l'Ecole
de danse. There were also two gala performances: Hommage a Yvette
Chauvire, and a New Year's Gala at the Palais Gamier. The programme of
the Ballet de Opara also included three programmes 1 by visiting companies:
Merce Cunningham Dance Company (two triple bills by Merce Cunningham)
and Nederlands Dans Theater (Creation by Jiri Kyliki).
There were ten other ballet performances in the programme of the Ballet de
Opara national de Paris in 1998, six at the Palais Gamier and four at the
0par-a Bastille. The ballets performed at the Palais Gamier were: Double Bill
(Neumeier: Vaslaw and Bagouet: So schnell), Nuryev after Petipa: Don
Quixote, Macmillan: L'Histoire de Manon, Bart: Coppelia, Mats Ek: Giselle,
and Quadruple Bill by Duboc, Graham and Bausch. The ballets performed at
the Opara Bastille were: Nuryev after Petipa: Raymonda, Gallotta: Les
Variations d'Ulysse, Nuryev: Romeo et Juliette, and Nuryev after Petipa: La
Bayadére.
The total number of performances in 1998 of the Opera national de Paris was
3662 ; 195 performances at the Opara Bastille and 171 performances at the
Palais Gamier. The total number of opera performances was 182 and the
total number of ballet performances 184. The Opera national de Paris also
organised 13 concerts in 1998, 5 symphony concerts, 6 chamber music
concerts and 2 recitals.
1 Here considered as premieres as they were performed for the first time at the Opera national
de Paris.
2 Excluding concerts.
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The pricing structure of the Opera national de Paris is divided in three ways:
by venue (Opera Bastille / Palais Gamier), by performance and by seat
location.
There are seven l price categories used in both Opera Bastille and Palais
Gamicr2 based on the performance: Opera A and B 3 , Ballet A, B & C,
Concerts/Recitals, and Chamber Music. The price ranges of these, the top
and bottom being the same4 in both houses, are: Opera A FE 650 - 60, Opera
B FE 555 - 60, Ballet A FE 405 - 30 ( FE 50 in Bastille), Ballet B (used in 1998
season only for Palais Gamier) FF 340 - 30, Ballet C FE 250 - 30 (FF 45 in
Bastille), Concerts FF 245 - 45, and Chamber Music (in Palais Gamier only)
FE 90 - 45. The division (apart from the obvious opera/ballet/concerts) of
performances between the price groups is relatively straightforward, e.g. all
the operas belong to the A category, apart from Billy Budd, Eugene One gin,
Lulu, SalammbO, I Capuleti e i Montecchi and the von Zemlinsky-Ravel
Double Bill, i.e. the slightly less well known operas. A similar, only three-tier
structure applies to ballets, e.g. Don Quixote in category A and 'Spectacle de
l'Ecole de dance' in category C.
The price categories based on the programme are divided into subcategories
according to the location of the seat. There are six (e.g. Opera A: FE 650,
495, 340, 220, 135, 60) seating categories in Palais Gamier and seven (e.g.
1 The categories and prices given here are based on the 1998/99 season. There has been a
slight increase in prices from 1997/98 to 1998/99. However, the changes have been relatively
straightforward increases, e.g. the top price increased from FF 635 to 650, thus making the
presentation of both prices unnecessary.
2 This is obviously a 'political' statement since the demand for opera seats, especially at the
Paleis Gamier is greater. See below the section on sold capacities.
3 In previous seasons there have been different price categories for both Opera and Ballet
from A to D. However, the tendency seems to have been to use only the top end of the scale,
thus making category D and Opera C obsolete.
4 There are some exceptions to this general rule. In Ballet price categories some lower end
prices are lower at the Palais Gamier than at the Bastille. This is due to the more limited
visibility of the stage from certain less expensive seats at the Palais Gamier than at the Opêra
Bastille.
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Opera A: FF 650, 530, 450, 340, 220, 150, 60) in Opëra Bastille. The division
of the auditorium in the Palais Gamier is very detailed and complex l , the
stalls belonging to price group one (highest) and the amphitheatre to price
group four. The rest of the auditorium is divided on the principle that the
higher and the more towards the side the seat is, the cheaper it is. This is
done in a very detailed manner indeed. The dress circle boxes are a good
example of this detailed division since all the price categories - apart from
category four - are present in them. The division at the Opera Bastille is
simpler, but still more detailed than in many opera houses. The stalls are
mainly price category one, but the sides and the rear contain all the other
categories apart from category seven. The dress circle front belongs to
category one, the rest being divided between categories two, three, five and
six. The upper circle front belongs to category four, the rest being divided
between categories five, six and seven. The side galleries all belong to price
category seven.
Apart from the individual fully-priced tickets there are 'advance' concessions
for persons under 25 years of age in specified performances. Furthermore,
young persons, students, the retired and the unemployed can obtain
discounted tickets four hours before the performance if there is sufficient
number empty seats. This concession is available at the discretion of the
management.
There are several subscription schemes in operation at the Opëra national de
Paris, altogether ten different arrangements all with several choices for the
performances included, totalling 31 different subscription choices. The range
is from 'a la carte' to 'young persons' subscription scheme. The subscription
selection reflects the same complicated pricing policy as the individual ticket
prices - obviously intended to cater for a wide range of patrons.
1 The system has recently been made even more complicated. The `Saison 1997/1998'
booklet contains a 'corrections sheet' presenting the new Paleis Gamier seating category
structure. This is considerably more complicated than in the original picture contained in the
booklet, e.g. the boxes are divided in a more detailed way in the corrections sheet.
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The Opêra national de Paris conducted audience research in September-
October 1997. Based on that survey, the audience structure divided by
profession was as follows: professionals in managerial positions 40%,
intermediate professionals 43%, manual labourers 9%, self employed 3% and
others 5%. Geographic division of the audience was Paris 46%, Paris Region
38%, France outside the Paris Region 14% and foreigners 2%. (ONP 1998.)
The information available about total sold capacities is divided up by the
venue and the performance. The attendance figures have been constantly
high, the total being 94% in the main auditoriums both in the 1996-97 and the
1997-98 season. In the 1997-98 season the total for operas at the Bastille
was 96%, and for ballets 82% 1 . The figures for Gamier were 99% and 97%,
respectively. The attendance figures for each performance varied from 72%
(Mahagonny) to 100% (e.g. La Traviata, Swan Lake), most performances,
however, reaching attendance figures of over 90%. (ONP 1998.)
7. The organisational structure of the Opera national de Paris
The Opêra national de Paris defines its organisational structure by an
`organigramme' - a listing of the departments and the personnel - included in
the 1998-99 `Saison' booklet. According to the Administrative and Financial
Director, Benoit Paumier, the organisation avoids defining the relationships of
the employees by a traditional organisational chart. This is partly due to the
problems this sort of definition of authority would create in the relationship of
higher level employees and partly due to the problems involved in the process
of creating this sort of complicated chart for an arts organisation 2. (Paumier
1998.) However, this sort of hierarchical definition of the organisation (of its
1 Due to relatively low attendance for Raymonda.
2 The Theatro alla Scala, Milano similarly restrains itself from this sort of hierarchical
definitions of authority. This was revealed in the initial discussions with the representatives of
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higher levels) had been done under the direction of the former General
Director, Jean-Paul Cluzel. As the departments of the current organisation
mainly correspond with the structure of the organisation under Cluzel, this
organisational chart will be presented below in figure 14.
Figure 14.
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Based on the former hierarchical organisational structure and the current
'organigramme' the organisational structure of Opôra national de Paris is
described in chart from in figure 15, as interpreted by the author.
the organisation when it was approached and asked to participate in the research project.
Unfortunately, La Scala decided not to take part in the research.
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The Opôra national de Paris is run by General Director Hugues Gall, who has
a background in opera administration. He has sole overall responsibility for
the organisation and is responsible to the Board of Directors (i.e. the State
through the Ministry of Culture). He has two co-directors, Artistic co-director
Bruno Schuster l and Managing co-director Philippe Agid. The former has a
background in arts administration (through the civil service) and the latter has
a general managerial and civil service background. Thus the three top
directors do not include artists. The second level of the organisation contains
the top artistic personnel, e.g. Music Director James Conlon and Chorus
Master David Levi. It also contains the directors of the Ballet (Birgitte Lefévre),
the Ballet School (Claude Bessy) and the Opera Studio (Christine Bullin).
Below these five 'artistic' directors there are ten departments and their
directors, all responsible directly to the General Director (through the co-
directors, where appropriate). The structure seems relatively bureaucratic with
a large number of independent departments, all with a specified director.
However, as the organisation is rather big, with the total of 1388 employees,
this seems understandable. In reality, according to the Administrative and
Finance Director, Benoit Paumier, all the departmental directors report directly
to the General Director, who thus keeps the organisation under his control
and coordinates the functioning of the organisation with the assistance of his
co-directors. (Paumier 1998.)
8. The artistic and financial planning and decision-making structure of
Opera national de Paris
This section is based on three interviews, two of which were conducted at the
00ra national de Paris with co-directors, Philippe Agid and Bruno Schuster,
and one at the Ministry of Culture with Senior Music Advisor Alain Surrans.
Some information based on a short discussion with the Programming
1 Artistic co-director Bruno Schuster left the organisation unexpectedly in 1999. Unfortunately,
there is no information available on the reasons of his departure.
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Director, Christoph Seuferle, and a telephone interview with the Director of
Administration and Finance, Benoit Paumier, is also included. The importance
of the General Director, Hugues Gall, in relation to artistic and financial
planning was emphasised in all the interviews.
The General Director has overall responsibility for the artistic planning and
financial stability of the organisation. In effect there is a 'moral contract'
between the General Director and the State (Ministry of Culture and the
Treasury) based on the plans and projections about the development of the
organisations. (Schuster 1998.) Before taking on the responsibility of the
Opera national de Paris in 1993, Hugues Gall was contracted to conduct an
extensive survey of the state of the organisation and to propose plans and a
financial framework for the organisation up to the year 2000 (roughly for the
duration of his six years in office). (Gall 1993.) In 1997, General Director Gall
produced a follow-up to the initial report, in which the years 1998-2000
receive more detailed attention. (Gall 1997.) In these reports the issues of, for
example, artistic programming principles, utilisation of the two venues, the
financial framework of the organisation, employment and personnel structures
and the relationship between the state and the Opera are explored in detail. It
seems that these reports and the plans and forecasts they contain form the
basis for the 'moral contract' and 'project of Hugues Gall' that define the
relationship between the General Director and the Board of Directors, i.e. the
Ministry of Culture and the Exchequer. (Schuster 1998 & Surrans 1998.)
The artistic policy defined in the Gall reports is to achieve a total number of
365 performances annually, approximately 200 opera performances and 165
ballet performances. The division of the two venues utilised by the
organisation is defined by the type of performance, Opera Bastille used
mainly for opera and Palais Gamier for ballet performances. When
programmes artistically allow, interchange between the venues and opera
and ballet will take place, providing a few productions of opera at Palais
Gamier per season. The 'project' at the Opera Bastille is to produce relatively
popular opera (due to the size of the auditorium) at the artistically highest
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level, and to gradually build up a repertory that would allow a high number of
different productions per season. The actual artistic plan is then derived from
this initial artistic policy. As a rough rule to the (opera) planning principle, the
Managing co-director, Philippe Agid, suggested a division where the repertory
consists 1/3 each of French, German and Italian works. The other principle
used is based on the era of the opera, 3/5 being 19th century repertory and
1/5 each 18th and 20th century works.
The budget and financial framework projections of the organisation have been
defined in the Gall reports, and the organisation has been successful in
keeping to those forecasts and has even managed to undercut them. For
example the forecast for the total expenditure of the organisation for 1998
was FF 917 000 000, while the actual budgeted expenditure remained at FE
866 100 000. From the Board of Directors' point of view, the General Director
is free to fulfil his artistic plan for the organisation as long as the financial
framework is adhered to. The role of the Board of Directors is to monitor this
development and control the artistic and financial success of Opera national
de Paris. As the organisation has performed well both arfigically - based on
its artistic policy of popular opera - and financially, the relationship between
General Director Gall and the representatives of the State is a good one.
Internally the artistic planning process precedes the budgeting process. When
the programme has been selected and finalised the actual production and
performance plans are put together in the Planning and Programming
Department. Only when the dates have been fixed and the artistic personnel
contracted is the detailed budgeting of individual productions done. (Seuferle
1998.) According to the Managing co-director, Philippe Agid, the contracts
with the artists seldom provide problems, with the exception of the designers
and occasionally the directors. (Agid 1998.) However, the production control
is relatively tight - the status of Opera national de Paris among the leading
opera houses providing the organisation with a good bargaining position.
According to Artistic co-director Schuster, the management is not 'afraid of
the artists' and allows the budget to be exceeded only if it seems artistically
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important. (Schuster 1998.) Thus the management executes its own artistic
judgement on artistic issues if the result is important to the budget of the
organisation. However, as the Opera national de Paris has been successful at
the box office as well as fulfilling the artistic 'project' of General Director Gall,
the artistic planning and budgeting mechanism is not currently deemed overtly
problematic. Its importance to the organisation is, however, widely
acknowledged.
9. Summary
In this section, the main points of the information presented above are
collected into table form. The information is based — where applicable — on
annual figures, the sources of which are defined in the text above. The
information will be compared with other case-studies and discussed in the
next part of the thesis.
Organisational history
and legal status
Governing bodies
Founded in 1669 by the royal patent granted to
Pierre Perrin. The organisational history is best
described as close connection and relationship
with the State. Despite the mode of government,
the French monarchs and the State have had a
close interest in the functioning of the Opera. The
current legal status is a public institution under the
control of the Ministry of Culture.
Board of Governors, the role of which is defined in
French legislation. Comprises five members
appointed by the Ministry of Culture, four
representatives of the employees and two 'experts
in the field' appointed on the recommendation of
the Ministry of the Culture.
Management structure 	 General Director, assisted by administrative and
artistic co-directors.
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Organisational structure
Income structure
Expenditure structure
Number of employees
Personnel structure
Opera House
Programming and
number of performances
in the main auditorium
Ticket prices and sold
capacities
There are ten departments operating under the
direct authority of the General Director leading to a
flat organisational structure. Additionally, the
Ballet, Ballet School and the Opera Studio operate
as separate entities under the authority of the
General Director.
Total FF 874 900 000. State subsidy 65%, Box
Office 25%, Other self-generated income 10%.
Personnel 57%, artistic production 23%, general
operational expenditure 16%, other 4%.
1388 + app. 300 visiting artists
Artistic personnel 537 (ballet 152, chorus 95,
orchestra 150, other artistic staff 88, ballet school
42), techn‘c2A staff 537, actmknkstcatkon VaS,
maintenance 119.
Two main venues: Palais Gamier and Opêra
Bastille.
Gamier: Inaugurated in 1875. Auditorium capacity
1990. Stage size 28 x 24.5 m with some wing
space, but no real rear stage. Technology recently
renovated, however, the historical importance of
the building results in some difficulties in working
practices.
Bastille: Inaugurated in 1990. Main auditorium
capacity 2700. Stage highly automated consisting
of six interchangeable modules of 19.5 x 19.5 m.
Additionally lots of storage space behind and
underneath the stage. Technically state-of-the-art,
now that initial problems have been solved.
Total number of performances 366; 182 opera and
184 ballet. 195 performances in Bastille and 171
in Gamier. 34 different productions, out of which
10 new (7 operas, 3 ballets).
Ticket prices FF 30 — 650. Sold capacities Bastille:
Opera 96%, ballet 82%; Gamier Opera 99%,
ballet 97%.
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PART III - DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
10. DISCUSSION
1. Introduction
In this part of the thesis, the five case-studies on the organisational structures
of opera companies are discussed and some conclusions are drawn. The
main conclusions of the research project are presented in the next chapter.
The discussion will take the form of presenting the core information about the
case-study organisations, one aspect at a time, bringing the information
together form all the organisations analysed. This information is aiso
discussed, where applicable (i.e. where the artistic or socio-economic issues
influencing the organisational structures are discussed), in conjunction with
the analytical model created in the theoretical part of the thesis. The core
information about the case-study organisations is repeated here in order to
avoid the necessity to constantly refer back to the case-study descriptions.
2. Organisational history and the legal status of the organisations
The organisational history and the legal status of the case-study organisations
is summarised in table form below.
DOB Established as a bourgeois opera theatre in 1911 by civil society
initiative. The City of Berlin assumed responsibility for the organisation
in 1925 changing it into a public institution under the authority of the
cultural administration. The authority over the organisation has
changed several times from City of Berlin to German Reich to Allied
Forces in 1945. Currently the organisation operates under the
authority of the Senatsverwaltung fur Wissenschaft, Forschung und
Kultur as a non-independent public organisation.
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ENO Founded in 1925 (opened in 1931 at Sadler's Wells Theatre) on the
initiative of Lillian Baylis to offer opera and drama at popular prices.
Legal status: Charitable Company limited by guarantee — Sadler's
Wells Trust Limited (non-profit-making organisation) established in
1946. Company changed its name to the English National Opera in
1974 after moving to the London Coliseum.
FNO Founded in 1911 as an artists' co-operative. Formed into a foundation
in 1956 in cooperation with the Ministry of Education. Current legal
status: a private foundation (non-profit-making organisation) with close
links to the Ministry of Education.
GFO The festival grew from domestic cultural activities of an aristocratic
family. The first festival took place in 1934 in the purpose built opera
house adjacent to the manor house. The legal organisational structure
was created in 1939 as a charitable company — Glyndebourne
Production Limited. When the activities resumed after the Second
World War a supporting Trust was also established, in practice in
1954. The Glyndebourne Festival Opera currently operates through
the two charitable companies, Glyndeboume Production Umited beirig
responsible for the day-to-day activities of the organisation and the
Glyndebourne Arts Trust concentrating on fund raising.
ONP Founded in 1669 by royal patent granted to Pierre Perrin. The
organisational history is best described as close connection and
relationship with the State. Despite the mode of government the
French monarchs and the State have had a close interest in the
functioning of the Opera. The current legal status is a public institution
under the control of the Ministry of Culture.
It is notable that the organisational history of all the case-study organisations
(apart from the Paris Opera) has started from a civil society initiative. Even in
the case of the Paris Opera, Louis XIV took a keen interest in the
development of the new art-form that had gained ground at court and among
the aristocracy when establishing the Academie d'Opera, thus not merely
establishing an organisation according to his own will 'as the State'. All the
organisations operate currently as non-profit-making organisations — a fact
that can be seen as a continuation of the original civil society values in the
organisations' functions. It is also worth noting that the legal status of all the
organisations has changed between 1925 and 1946. The change brought
stronger involvement of the State authorities in most cases. In the case of the
Glyndebourne Festival Opera — not directly funded by the state — the
company nevertheless needed to conform to the requirements of the State
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and the market in its mode of operations. Thus, it was established as a
charitable company in 1939, bringing it more towards the systems level from
the lifeworld (civil society) level where it had operated before that. The current
trend, however, seems to be towards a lessening in the involvement of the
State authorities (not least due to reduced or frozen funding levels). This is
evident, for example, in the case of the Deutsche Oper Berlin which the
Senatsverwaltung would like to see as an independent body, apart from the
State administration. Similar development is taking place in Italy, where the
Enti Autonomi are to be established as private foundations. In the UK there
has been discussion about the possibility to 'privatising° th e Royal Opera
House. Thus, the development from civil-society-based opera organisations
towards state-run opera organisations seems to have ended in many parts of
Europe. The possible ways for the organisations to proceed if they need to
distance themselves form the state authorities, are either towards the market
or the civil society. At the moment, however, there is no clear evidence of the
direction that will prevail, even though there seems to be more emphasis on
the market in the current discussion as the possible new source of income.
3. Governing bodies
Information on the governing bodies of the case-study organisations is
summarised in table form below.
DOB No board of directors structure. Organisation governed through the
Berlin Senate Administration.
ENO Board of Directors elected by the general meeting from the Members
of the Company. In practice the Members of the Company and the
Board of Directors are the same, making the Board a self-nominating
body.
1 The ROH organisation is a charitable company, so that privatisation would mean
discontinuing State subsidies not a change in the legal organisational status.
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FNO Board of Governors (20 members, 15 nominated by the funding
bodies) and Board of Directors (12 members, 7 nominated by the
funding bodies).
GFO Official governing bodies: Board of Directors (Trustees) of the
Glyndebourne Production Limited and the Board of Directors
(Trustees) of the Glyndebourne Arts Trust. Members of the board
appointed from the members of the company in both cases, these two
being in practice the same. Thus, the boards are in reality self-
appointing bodies. Both boards have close connections with the
Christie family. Additionally, there is a Glyndebourne Council, which
consists of eminent supporters of the Festival. Initially the Council was
a working committee, but has later become more of an honorary
committee.
ONP Board of Governors, the role of which is defined in French legislation.
Comprises five members appointed by the Ministry of Culture, four
representatives of the employees and two 'experts in the field'
appointed on the recommendation of the Ministry of Culture.
The board of directors level structures of the case-study organisations well
reflect the socio-economic framework in which the organisations operate. In
the cases of the Deutsche Oper Berlin, the Finnish National Opera and the
Opera national de Paris the close links of the organisations to the State
authorities is evident in the governing structure. The Deutsche Oper Berlin is
currently governed directly by the authorities. Should it become
organisationally more independent (GmbH - i.e. Plc.) in the future, the
governing structure would doubtless resemble the Finnish and the French
structure. In these cases the organisation is 'semi-independent', however, the
majority of the members of the governing body are determined by the Ministry
of Culture. Thus, the cultural authorities have relatively strong control over the
organisations. The control is tighter in the French case where the Opera is a
public body and the governing structure is defined in the legislation.
In the cases of the English National Opera and the Glyndebourne Festival
Opera the British 'arm's length' principle operates in the governing structures.
The authorities do not have direct control over cultural organisations that
operate in society in a way that combines civil society aspects and market
aspects. The governing structure of the organisations resemble the structure
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used in the profit-making organisations. As the organisations are non-profit-
making, however, the directors do not have similar financial liabilities and
responsibilities to the shareholders as in the case of the profit-making
companies. 'The shareholders' in essence is that section of civil society which
the organisation caters for. This section also has an impact on the selection of
the board of directors, as can be seen clearly for instance in the case of the
Glyndebourne Festival Opera. In the case of the English National Opera, the
board of directors appointments made by the board are tacitly to be approved
by the Arts Council. Thus, it executes its power as the main source of funding
for the organisation through unofficial chains rather than official, as is the
case with the Paris Opêra, for example.
4. Management structures of the case-study organisations
Information on the management structures of the case-study organisations is
summarised in table form below.
DOB The organisation is directed by the General Director. The
management team also includes the Administrative Director, the
Music Director and the ballet Director. (Schmitz 1998.)
ENO Three top managers: General Director, Executive Director and Music
Director. General Director ultimately responsible.
FNO Two top managers: General Director and Administrative Director.
Management team includes: Music Director, Ballet Director and
Technical Director.
GFO In 1998: the General Director responsible for the organisation. Two
co-directors: Music Director and the Director of Productions. New
General Director is changing the structure concentrating both artistic
and economic decision-making to himself. (Director of Productions to
retire, no Music Director at the present time.)
ONP General Director, assisted by administrative and artistic co-directors.
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The case-study organisations are all run by a General Director (or equivalent)
who has a very strong position in the organisation. The backgrounds of the
general directors are artistic in the case of the Deutsche Oper Berlin and the
Finnish National Opera, and arts administrative in the cases of the English
National Opera, the Glyndebourne Festival Opera and the Opera national de
Paris. The dual function of opera organisations is manifested in the position of
the general director. Their task is on one hand to ensure the artistic quality of
the organisation's productions and on the other to ensure the financial viability
of the organisation. This is reflected in the discussion about the preferred
background of the general director — i.e. artistic versus managerial — which is
taking place around several of the organisations concerned. Where the
general director is artistic, the role of the administrative director or managing
director becomes important. However, the trend seems to be towards general
directors with backgrounds in arts administration, which in effect combines the
two functions and two areas of expertise. In Finland there has even been
discussion about whether the next general director of the Finnish National
Opera should have a general administrative or business background;
naturally combined with some understanding of the art form. In this case, the
role of a separate strong artistic director would have been created. However,
this solution (which was not in the end adopted by the FNO) might not provide
the answer to the artistic-economic dichotomy the general director is forced to
work with. It would only change the situation from one extreme to the other;
from the dominance of the artistic issues to the dominance of the economic
viability of the organisation.
The structure of the management team seems to be strongly influenced in the
case-study organisations by the background of the general director and the
general expectations of the socio-economic framework. In the case of the
Deutsche Oper Berlin, for example, society has (until recently) placed the
emphasis on the artistic viability of the organisation. Thus, the management
team includes three artistic persons. The Administrative Director is a lawyer,
which is again well in line with the bureaucratic way in which the organisation
is governed. In the case of the Finnish National Opera the Administrative
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Director, who has a business background, currently provides the necessary
'counter force' to the artistic General Director, ensuring the financial viability of
the organisation.
In the cases of the other three case-study organisations where the general
directors all have a background in arts administration, the management team
comprises both artistic and administrative managers or directors. This solution
obviously gives the general directors assistance in both fields of expertise and
emphasises the task of the general director as the combining and balancing
force between the artistic and financial aims of the organisation.
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5. Organisational structures of the case-study organisations
Information about the organisational structures of the case-study
organisations is summarised in table form below. Additionally, the
organisational charts of the organisations are repeated below the table in
figures 16 — 20 to enable easier comparison.
DOB The organisational structure is relatively flat and the role of the
General Director is strong. The second managerial layer of the
organisation consists of the Music Director, the Opera Director, the
Principal Stage Director and the Managing Director. Additionally there
are seven other Directors under the General Manager on a level below
the second managerial level.
ENO Seven departmental directors (senior management team) under the
General Director leading to a fairly flat organisational structure. The
structure is defined hierarchically right down to the level of individual
workers.
FNO Flat organisational structure. Departments directly under the General
Director.
GFO Departments directly under the General Director. Exceptionally (partly
due to the festival nature) the artists are included in the description of
the organisation (i.e. listing of personnel by department). Fairly flat
and streamlined structure, partly due to the seasonal nature of the
company's operations.
ONP There are ten departments operating under the direct authority of the
General Director leading to a flat organisational structure. Additionally,
the Ballet, Ballet School and the Opera Studio operate as individual
units under the authority of the General Director.
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The organisational structures of the case-study organisations are surprisingly
similar. All of the organisations - and organisational charts - analysed have a
relatively flat organisational structure consisting of the General Manager and
a set of Directors, each in charge of a department of the organisation. The
organisations analysed vary considerably in size, from the 570 employees of
the ENO to the 1388 employees of the ONP, which naturally influences the
complexity of the organisational structures of the organisations. However,
there seems to be a common basis for the division of all the organisations.
Under the General Director there seem to exist five basic functions
(sometimes divided between several Directors): the Managing Director in
charge of the financial and organisational issues, the Planning and Production
Department (in some cases called Artistic Administration) in charge of
programming and production planning etc., the Music Department in charge
of the orchestra, chorus etc., the Ballet in charge of ballet related matters, and
the Technical Department in charge of the stages, workshops etc. In the case
of the Opêra national de Paris, there are altogether seventeen different
Directors immediately under the General Director. However, as the ONP
organisation is considerably bigger than the others analysed, this is explained
by division of the basic roles into smaller departments. For example, financial
and organisational issues have been divided into six different areas including
human resources, public relations, broadcasting and recording etc. None of
the organisational structures analysed acknowledge any 'vertical' interaction
between these five 'Departments' which must inevitably for the organisations
to function properly without referring all decisions to the General Director and
communicating through him. Additionally, apart from the description of the
organisational structure of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera, there are very
few of the top artists — e.g. singers, conductors, designers — included in the
structure charts of the case-study organisations. This seems surprising, as in
the analytical model the top artistic figures seem to play an important part in
the artistic-economic equation influencing the organisational structures. This
phenomenon — deemed to be among the key findings of this research project
— will be further discussed and commented on in the conclusion.
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6. Income structures of the case-study organisations
The information about the income structures of the case-study organisations
is summarised in table form below.
DOB Total income in 1998 budget € 51 142 000: Land subsidy 80%, Box
Office 9,5%, Other self-generated income (mainly touring) 10.5%.
ENO Total income € 38 530 000 1 : Arts Council subsidy 46%, Box Office
26%, subsidy from National Lottery funds 14%, sponsorship and
donations 5%, other income (sales etc.) 9%.
FNO Total income € 34 365 000: State subsidy (National Lottery Funds)
67%, Box Office 20%, subsidies from local authorities 10%, other
income 3%.
GFO Total income € 15 130 000: Box Office 70%, Glyndebourne Festival
Society donations (through the Glyndebourne Arts Trust) 15%,
programmes, catering and merchandising 9%, sponsorship and
donations 6%.
ONP Total € 133 378 000: State subsidy 65%, Box Office 25%, Other self-
generated income 10%.
The sources of income were divided in the analytical model between private
sources and institutional sources and subsequently into single and multiple
sources. Additionally, the value systems and the quality assumptions of state,
market and civil society were linked to these income categories. The income
of all the case-study organisations is divided into three main categories:
subsidies (or major donations), box-office income and other self-generated
income. The analysis of these categories is presented below one at the time,
starting from the lower end of percentages of total income.
The category of 'other self-generated income' (including sales, merchandising
and sponsorship' etc.) belongs clearly to the category of multiple-source
1 All the GBP amounts have been converted to Euros using the exchange rate on 1st February
1999.
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income. It consists mostly of income from private sources (apart from
sponsorship). Clearly the common factor in this category is 'the market' as the
value system, as all the income is derived from market-based activities. The
amounts (in percentages of total income) are fairly similar in all the
organisations, the figures being: Deutsche Oper Berlin 10.5%2 , the English
National Opera 14%, the Finnish National Opera 3%, the Glyndebourne
Festival Opera 15% and Opera national de Paris 10%. Based on the case
studies it seems reasonable to claim that the figure of 10 — 15% of self-
generated income from market-based activities seems to be achievable for a
European opera house in the current economic climate. Naturally, there are
different factors influencing this figure in individual cases so that no
conclusive claim can be made on the basis of the limited set of case studies
analysed.
Box-office income forms the second income source category for all the case-
study organisations apart from the Glyndebourne Festival Opera, for which it
is the main source of income. The figures (in percentages of the total income)
for the case-study organisations are: Deutsche Oper Berlin 9.5%, the English
National Opera 26%, the Finnish National Opera 20%, the Glyndeboume
Festival Opera 70% and Opera national de Paris 25%. The box office income
mostly comes into the category of multiple private sources. There is inevitably
a segment of this income that comes from multiple institutional sources,
consisting of tickets purchased by corporations for entertaining clients,
rewarding employees etc. However, as no figures dividing the sales in this
way are available, it is assumed that as individuals attend the performances
the source of income can be classified as private even though the ticket is
occasionally paid for by a corporation. The value system attached to the box
1 Sponsorship and donations are not separated in the figures of all the case-study
organisations. Therefore, for the sake of comparability they have been included in the figures
of 'other self-generated income' also in the organisations which do give the information
separately.
2 The DOB figure is inflated by exceptionally high touring income. The average figure for self
generated income at the Deutsche Oper Berlin is considerably lower.
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office income can be analysed in two ways. On one hand the process of
selling the tickets is clearly a market-based activity; on the other the reason
for an individual to attend opera is clearly based on the civil-society value
system and the meaning the performance has on his/her lifeworld level. Thus,
it is argued here that the civil-society value system is the basis for the box
office income, which in turn can be influenced by market-related processes of
pricing and marketing. This interpretation makes sense, when considering the
high box office figure for the Glyndebourne Festival Opera, for example. If the
value source of the box-office income would be market-related, the GFO
would inevitably be classified as a market-oriented organisation. However, it is
obvious from the whole atmosphere and the list of benefactors of the
Glyndebourne Festival Opera that this is not the case. Rather, the festival is a
social occasion in which the civil-society values of a certain segment of British
society are strongly manifested.
The biggest source of income for all the case-study organisations — apart
from the Glyndebourne Festival Opera — are the subsidies. The figures (in
percentages of the total income) for the case-study organisations are:
Deutsche Oper Berlin 80%, the English National Opera 60%, the Finnish
National Opera 77%, the Glyndebourne Festival Opera 15% and Opèra
national de Paris 65%. The categorisation of the subsidies is mainly single
institutional source. However, in the case of the English National Opera and
the Finnish National Opera there are also subsidies from local authorities and,
in the case of the ENO also from National Lottery Funds. However, these
form only a minor part of the subsidies and, in the case of the ENO and the
National Lottery, the funds are channelled through the state authorities as
well. The value system connected with the subsidies — apart from the case of
the Glyndebourne Festival Opera — is naturally state-based. As was pointed
out earlier, most of the organisations have moved closer to the state from the
civil-society framework (in which they were established) during or after the
Second World War. Thus, the states have accepted responsibility for
maintaining organisations that were deemed valuable by the civil-society.
However, this acceptance of responsibility seems to be increasingly
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questioned by the authorities, leading to diminishing or frozen subsidy levels.
The Glyndebourne Festival Opera 'subsidy' — i.e. major donations — come
from the Glyndebourne Arts Trust, which operates as a fund-raising body for
the Festival. The value system attached to this support is naturally civil-
society, as the individuals and members of the Glyndebourne Festival Society
donating to the Arts Trust want to support the Festival from their personal
funds.
Based on the above analysis — and generalising from it — it can be claimed
that the main source of income for the case-study organisations (apart from
the Glyndebourne Festival Opera) is a single institutional source (i.e. state
subsidies), that operates on the state-based value system. The second
largest income category is income from multiple private sources (i.e. the box
office), its values being mainly civil-society based with, however, links to the
market-based value system. The third category of income is that of multiple
sources, both private and institutional, with a clearly market-related value
system (i.e. sales, merchandising and sponsorship). The implications of this
divisions on the organisational structures of the case studies analysed is
discussed in the conclusions section. However, it needs to be noted here that
the Glyndebourne Festival Opera differs from this in having a very strong civil-
society value system behind 85% of its income (box office and Festival
Society donations), which is clearly manifested in the operations and the
structures of the organisation.
213
7. Expenditure structures of the case-study organisations
Information on the expenditure structures of the case-study organisations is
summarised in table form below.
DOB Personnel 84.5%, operational 12.5%, materials 3%.
ENO Personnel 59%, other operational costs 38%, depreciation 3%.
Divided by activity (including staff costs): production and performance
55%, technical and transport 18%, support costs 13%, fund-raising
and marketing 8%, other 6%.
FNO Personnel 80%, operational 18.6%, rents1.4%.
GFO The personnel costs are not separated in the accounts. All costs
stated here include personnel. Artistic costs 32%, technical and
production costs 23%, overhead costs 27%, administration and
pensions 18%.
ONP Personnel 57%, artistic production 23%, general operational
expenditure 16%, other 4%.
The division of the expenditure information varies greatly between the
organisations. Thus, the information is not in a form that would avow
comparative study in the strict sense. Even basic comparisons of this division
cannot reliably be made here, apart from noting that the personnel costs form
a high percentage in all the organisations. However, some indication of the
operations of the case-study organisations can be found when comparing the
total expenditure with numbers of performances and employees. These
comparisons are only indicative as the corpus of case-studies is too small for
any conclusive remarks. However, the aim of the research was not to provide
comparative information on the case studies but to perceive possible patterns
and similarities emerging from the information. The comparisons below seem
to suggest that there is a strong link between the art form and the resources
needed for its production. This pattern is manifested in both of these
comparisons.
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The total expenditure of the case-study organisations per performance is
calculated below. The similarity of this figure in the English National Opera,
the Finnish National Opera and the Glyndebourne Festival Opera is striking.
As the artistic output of the organisations is relatively comparable e.g. in
terms of artistic quality and number of different productions, it seems
reasonable to assume that the art form fairly strongly influences the economic
input needed for a similar output. Naturally, the number of case studies is not
high enough for any far-reaching conclusions. However, the difference in the
figure in the cases of the Deutsche Oper Berlin and the Opera national de
Paris are likely to be caused by the higher number of different productions in
the repertory of these two organisations (i.e. 38 and 34 respectively)
compared with the other three (i.e. 22, 20 and 6 1 ). Additionally, the Opera
national de Paris operates in two different venues which probably influences
the cost per performance.
DOB Total expenditure € 51 142 000 /
205 performances
ENO Total expenditure € 38 530 000 /
193 performances
FNO Total expenditure € 34 365 000 /
199 performances
GFO Total expenditure € 15 130 000 /
76 performances
ONP Total expenditure € 133 378 000 /
366 performances
€
249 000 / performance
€
199 000 / performance
€
172 000 / performance
€
199 000 / performance
€ 364 000 / performance
Below the total expenditure of the case-study organisations is divided by
number of employees, including the visiting artists. Again, the similarity in the
numbers is fairly clear. The organisations differing most in this calculation are
the Glyndebourne Festival Opera and the Opera national de Paris.
1 The difference in the number of productions is accounted for the festival nature of the
operations of the Glyndebourne Festival Opera.
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Glyndebourne has many part-time staff members, this difference explaining
the figure. In the case of the 00ra national de Paris the difference is more
difficult to explain, since the staffing level of the organisation is the highest
among the case-study organisations. Thus, it seems that either the
organisation is not operated on as economical a basis as some of the other
case-study organisations or the artistically more 'international' standard
influences the expenditure structure of the organisation quite strongly.
DOB Total expenditure € 51 142 000 /
975 employees
ENO Total expenditure € 38 530 000 /
662 employees
FNO Total expenditure € 34 365 000 /
755 employees
GFO Total expenditure € 15 130 000 /
603 employees (many part-time)
ONP Total expenditure € 133 378 000 /
1688 employees
€
52 000 / employee
€
58 000 / employee
€ 46 000 / employee
€
25 000 / employee
€
79 000 / employee
8. Number of employees and the personnel structures of the case-study
organisations
Information on the total numbers of employees and the personnel structures
of the case-study organisations is summarised in table form below. The first
table contains the total number of employees and the second the personnel
structures.
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Total numbers of personnel of the case-study organisations:
DOB 867 employees + 108 visiting artists = total 975
ENO 570 + 92 visiting artists = total 662
FNO 583 + 172 visiting artists = total 755
GFO 603 including part-time personnel and visiting artists = total 603
ONP 1388 + app. 300 visiting artists = total app. 1688
Division of the employed personnel of the case-study organisations:
DOB Artistic personnel 417 (ensemble 45, ballet 53, chorus 100, orchestra
141, other artistic personnel 55), technical staff 332, administration 52,
maintenance 66.
ENO Artistic personnel 238 (ensemble 20, chorus 68, orchestra 79, other
artistic personnel 71), technical staff 191, administration 57, front-of-
house and maintenance staff 84.
FNO Artistic personnel 355 (ensemble 29, ballet 80, chorus 60, orchestra
115, other artistic personnel 53, ballet school 18), technical staff 184,
administration 44.
GFO Artistic personnel 369 (principal singers 53, dancers 4, chorus 66,
orchestras 118 + 36 - total 154, music staff 25, extras 25, other
artistic personnel 42), administration (incl. maintenance) 118,
technical and production personnel 116.
ONP Artistic personnel 537 (ballet 152, chorus 95, orchestra 150, other
artistic staff 88, ballet school 42), technical staff 537, administration
195, maintenance 119.
The information about the personnel structures is in a form which does not
allow conclusive comparisons to be made. This is due to different
categorisations of personnel structures etc. However, it is deemed useful that
the information is available for informal comparisons even though any firm
conclusions cannot be reliably made here. Nevertheless, it can be pointed out
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that the organisations that have in earlier comparisons displayed great
similarity, i.e. the English National Opera and the Finnish National Opera,
seem also to have fairly similar personnel structures when the effect of the
ballet company is removed from the FNO figures. This might suggest that the
artistic policy, the number of performances and the number of productions (all
relatively similar between the ENO and the FNO) define the functions of the
organisation to a great extent. However, the corpus of the case studies is too
small and does not fulfil the criteria for comparative analysis for this to be
conclusively claimed here.
The aspect most worth noting in the personnel structure figures of the case-
study organisations is that the artistic personnel is the biggest personnel
category in all the case-study organisations. This, in itself, is not surprising. It
was rather to be expected, as the artistic side of the analytical model of
variables influencing the structures of opera organisations displayed a great
number of different artistic roles. However, this fact makes even more
surprising the finding presented earlier, that the artists — apart from the chorus
and the orchestra — often seem to be missing form the organisational charts
describing the case-study organisations. This phenomenon will be further
commented on in the conclusion.
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9. Opera Houses of the case-study organisations
Information on the opera houses used by the case-study organisations is
summarised in table form below.
DOB The New Charlottenburg Opera House was inaugurated in 1961.
Capacity of 1900 seats, all facing the stage (i.e. democratic layout).
The cross-shaped main stage is 18 x 18 m, with similar size wing
(right wing stage slightly narrower) and rear stages. The lighting and
sound technology were refitted in 1989, thus being state-of-the-art.
ENO London Coliseum, built in 1904 as a variety hall. Auditorium capacity
2350. Stage 16 x 16 m, with very limited wing and rear-stage spaces.
Technically fairly outdated, the limitations in space and stage-
technology hinder effective working. Some of the workshops and
majority of storage space located outside the theatre.
FNO New Opera House, inaugurated in 1993. Main auditorium capacity
1365. Stage cross-shaped, size 16 x 16 metres with good wing and
rear stage spaces. State-of-the-art equipment.
GFO The new opera house was inaugurated in 1994 and has an auditorium
capacity of 1200. The stage is 16 m x 16 m in size and has some wing
and rear stage areas, though not completely cruciform-shaped. The
technical facilities are state-of-the-art.
ONP Two main venues: Palais Gamier and Opera Bastille.
Gamier: Inaugurated in 1875. Auditorium capacity 1990. Stage size 28
x 24.5 m with wing space, but no real rear stage. Technology recently
renovated, however, the historical importance of the building results in
some difficulties in working practices.
Bastille: Inaugurated in 1990. Main auditorium capacity 2700. Stage
highly automated, consisting of six interchangeable modules of 19.5 x
19.5 m. Additionally lots of storage space behind and underneath the
stage. Technically state-of-the-art, now that initial problems have been
solved.
Two of the opera houses used by the case-study organisations date from the
19th century (Palais Gamier 1875) or the early 20th century (London
Coliseum 1904). The other four houses are relatively new, being built well
after the Second World War. The older opera houses are both designed to
conform to the more 'aristocratic' theatre tradition (tiered horse-shoe shape
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with gilded decorations and velvet materials) than the new ones. Descriptions
of the new opera houses by the case-study organisations often emphasise
the fact that the layout is 'democratic', providing good visibility from all the
seats etc. This does not, however, prevent the theatres from having a tiered
structure, which conforms to the older tradition and offers a good solution to
the need to accommodate large audiences in a limited amount of spacel.
Often, the most notable visual difference in the new opera houses compared
with the older ones are the colours and the materials. All the new houses use
wood and light colours in the finishes of the auditorium and often dark
material in the seats. The obvious aim has been to avoid gold and red, due to
their 'aristocratic' connotations that would not suit the new 'democratic' opera
houses. Thus the process of democratisation of the art-form of the bourgeois
public sphere — pointed out earlier — has implications on the design of the new
theatres as well. The auditorium capacities of the case-study organisations
vary from 1200 to 2700 which reflects fairly well the limits of the general
variation of opera auditoria in Europe. It seems that presenting large-scale
opera for less than a thousand spectators would not make sense (especially
economically) and audiences of well over 2500 would be difficult to
accommodate in a way that would ensure visibility of the stage and
acoustically ensure that the performance is adequately heard in the
auditorium.
The stages of the case-study organisations seem to reflect great similarity,
both in size and layout. The most notable exception is the Palais Gamier
which differs both in size and layout due to the fact that it dates from an
earlier historical period. Similar 'individuality' can also be seen in the London
Coliseum, which — as should be born in mind — was not originally designed as
an opera house. The other opera houses conform to the trend of uniformity of
opera houses all having a cruciform stage, the size of the main stage being
between 16 x 16 m and 19.5 x 19.5 m. The size of the stage, understandably,
reflects the general size of the auditorium. Thus, the biggest stage is in Opera
1 This phenomenon was commented on earlier when discussing the physical limitations
influencing the operations of an opera organisation.
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Bastille which also has by far the biggest auditorium capacity. Also, the
Bastille stage layout is 'the next step' from the cruciform stage, providing more
space around the main stage for preparing and storing scenery etc.
Technically, the new opera houses seem to conform to a similar standard, the
technical limitations of the older ones being referred to as problematic. This is
inevitably a reflection of the fact that the main designers and directors move
around internationally and expect to find similar facilities in all the opera
houses. Thus, the opera houses need to conform to these expectations to be
able to attract the most wanted artists. The technical improvements are also
argued to have had an impact on the needed technical staffing levels
required, reducing them due to improved working practices. Naturally, the
need to conform to current technical expectations poses a problem to those
older opera houses wit limited space. It is often deemed difficult or impossible
to expand or renovate the older theatres because of their cultural value or
limitations in building space around them, as is the case with the London
Coliseum. In contrast, the Royal Opera House has just gone through an
extensive building project to ensure that its technical resources will be
adequate in the future. This has been done, however, by respecting the old
auditorium to protect the cultural historical value of the opera house, and has
been made possible by the fact that there was space available around the
original site.
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10. Programming and performance numbers of the case-study
organisations
The information on programming and performance numbers at the case-study
organisations is summarised in table form below.
DOB Total number of performances 195; 145 opera performances and 50
ballet performances. Additionally 10 opera performances on tour.
Number of different productions 36, of which six new (four operas, two
ballets). Programming principle — semi-stagione / repertory. Repertory
fairly traditional, Wagner emphasised.
ENO Total number of performances 193. 22 different productions, of which
9 new productions. The English National Ballet visited the theatre with
78 ballet performances. Programming principle — semi-stagione /
repertory. Repertory relatively traditional, Handel and new English
works included.
FNO Total number of performances 199; 125 opera performances, 74
ballet performances. 20 different productions, of which 7 new
productions (4 operas, 3 ballets). Programming principle — semi-
stagione / repertory. Repertory fairly traditional apart from new Finnish
works.
GFO Total number of performances 76, all opera. Six different productions
of which three new. Programming principle — semi-stagione.
Programming relatively conservative, some less well known works
included.
ONP Total number of performances 366; 182 opera and 184 ballet. 195
performances in Bastille and 171 in Gamier. 34 different productions,
of which 10 new (7 operas, 3 ballets). Programming principle — semi-
stag ione — repertory. Repertory conservative.
The total numbers of performances per annum are relatively similar in all the
opera houses operating on a full-time basis', the total number of
performances being just under 200 per annum. It seems reasonable to
assume that this figure represents fairly well the highest possible number that
can be achieved in one auditorium in reality, taking into account changing
1 In this, Opëra Bastille and Palais Gamier are regarded as separate entities.
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productions and staff vacations. The number of new productions per annum
varies from Glyndebourne's three to the Opera National de Paris's ten. The
average for the full-time companies is eight new productions a year. Again, as
the figures suggest a high degree of similarity, it seems reasonable to assume
that this rate of renewal is deemed optimal in the framework of financial and
practical constraints of a full-time opera company. The number of different
productions in the programme of the case-study organisations per annum
varies from Glyndebourne's six to Deutsche Oper Berlin's 38. The figure is
higher for the 'bigger' companies, i.e. Opera national de Paris and Deutsche
Oper Berlin (34 and 38, respectively), compared with the 'smaller' full-time
companies English and Finnish National Operas (22 and 20, respectively).
The number of different performances in the repertory of the company might
thus be one explanatory factor in the differences in the resources needed for
a similar output in performance numbers.
The programming principle of all the case-study organisations is semi-
stagione / repertory, i.e. combining aspects of both systems. Most case-study
organisations have a core repertory upon which they can draw. The
performances are then organised in semi-stagione manner, alternating a few
productions during a short period of time. This is presumably the most
effective way of making use of the international visiting artists, but on the
other hand maintaining the economies of a core repertory. There are slight
variations in the way in which the case-study organisations conduct their
programming, some leaning more towards the repertory principle, e.g.
Deutsche Oper Berlin, some more towards the serni-skagione plim0e.
The programming of all the case-study organisations is fairly conservative,
concentrating mostly on the 19th century repertory. This, naturally, is the
current (20th century) trend throughout the operatic world. The difference in
the repertory is mainly reflected in national characteristics — e.g. Deutsche
Oper Berlin presenting more Wagner than the other case-study organisations,
or contemporary national composers gaining world-premieres in their national
opera houses. Thus, it seems quite possible to claim that the quality context
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in which the case-study organisations operate is political-economic based on
the categorisation of Nielsen. (Nielsen 1999.) The organisations need to
choose the programme so that the auditorium is kept constantly full and the
political authorities thus satisfied. Naturally, the effect of the director and the
designers in the artistic quality of the repertory has not been taken into
account in this consideration, it being within the sphere of the quality in art
institution context. This can have quite an effect on the functioning of the
organisation, as can be seen in the case of the Deutsche Oper Berlin. This is
further commented on in the context of the sold capacities of the case-study
organisations.
11. Ticket prices and the sold capacities of the case-study organisations
Information on the ticket prices and the sold capacities of the case-study
organisations is summarised in table form below.
DOB Ticket prices € 9-72  . Sold capacities 70% for opera, 41% for ballet.
ENO Ticket prices € 7 — 79. Sold capacities 75% (for the opera
performances by the company).
FNO Ticket prices € 8— 67. Sold capacities 91% for opera, 86% for ballet.
GFO Ticket prices € 14 — 170. Sold capacities not publicly available,
amounting to, however, over 90%.
ONP Ticket prices € 5 — 99. Sold capacities: Bastille: 96% for opera, 82%
for ballet. Gamier: 99% for opera, 97% for ballet.
The range of ticket prices of the case-study organisations is surprisingly
similar in Euros. The Glyndebourne Festival Opera differs greatly due to its
festival type of operations and due to the fact that it does not receive any
public subsidies. The other organisation differing from an otherwise uniform
pricing structure is the OpOra national de Paris which has both the lowest low
end and the highest high end of the prices. This is partly explained by the
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more detailed pricing categorisation used in Paris, which allows both the low
and the high end of the pricing structure to be extended to their limits.
The sold capacities of all the case-study organisations are high — around or
above 90% — apart from the English National Opera and the Deutsche Oper
Berlin. In the case of the ENO this is probably explained more by the
characteristics of the London Coliseum than by not paying attention to the
box-office figures. The London Coliseum auditorium has a relatively high
number of seats that do not provide ideal conditions for opera spectators.
Also, the auditorium size is quite large, possibly slightly too large for the scale
of operations of the English National Opera. Thus, even 75 of the total
auditorium capacity is equivalent to 1762 tickets being sold on average per
performance. The case of the Deutsche Oper Berlin is slightly different. The
sold capacities for opera and ballet are 70% and 41%, respectively. This
seems to be more a policy decision by the Generalintendant GOtz Friedrich
than an inability to attract spectators if desired. Friedrich has obviously
emphasised the art institution as the organisation's quality context rather than
the political and economic quality context. Thus, he has aimed to provide
interesting productions that have high artistic quality rather than making
decisions on programming decisions and selection of the key artists on the
basis of audience figures. This assumption was confirmed by both the
Senatsverwaltung fiir Kultur Senior Advisor, Guido Herrmann, and Financial
Manager, Heinz-Dieter Sense, in the interviews. However, based on the fact
that Generalintendant Friedrich is to resign in the near future, the political and
economic quality context is likely to gain more ground in the Deutsche Oper
Berlin in the future.
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12. The artistic-financial decision-making structures of the case-study
organisations
The analytical framework with which the variables influencing the opera
organisation structures were analysed included a great number of artists
involved in the artistic process. The initial overly ambitious aim of the research
project was to analyse and map the forces inherent in the process of
transforming the artistic vision into reality in the organisational framework of
an opera organisation. This, however, proved to be impossible within the
time-scale and resources available for the project. Nevertheless, some insight
into the structures perceived through the analysis of the material about the
case-study organisations was gained through interviews with the top
management of the case-study organisations. The persons interviewed were,
however, mainly directors and board members 0 the organisations and, apart
from the artistic general directors, were not artists. Thus the information
gathered mostly covers the area of the relationship of the /official'
organisational framework to the artistic production process, and not so much
the actual artistic process. This woutd be a Tretd lor another research pro\ect
to explore in the future.
The organisational approach of the case-study organisations to the artistic-
financial dichotomy is defined by reference to the systemic tools in these
relationships in the first place. The starting point for the artistic-financial
planning process seems in most cases to be an artistic one; a vision of the
artistic future of the organisation is created. Subsequently, this vision is
gradually worked towards an executable plan that takes into account the
financial and organisational limitations of the organisation concerned — i.e.
brings the artistic vision to the systemic level. Thus, a detailed plan stating the
programming, the key artistic personnel and the resources available is drawn
up. Control of this plan — often incorporated in the funding agreements of the
organisation and in the contracts of the artistic personnel — takes place on two
levels in most of the case-study organisations. The first and most obvious one
is the systemic level; i.e. enforceability of the contracts and agreements.
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However, most of the general directors interviewed emphasised that this is
not always effective in relation to the artistic realm the organisation needs to
deal with. Thus, the personal negotiation skills of the general director and
his/her ability to balance the artistic and the organisational goals of the
organisation become the most important tools in balancing artistic-economic
decision-making. Thus, the success of an opera organisation seems to be
connected to the general director's ability to engage in a process of
communicative interaction with the artistic side (the artists involved) of opera
production. This issue is further commented on in the next chapter presenting
the conclusions of the research project.
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11. CONCLUSION
1. Introduction
Based on the organisational information and the organisational charts for the
case study organisations presented above, several observations and
conclusions can be made. These are mainly divided into two different areas:
the artistic-economic dichotomy in the organisational structures of opera
organisations at the organisational level, and the general framework of opera
organisations incorporating the value systems and the quality assumptions
defined above. The dual organisational structure is first discussed in this
chapter and then a holistic model describing the organisational framework of
opera organisations proposed. This analytical model brings together the
model created for the analysis of the case-study organisations and the case-
study findings. Additionally, some practical implications of this model and the
forces included in it will be pointed out. Also, some issues linked to the
research project will be commented on. These include certain limitations in
the approach used and some new research questions arising form the
material of the research.
2. The dual organisational structure; artistic and organisational
One of the main findings of the research project is that there is a dual
organisational structure in many opera companies: artistic and organisational.
This finding is validated by extensive analyses of five major European opera
houses and interviews with key persons involved in their management. This
finding is discussed and argued for below. It presents the main manifestation
of the artistic-economic dichotomy in the organisational structures of the
opera companies analysed.
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In the structures of the organisations analysed, the first thing that seems
surprising is the absence, or relative unimportance, of the key artistic players
in the artistic process .' and the small role of the numerically largest personnel
group, the artists. It seems unreasonable to assume that the star conductors,
stage directors and singers are happy to accept the place they have been
allocated at the lowest level of the organisation charts - needing in effect to go
through the whole 'chain of command' before reaching the general director.
Rather, they should be included in the top layers of the organisations. Based
on this observation — and the undeniable power and influence these key
players have on the functioning of opera organisations (demonstrated for
example by the fees the organisations are willing to pay for their services) — it
seems more likely that a dual organisational structure exists in the
organisations concerned. In the organisations analysed there is an official
organisational structure — dealing with the organisational and socio-economic
side of the organisation — and an unofficial artistic one — dealing with the
artistic side of the opera production process. This is well in line with the
argument made earlier that opera as an art-form is a civil society / lifeworld
phenomenon and thus operates in the realm of communicative interaction.
Thus, the official organisational structure — operating on the system level — is
ultimately incapable of dealing with the art form and thus needs to rely on the
person of the general director in doing this.
Based on the above it seems reasonable to claim that the role of the
organisation with its official organisational structure is to cater for the artistic
production process managed more or less directly by the general director (as
the artistic director of the organisation) through communicative interaction
somewhat 'outside' the organisational domain. The organisation serves this
process — under the temporary artistic authority granted by the General
Director to the key artists in the production team — with its planning and
production department, music department, ballet, technical department and
1 These were highlighted in the artistic side of the analytical model.
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administrative department. 1 The role of the Managing Director is then to
ensure that the organisation complies with the financial and organisational
expectations of surrounding society — i.e. the system level. This is reflected in
the organisational structures which outline the resources needed for opera
production (in the division of the above mentioned departments), but do not
acknowledge the organisational powers of the key artistic personnel in the
artistic production process. This leads inevitably to conflicts and confusions of
authority (organisational versus artistic) in the organisations, as anyone
familiar with the everyday work of an opera organisations knows well.
This dual organisational structure, and the friction it often causes, is the key
manifestation of the artistic-economic dichotomy in opera organisations. It
represents the solution to the need to combine the artistic success criteria
and the organisational-economic success criteria in producing opera. In
effect, thus, both sides of the artistic-economic dichotomy are managed as
individual co-existing entities. This is done, and the relationship is balanced
mainly by the general director, as will be described in the model presented
below in section 4 of this chapter.
3. The socio-economic framework
One of the preliminary assumptions of the research project was that the
socio-economic framework in which a specific opera organisation exists
influences its organisational structure considerably. As can be seen from the
organisational charts, this is the case at the 'Board of Directors' level of the
organisations, but does not seem to filter any deeper into the actual
organisational structures - apart from the value and quality assumptions
discussed separately below. This places the general director of an opera
I This is the basic organisational division detected in all the case-study organisations.
Naturally, in bigger organisations these functions may have been divided between several
departments, as is the case in the Opera national de Paris, for example.
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organisation in a difficult balancing act between three types of forces: the
artistic forces not directly dealt with by his organisation, the socio-economic
forces influencing his organisation in the form of the Board of Directors (or
equivalent) and the audience (Box Office), and the organisational forces (as
the manager of an organisation - even though in this the managing director
can provide support).
This claim can be supported by brief examples. In the interviews included in
the case-study analyses, the directors were asked about the systems by
which the artistic production process can be, and is, controlled. In the
answers the importance of contracts was stressed, acknowledging that the
bargaining power of the key artists extended beyond the legal organisational
realm and that in the event of a dispute (artistic or artistic-financial) the
general director plays a key role in solving the tensions and negotiating a
solution to the problematic situation. Similarly, in the interviews the
representatives of the boards and the funding bodies stressed the (relative)
artistic autonomy of the general directors admitting, however, that the choice
of the director is a key policy decision in the artistic sense. This provides the
Board with an opportunity to influence the organisation and its future policy by
this selection.
4. The model combining the analytical model and the case-study
findings
Based on the argumentation above the organisational forces involved in
managing an opera organisation can be described as a tripartite model, the
central role being taken by the general director. The creation of this model is
among the key results of the research project. The model includes the artistic
process taking place somewhat outside the organisational domain, the official
organisational structure serving the artistic process and dealing with the
systemic expectations of society, and the socio-economic framework in which
the organisation needs to operate including the different value and quality
Artistic process:
Production team: Director,
Conductor, Designer(s),
Singers
Quality context: 'Arts
institution'
411----.--n1110 Society providing resources
for the organisation
Value set of support: State /
Market / Civil Society
Quality contexts: Political and
economical context (State &
Market), Lifeworld as context
(Civil Society)
	.. General Director
Opera organisation:
Planning and production
department, Music department,
Ballet, Technical department,
Financial and organisational
issues
Managing
Director
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assumptions. This model is presented below in figure 21. It is argued here
that the forces — often contradictory — surrounding an opera organisation can
be mapped and analysed with its help.
Figure 21.
5. Practical applications of the model created
As a demonstration of the practical usefulness of the model, let us conslder
some examples of the most frequently occurring problems and arguments
concerning opera organisations (e.g. financial carelessness and
mismanagement) and the problems in the relationship between the general
director and the managing director (and the whole discussion on whether the
organisations should be managed by an artist or by a professional manager).
The key to understanding these problems seems to be the value assumptions
attached to the resources allocated to the organisation, and the different
contexts of quality discussion in which the different instances operate. The
general director is in the position where s/he needs to evaluate the
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importance of these value sets and contexts of quality discussion to his/her
organisation. His/her success in this balancing act — determining the
organisation's artistic policy and managerial practices — determines the
success of the whole organisation.
The relationship between the organisation and the artistic production team
(assumed to be aiming for artistically high quality production — arts institution
as quality context) has earlier been shown to be mediated by the general
director - apart from the direct influence and authority given to the artistic
team over the organisation in order to realise the production. Should the
general director choose to accept the 'arts institution' as the organisation's
sole context of quality discourse, the organisation would completely facilitate
the artists in their quest. However, as the organisation experiences influences
from the economic side of the equation as well - state and market oriented
expectations of accountability and efficiency (with quality discussed in the
political and economic context), and civil society oriented expectations by the
society (with lifeworld as quality context) a balance needs to be found.
Accusations of financial carelessness and mismanagement intrude when the
general director has balanced the equation in favour of the artistic production
team, causing the issues of accountability and efficiency to be placed in a
secondary position. In effect, the question is about prioritising the artistic
output of the organisation rather than the market oriented expectations of
financial accountability.
Naturally, the inability of the general director to successfully balance the
expectations of the 'arts institution' and the society providing the resources for
his organisation can also be manifested as problems between the general
director and the managing director, whose primary function is to assure the
efficacy of the organisation in organisational and financial terms. These
problems, occurring frequently, have led to different solutions in different
value frameworks. For example, in the Deutsche Oper Berlin there seems to
be a trend to move from the situation of one 'Genera/intendant' towards two
equal Directors (Artistic Director - Managing Director) structure (Herrmann
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1998.) in the future. On the other hand, Richard Eyre recommends an
arrangement at the Royal Opera House with a single Artistic Director
(Intendant) at the top of the organisation assisted by general manager rather
than the general director having a managerial background, as has been the
case recently. (Eyre 1998, 106.) However, it seems that both systems can
produce good as well as catastrophic results. The answer to this dilemma is
the top management's ability to correctly read the value and quality
expectations of the forces influencing their organisations and balance them
successfully, not the number, job definitions or backgrounds of the top
directors. Naturally, a change in the managerial structure of an opera
organisation in difficulties can provide a scapegoat for the parties responsible.
However, without proper consideration of the value and quality issues in the
future management of the organisation, this hardly provides a lasting solution.
6. Wider implications of the findings of the research project
Apart from its usefulness in the analysis of the framework in which opera
organisations operate, the model created here has some wider implications
as well. These fall mainly into two categories: the potential for generalising the
findings outside the realm of opera organisations and the implications for arts
management education.
The model was based on the analysis of opera organisations and their socio-
economic framework. However, it may be possible to generalise the findings
beyond the art form of opera as there are only limited references to opera-
specific issues in the model. Naturally, there is no firm basis for this, as the
research project concentrated on opera organisations. However, looking at
the issue from the other direction, one could ask why opera should differ from
other art-forms in the way it is organised and managed in its socio-economic
framework. The artistic-economic dichotomy (defined as the tension between
the artistic and the economic-organisational goals of the arts organisation) is
common to all art forms. Thus, why would the forces influencing art
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organisations in general be any different from the forces influencing opera
organisations. Therefore, analysis of the framework of all arts organisations
based on the values and quality contexts is essential to the functioning of
these organisations in the future.
Furthermore, as the issues of the value assumptions of the society in
question and the issues concerning different quality contexts seem — based
on the model created here — to form the core forces influencing the
functioning of an opera organisation, these issues should, accordingly, form
the core of education for potential opera directors. Should it be possible to
generalise the findings to other art-forms as well, this would be applicable to
all arts management education. Thus, the education of future arts managers
should include the value and quality concepts for the students to be able to
deal with them successfully in their future careers. Naturally, an arts manager
will need the practical tools required to manage the official organisational
structure of his/her organisation in the future, too. However, as the artistic and
socio-economic frameworks are currently going through a process of change,
the ability to analyse and conceptualise the value and quality issues will be of
increasing importance, especlay to the top-?eve? managers ol ait
organisations. The importance of the value and quality issues is also relevant
to the people operating at lower organisational levels in arts organisations. As
was pointed out earlier, there are numerous conflicts and confusions of
authority resulting from the fact that a dual organisational structure exists in
opera organisations. If arts management education is able to conceptua)ise
and model this phenomenon to the people working on the administrative-
organisational side of arts organisations it would inevitably be easier to deal
with this tension. Naturally, the higher position the person has in the
organisation, the more useful — if not essential — these considerations will be.
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7. Limitations of the research and possible new research questions
The initial aim of the research project was to map the forces influencing the
organisational structures of opera companies and also the decision-making
processes, especially in conjunction with the artistic-economic dichotomy.
This was to be done by analysing several case-study organisations. This
approach, however, soon proved that it was impossible to include the artistic
decision-making processes in the research project in a conclusive way. It
could be argued that analysing and mapping these forces could be done
successfully in only one organisation at a time with extensive participative
observation. The omission of artistic decision-making from the research
project has naturally biased the approach more to the organisational side.
However, it is argued that with the initial analysis of the structures of opera
organisations made in this research project, it will be easier to tackle the
subtle issues of artistic decision-making in future research. This research
project has thus provided a useful starting point and defined an interesting
new topic for a possible future research project.
The analysis of the case-study organisations seemed to suggest that there is
a strong correlation between the artistic policy of the organisation and the
resources needed for the realisation of its artistic aims. This was most evident
when comparing the English National Opera and the Finnish National Opera,
with regard to both their artistic policies and their numerical and structural
information. However, as the case-study material was not collected in a way
that would enable comparative study in a strict sense, this correlation can only
be suggested. It would be interesting to conduct a similar research project
with a set of case-studies that would from the outset be selected on the basis
of similar artistic policy and numbers of performances and new productions
annually. Based on the analysis of data selected in this way, i.e. according to
stricter principles of comparative study, the findings suggested here could be
confirmed. Another potential research topic thus arises from the findings of
and limitations contained in this research project.
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The limitation of the case-study organisations to the framework of Western
Europe — due to the withdrawal of the Metropolitan Opera Association — has
provided data that may not represent the global picture of the issues dealt
with. The North American situation especially would provide an interesting
comparison to the data presented here. Also, the former Eastern European
countries might provide a different perspective to the artistic-economic
dichotomy in opera organisations. Thus, similar research with a wider
geographical spread of the case-study organisations would be worthwhile
conducting in the future in order to provide further validation for the findings
presented here.
What is most important, however, is that research into the issues of quality
and values included in the management of arts organisations should receive
attention. Most often arts management research deals with issues on the
economic side of the artistic-economic dichotomy. However, the questions of
quality of the artistic output of the organisations and the values on which the
management of arts organisations is based are crucial ones that must be
contemplated and analysed. The model created in the course of this research
project is an attempt to approach these issues within the discipline of arts
management with tools created elsewhere in academic discussion. However,
further investigations of these matters and of the applicability of the model
created here still need be carried out.
8. Conclusion
In this thesis a research project into opera organisational structures has been
described and the findings and conclusions presented. It has been shown that
a dual organisational structure exists in the opera organisations analysed:
artistic and official organisational structures. This division is further explained
and analysed considering opera as a civil society phenomenon, especially in
the bourgeois public sphere. The value systems and quality expectations of
state, market and civil society are also considered within this framework. The
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main result and culmination of the research project is the model created for
describing and analysing these forces — including the organisational aspects —
that influence opera organisations both from the artistic and the socio-
economic sides. With the help of this model the often contradictory forces and
expectations that make opera management difficult can be considered and
analysed, academically as well as practically. This, it is hoped, will provide
assistance in the actual process of managing an opera organisation in a
successful manner. This seems to be increasingly necessary if the art-form —
greatly loved by the author — is to survive in the future.
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APPENDIX I
INFORMATION REQUESTED FROM THE CASE-STUDY ORGANISATIONS
1) Legal status
Information about the legal status of the organisation, i.e. state legislation
where organisation's status is defined, association's articles, regulations and
legal mission statement etc., whichever are applicable to the organisation
concerned and which define its legal framework.
2) Composition of Board of Directors
List of the members of the Board of Directors and their background (state
representative, politician, benefactor, employees' representative etc.) and the
criteria of appointments (statutory, election, nomination etc.).
3) Organisational structure / chart
Organisational chart describing the top layers of the organisation, especially
the relationship between board of directors, general management and artistic
management. Information about the background of the persons in the top
management included in the chart (artistic background, managerial
background, political background etc.).
4) Income/expenditure information
Information about the income/expenditure structure of the organisation.
Especially information about revenues is essential, i.e. box office
(subscriptions and other), contributions (sponsorship and private), subsidies
(state and municipal) in as detailed form as possible. This information can be
provided in the form of annual report, accounts etc.
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5) Basic employee information
Numerical information about the personnel employed, i.e. size of permanent
ensemble, chorus, orchestra, technical staff, workshop staff, administrative
staff etc. including the total number of employees. Numbers of in-house
artistic staff (soloists, conductors, directors, designers) versus 'per production'
contracted artistic staff, if applicable.
6) Basic venue details
Basic information about the venue(s) used; seating capacities, size(s) of
stage(s) and general technical information.
7) Programming and pricing information
Information about current programming and pricing. If information about
audiences and capacities sold is available, this is most welcome.
